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Abstract 
This research addresses the effect of pedagogical ways-of-knowing in higher 
education design programmes such as Graphic Design, Interior Design, Fashion, 
and Industrial Design. 
One problematic aspect of design studio pedagogy is communication between 
teachers and students about the aesthetic visual meaning of the students’ designed 
objects. This problematic issue involves ambiguous and divergent ways-of-knowing 
the design meaning of these objects. The research focus is on the design teacher 
role in design studio interactions, and regards pedagogical ways-of-knowing as the 
ways in which teachers expect students to know visual design meaning. This 
pedagogical issue is complicated by the fact that there is no agreed-upon corpus of 
domain knowledge in design, so visual meaning depends greatly on the social 
knowledge retained by students and teachers.  
The thesis pursues an explanation of pedagogical ways-of-knowing that is 
approached through the philosophy of critical realism. How it is that particular events 
and experiences come to occur in a particular way is the general focus of critical 
realist philosophy. A critical realist approach to explanation is the use of abductive 
inference, or inference as to how it is that puzzling empirical circumstances emerge. 
An abductive strategy aims to explain how such circumstances emerge by 
considering them in a new light. This is done in this study by applying Luhmann’s 
theory of the emergence of cognition in communication to teacher ways-of-knowing 
in the design studio. Through the substantive use of Luhmann’s theory, an abductive 
conjecture of pedagogical ways-of-knowing is mounted. This conjecture is brought to 
bear on an examination of research data, in order to explain how pedagogical ways-
of-knowing constrain or enable the emergence of shared visual design meaning in 
the design studio.  
The abductive analysis explains three design pedagogical ways-of-knowing: design 
inquiry, design representation and design intent. These operate as macro relational 
mechanisms that either enable or constrain the emergence of shared visual design 
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meaning in the design studio. The mechanism of relation is between design inquiry, 
design representation and design intent as historical knowing structures, and ways-
of-knowing in respect of each of these knowing structures. For example, design 
inquiry as an historical knowing structure has over time moved from ways-of-knowing 
such as rationalistic problem solving to direct social observation and later to 
interpretive cultural analysis. The antecedence of these ways-of-knowing is 
important because communication about visual meaning depends upon prior 
knowledge, and teachers may then reproduce past ways-of-knowing.  
The many ways-of-knowing that respectively relate to design inquiry, design 
representation and design intent are shown to be communicatively formed and 
recursive over time. From a Luhmannian perspective, these ways-of-knowing 
operate as variational distinctions that indicate or relate to the knowing structures of 
design inquiry, design representation and design intent. This is the micro-level 
operation of pedagogical ways-of-knowing as relational mechanisms in design studio 
communication. Design teachers’ own ways-of-knowing may then embrace implicit 
way-of-knowing distinctions that indicate the knowledge structures of design inquiry, 
design representation and design intent. This implicit indication by distinction is the 
relational mechanism that may bring design teachers’ expectation that this and not 
that visual design meaning should apply in communication about any student’s 
designed object. Such an expectation influences communication between teachers 
and students about the potential future meaning of students’ designs. Consequently, 
shared visual design meaning may or may not emerge. 
The research explanation brings the opportunity for design teachers to make explicit 
the often implicit way-of-knowing distinctions they use, and to relate these 
distinctions to the knowing structures thus indicated. The study then offers a new 
perspective on the old design pedagogical problem of design studio conflict over the 
meaning of students’ designs. Options for applying this research explanation in 
design studio interactions between students and teachers are therefore suggested.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This study’s concerns are probably best introduced by an overview of the general 
idea of design. So I begin this thesis with a brief tour of the wider and lesser known 
reaches of design in the social world. Then I move on to the specific context of this 
study, the design studio in higher education, where the teaching of design involves 
students in the actual designing of objects.  
1.1 The Idea of Design 
Writing about the idea of design, Guffey (2009) wryly quotes the view that design has 
entered a golden age – and then says this was a view expressed in the 1950s. To 
use some intentionally disparate points of reference, the idea of design as a media 
phenomenon, as a museum and exhibition draw-card, and as a profession have 
grown exponentially since the 1950s. 
Design is situated in what are called the ‘creative industries’ (Department of Culture, 
Media and Sport, 2001) – a field that has included craft, art and design products and 
their vendors; the performing arts; various creative media such as film, video, DVD, 
television and radio; collectable design such as antiques and memorabilia; and 
design exhibitions. The inclusiveness of the creative industries continues to widen 
now that there are so many forms of electronic dissemination for created artefacts. 
One already huge and fast-growing form of this is the leisure pursuit of interactive 
gaming, which is designed aesthetically and technologically by multimedia-trained 
design graduates. Understandably, this blurring of the boundaries of design-based 
creative industries means that it is difficult to pin down the idea of design. 
Heller’s ‘Design Literacy: Understanding Graphic Design’ (2004, 2nd ed.) is a very 
eclectic collection of essays on the graphic design meanings of historical and 
contemporary ‘objects’. Designed ‘objects’ are artefacts, but artefacts as human-
made objects can be visual images or even the ideas and practices associated with 
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visual images (Smith, 2007; Friedman, 2007; Hagan, 2007). One might well describe 
designed artefacts as knowledge artefacts. Heller’s ‘Design Literacy’ collection 
(2004) examines such knowledge artefacts as the graphic rendition of identity in 
‘Dylan’ (Glaser, 2004); of style in ‘Japanese Movie Tickets’ (Anonymous, 2004); and 
of persuasion in ‘End Bad Breath’ (Chwast, 2004). Buchanan (1996) has famously 
called this kind of design meaning ‘design rhetoric’, as an area of formal design 
scholarship. Informally, television and magazine journalism pursues design rhetoric 
or design argument (Buchanan, ibid) about interior decor, cars, garden design, and 
fashion, as a minimal listing. 
In the wake of this rhetorical focus on design, Krippendorff (2006, p. 47) has said, 
“Humans do not see and act on the physical qualities of things, but on what they 
mean to them”. Since the 1980s, the meaning of designed products has been 
theorised in a disciplinary field called ‘product semantics’. Krippendorff’s book ‘The 
Semantic Turn’ (2006) established this semantic inquiry into design meaning. In 
Krippendorff’s view, designed object forms are endowed with symbolic qualities 
through social practices, over time. Well-known examples are the Mini motor car and 
the miniskirt of the 1960s, which were strongly associated with the rise of youth 
culture (Tambini, 1996). 
The semantic turn of social meaning in design expression seems, however, to have 
been overtaken by the ‘social responsibility’ turn. Socially responsible design has 
wide concerns relating to environmental issues and the redress of a compromised 
quality of life. A fine example of the latter is Tracy Gromeks’ FiiWA (Freedom in 
Interactive Wearable Art) sports equipment for the visually impaired. Sensors 
implanted in Gromek’s sportswear and sports equipment enable groups of visually 
impaired people to play sports together (Marshall, 2009). 
Designers have increasingly been tasked with addressing social issues, whether 
through the design of physical objects or through the design of systems or services. 
Sustainable design is another form of socially responsible design that reduces the 
attrition of natural resources through human needs. Burns, Cottam, Vanstone, and 
Winhall (2006) promote ‘transformation design’ which addresses problems such as 
the design of environments for learning, health care and transport. These are issues 
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of social responsibility that often require design services providing an efficiently 
functioning system, as well as an aesthetically positive human experience. Burns et 
al. (2006) say that since the post-war movement of design toward a customer or 
market-led approach, the participation of those who use and receive designed 
services or amenities has become part of the design process. Lupton (2004) has 
also made the point that from the 1990s onward, the ‘user’ is a central idea in 
design. The ‘user’ was first referred to as one who used a computer in the field of 
human computer interaction (HCI) design – the person or group who might 
experience the use of a designed object as meaningful in cognitive, emotional and 
physical ways. The more acceptable and more accurate term for ‘user’ is ‘human’, 
and Hanington, (2006, p. 1) advocates a human interactional or interface approach 
to other design domains, such as graphic design. Of this, though, Lupton (2004) 
says that while a designed artefact might meaningfully address a human user, the 
designed artefact also talks back through human use of it.  
Socially responsible design that puts ethical values first is the current rallying cry. But 
objects with culturally expressive associative appeal are still in very high demand, 
and these associations need not hark to grubby capitalist excess. For Palmer, (1996, 
citing Haug, p. 11): 
People convert their sensual self-expression into the commodity form of 
buying things which become expressions of themselves, which changes 
the possibilities of expressing the human instinctual structure … features 
of design – function, preference and aesthetic judgement – complicate the 
issue of aesthetic judgement of design, because aesthetic judgement has 
traditionally been analysed in terms of a very different conception of 
objects, one that does not necessarily include consumption. This means 
that in design we have to take into account the relationship between 
human beings and objects. 
Fairs (2004, unpaged) says that when people say that they are interested in design 
or remark on the beauty of a design they are usually referring to ‘stuff’ – the artefact 
outcomes of design. But for Fairs, one of the things that makes design unique is that 
it is the process of design that design more precisely refers to, because of the 
practical origins of design in craft as a trade vocation. Fairs’ perceptive comment is 
that art, literature and music mean the results of the creative process, whereas 
design properly refers to designing. The significance of this is that people want 
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things that have been designed, often by ‘star’ designers, who adopt a particular 
representational position, such as that of deconstructivism, or postmodernist retro 
references, or modernist purity of form. Such designers attract a cognoscenti 
following, where the famed designer’s approach rubs off in proclaiming a person’s 
discerning social identity. 
The idea of design thus has multiple trajectories. 
The meaning of designed objects is visual meaning that is non-verbally 
communicated. Sharing in this meaning is common in everyday life, where we use a 
great many visual cues as information, and a great many visual forms have cultural 
and social meaning. In social life, design meanings are not only known, but are 
actively incorporated in activities and practices. Every item of personal use is 
designed with meaning value in mind. We furnish our everyday lives with French 
garden furniture, retro-modern toasters and kettles, fashion garments that portray the 
wearer as wanton, ascetic or alien; we drive motor cars that bespeak glamour, youth 
or power. In our designed environment, themed visual narratives bring an 
imaginative dimension to everyday life, in the form, for instance, of a series of 
oriental pavilions that house a shopping mall. 
In one view, the ‘narrativising’ of our environment and ourselves with designed 
meaning can be regarded as frivolous and superficial, causing rampant spending 
and waste of resources. From the early 20th century, the meaning associations that 
have come with ‘lifestyle’ products have been a social preoccupation. The resulting 
tidal wave of ‘lifestyle’ consumerism has been under sustained critique since the 
1980s, because of the social and natural environment damage it has caused 
(Thomas & Southwell, 2003). 
But from an opposing viewpoint, designed artefacts provide ways of negotiating 
cultural transitions (Attfield, 2000; Ebbesen & Vihma, 2006; Atzmon, 2007). The 
Bauhaus movement in design is probably the best example of this. The Bauhaus 
was an intensely ideological movement in design during the 1920s and 1930s that 
championed a progressive industrial aesthetic of clean lines and purity of form (Kim, 
2006). 
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Designed artefacts that challenge or advance social and cultural norms (Buchanan, 
1996) are not simply about consumerism. The general public’s involvement in design 
need not involve actually living in a home, or actually wearing a necklace. Neither 
does it necessarily involve the purchase thereof, in the popular understanding of the 
word ‘consumer’, which is generally thought to involve the purchase of an artefact. In 
the lingo of material cultural studies, consumption designates the consumption of 
meaning through social involvement with material things (Miller, 1987). We 
‘consume’ design meaning simply by living in a designed world. 
Professional designers, whether they be stars or not, address design meaning as 
human involvement with material things. The process of design in a professional 
context has been the object of Schön’s groundbreaking insights into the design 
process. In Schön’s (1983, p. 165) research into professional design practice, 
professional design practitioners 
frame the problem of the situation, they determine the features to which 
they will attend, the order they will attempt to impose on the situation, the 
directions in which they will try to change it. In this process, they identify 
both the ends to be sought and the means to be employed [My emphasis]. 
Schön’s reference to both ends and means in design exemplifies design endeavour. 
Designers not only solve problems or meet needs; they identify what constitutes a 
problem or issue. Then they execute design as the artefactual expression of a 
solution, a response, or a proposition. This is fully the sense in which the practice of 
design is quintessentially intentional (Prentice, 1996; McCullagh, 2000; Tregay, 
2000; Russell, 2008). But in the design professions this is just the beginning, 
because the designer is often not the maker. The professional designer, briefed by a 
commissioning client, provides a blueprint or model for manufacture of the design in 
multiple product runs. 
Marshall (2009, unpaged) observes that design is a human capacity that is defined 
by, but not limited to, professional design. Marshall’s comment brings up the 
uncomfortable fact that design education and design pedagogy neither necessarily 
provide for professional design competence, nor bring the ability to convey 
significant meaning to design. There are, as Marshall says, completely untrained but 
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much celebrated professional designers. In the next section I explore what this and 
other anomalies might mean for design education and design pedagogy. 
1.2 Design Education and Design Pedagogy 
Design education has made a transition from vocational training to higher education 
in tandem with the rise of the knowledge economy (Friedman, 2003). The historical 
development of design through vocational training came from the days of the craft 
guilds, when apprentices learned from master craftspersons (Friedman, ibid). Cross 
(2007) regrets the continuing vocational or ‘trade’ association that design education 
carries, especially since design teachers are often designers themselves – and 
designers first, teachers second. If the teaching is done by practising designers, this 
does not necessarily represent an advantage for the students, because there is no 
agreed content knowledge or formal subject knowledge domain in the design 
professions or in design education. By contrast with the lack of a content domain in 
design, without a good content knowledge of anatomy, one cannot hope to progress 
in the study of medicine. As Press (1994, cited by McCullagh 2000, p. 44) has bluntly 
put this, “There are few subject areas where less is known about itself than design”. 
Knowledge about design can then derive from the individual person of the teacher, 
and from that person’s perspective (Dutton, 1991; Prentice, 1995; Salmon, 1995; 
Oxman, 2003; Blair, Blythman & Orr, 2007; Shreeve, 2011; Ng, 2011). 
Instead of domain content knowledge, different kinds of expertise are pursued in 
particular design programmes. McCullagh (2000, p. 49) has provided an illustrative 
scheme of knowledge applications (rather than subject domains) in design 
‘disciplines’:  
Graphic Design – communication, product differentiation, semiotics 
Industrial Design – product language/semantics, human technology interface, 
economics and technologies of mass production, product differentiation 
Craft Design – intimate knowledge of materials, tools, processes 
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Interior Design – manipulation of space, light, materials and finish, building 
technology, ergonomics 
Fashion Design – social aspiration, sexuality, gender, fabric technology. 
Next, McCullagh (2000, p. 49) shows instances of knowledge crossover that are due 
to the digitisation of design, and to the ad hoc nature of problems faced by a 
designer in design fields that have blossomed over the last half-century:  
Interaction Design – industrial design, graphic design, anthropology, computer 
science and cognitive psychology 
Information Design – graphic design and cognitive psychology 
Transport – industrial design, interior design, textile design, mechanical engineering 
design and interaction design 
Sportswear, sports equipment and luggage design – industrial design, fashion 
design, mechanical engineering design and materials science.  
Though there are separations and cross-pollinations among design education 
programmes, there are still long-established traditions of design pedagogy. These 
forms of teaching are ‘signature pedagogies’ of design. Shulman’s signature 
pedagogy model (2005) describes the traditional forms of teaching in particular 
academic and professional disciplines. The three signature pedagogies of design 
education are theory teaching, practical studio teaching and subsequent summative 
‘crits’ (critiques of the finished design product).  
Theory study is usually meant to support practical design understanding in the studio 
and the crit. Theoretical study is generally of critical rather than subject knowledge 
nature, unless a programme curriculum includes the relatively structured field of 
design history. 
This study is concerned with the other two signature pedagogies, practical studio 
teaching and studio critique of students’ finished designs. 
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In the practical design study or ‘studio’ component of design education, students are 
typically given design briefs which they execute in a studio environment. Designing, 
in the context of this signature pedagogy, is something students do in response to 
their teachers’ more or less authentic1 design briefs. These are design briefs with 
requirements that simulate real-world scenarios (Wiggins, 1989) of professional 
design as closely as possible. However closely design educational project briefs 
might resemble real-world professional design commissions though, these briefs can 
be satisfied in multiple ways. Design briefs typically simulate real-world design 
challenges, but do not map out requirements in such a way as to limit possible 
design solutions. This makes knowing the visual meaning of students’ objects a most 
complex and ambiguous issue. 
Subsequent to the practical studio development, students’ designed objects undergo 
a summative critique or ‘crit’ led by a design teacher or teachers, and involving the 
individual students or groups of students.  
Studio and crit events involve a kind of pedagogical engagement with students that 
is unusually intensive and demanding for both the teachers and the students. In the 
first instance, communicating about the visual meaning of new student designs is far 
from easy. There are a variety of assumptions as to how it is that the meaning of 
students’ designs might be known to others in the social world, beyond the design 
studio, and beyond design education. The teachers may need to handle advice and 
critique along the lines of the title of Oak’s (2000) paper, “It’s a Nice Idea, But It’s Not 
Actually Real”. The students may sometimes feel thwarted and diminished by 
teacher comment, but at other times students appreciate their learning about 
nuances of visual design meaning (Blair, Blythman & Orr, 2007).2 There are a 
growing number of studies that deal with these pedagogical issues in the design 
studio, especially regarding the challenges of verbal communication about visual 
                                            
1
 Authentic learning tasks in Wiggins’s (1989) view are meant to simulate real world professional 
challenges. But simulated challenges can only be authentic to a degree. Other views on authentic 
learning prioritise reflection and collaboration between learners. These views follow upon Boud, 
Keogh and Walker‘s (1985) views about reflection on experience as authentic learning.  
.  
2
 Blair, Blythman and Orr’s (2007) research concerns a large inter-institutional study of the design 
studio ‘crit’ or critique.  
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design meaning (for instance, Fleming, 1998; Oak, 2000; Logan, 2007). This 
research is investigated in more detail in Chapter Two. 
In the next section I introduce this study’s concern with student design meaning, and 
in the section that then follows, I show why the knowing of these meanings is a 
central problem for design pedagogy. 
1.3 The Study’s Concern with Knowing Design Meaning 
Some while ago in the 1970s the term ‘affordance’, coined by Gibson (1977), began 
to be applied to designed objects in everyday use. A door knob affordance is the 
opening of a door. Why then are there serried ranks of differently designed 
doorknobs and handles in specialist shops? This is because the value of designed 
objects involves more than utilitarian meaning, and something other than skilled 
crafting.  
In a word, the meaning concerns of this study centre upon design meaning as 
relevant. But what counts as relevant? In ordinary life, design meaning engages 
people (Poynor, 2008), though they cannot necessarily say how or why. Buchanan 
(1996, p. 94) says that: 
[d]esign is an art of thought directed to practical action through the 
persuasiveness of objects, and, therefore, design involves the vivid 
expression of competing ideas about social life. 
Design teachers and students discuss why a student’s designed object should 
engage anyone, and in what way that object might have vivid and persuasive 
relevance in the social world. However a tricky issue arises from this: is it only the 
shared social meaning of designed objects that is important? What about personal 
meaning, the meaning individual students intend when they design, or the meaning 
individuals in society make of designed objects? I would argue that it is not possible 
for any individual (within or outside of design pedagogy) to make entirely personal 
meaning of a designed object. Individual knowledge is socially formed in the case of 
non-verbally communicated object meaning (Bandura, 1986; Barnard, 1998). As I 
explain in more detail in Chapter Two, individual self-expression is celebrated by 
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some design teachers, and lamented by others. In any event though, if individual 
members of the public engage with design meaning through their socially formed 
knowledge, then individual design students do so too. 
Poynor points to one way of construing the individual-versus-social-expression 
difference. Poynor (2008, unpaged) quotes Merholz’s view that design novelty for its 
own sake satisfies only the individual designer. This comes at the cost of a kind of 
engagement in which it is possible for people “[t]o be moved. To grow. Laugh. Cry. 
Discover. Move beyond their basic needs …” (Poynor, 2008, unpaged, quoting Ziba). 
Such a lack of engagement for Poynor (2008) ignores cultural and social expression 
in design. He asks: 
Are the great cathedrals of Europe – Rheims, Lincoln, Chartres – merely 
pretty? Are the gardens of Kyoto? Is Alvar Alto’s Paimio armchair? Was 
Alexey Brodovitch’s Portfolio magazine? How about Leica cameras? The 
patterns on Moorish ceramic tiles? Or the PowerBook and the iPod? 
A related question about design meaning arises from Poynor’s mention of the 
Powerbook and the iPod. These may be regarded as exclusively utilitarian but are 
designed with a concern for stimulating visual appeal. A similar example of the need 
for aesthetic qualities in utilitarian design is given by Buchanan, who comments on 
the aesthetic appeal of a pair of geometry dividers. He says these dividers “do not 
possess beauty, but show a concern for beauty” (1996, p. 102). 
The design meaning concerns of this study are not confined to non-utilitarian 
artefacts that are merely aesthetically engaging. Rather, the study considers all 
material artefacts that, like Buchanan’s dividers, are concerned with both 
functionality and aesthetic appeal. 
The following two examples may illustrate what is signified by ‘engaging relevance’: 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 overleaf show two more or less equally functional toothbrushes. 
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Figure 1.1 1940's toothbrush 
 
Figure 1.2 Philippe Starck toothbrush 
1989 
Source: Tambini (1996, pp. 100–101). 
The toothbrush in Figure 1.1, though it emerged in the 1940s, is still a popular 
design. The toothbrush in Figure 1.2 is the work of the celebrated designer Philippe 
Starck, and it departs significantly from the 1940’s design. The relevance of the 
Philippe Starck toothbrush might lie in its modernist, technological, streamlined, 
futurist or even aero-dynamic qualities. This relevance may not be precisely 
articulated by the general public, even as they are engaged by it, but design 
teachers and design students are required to articulate the reasons why a design 
might be found relevant and engaging. 
As a brief illustrative vignette, Dannels, Gaffney and Martin (2008, p. 1) quote from 
their observation of a design studio and teacher–student interaction: 
What is this black thing? That’s the handle for the crane? Ok well, when I 
look at it like this, it looks like I might stab myself with it or something. 
Designers have to explain things all the time. 
Archer (2005, p. 11) says that design concerns the human experience of material 
and spiritual needs and design education concerns the ability to understand, handle 
and express these through the medium of design. How then do students and 
teachers know and communicate within the very wide scope of these meaning 
matters? 
Design ‘ways-of-knowing’ have become a focus of design education scholarship; the 
most recent example is the third edition of ‘Designerly Ways of Knowing’ by Cross 
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(2007). In 1982 Cross published his seminal article on design ways-of-knowing. In 
this article, Cross (1982, p. 223) refers to a Royal College of Art Report stating that 
design has its own distinct “things to know, ways of knowing them, and ways of 
finding out about them”. 
Though Cross found this formulation vague, he did say that design knowing should 
enable the designer to translate social needs into physical artefacts. Cross’s view 
was that knowledge resides in objects themselves, a knowledge that is available to 
all. This knowledge is of material culture3 and designers are literate in the reading 
and writing of material culture. Citing Douglas and Isherwood, Cross (1982, p. 225) 
has explained that goods are “a nonverbal medium for the human relative faculty”, 
and that designers are particularly skilled in reading the world of goods. 
The meaning of designed objects becomes well known in social life, even if not every 
person can articulate this meaning. But what of students’ newly hatched designs? 
These objects have not yet been framed within social life. However new student 
designs are often aimed at revising the meaning of existing design objects, a 
meaning that has been framed in social life.  
Mostly, design is re-design (Michl, 2002). In design as re-design, part of the design 
meaning comes from the past, and part of the meaning comes from some alteration 
that challenges or transforms past meaning. Streamlined modern design is perhaps 
the epitome of this challenging and transforming impetus. Modernity has brought to 
design a principled forward-looking revision of a decoratively cluttered past; 
postmodernity has since challenged this revision. As Casakin (2008, p. 46) has put 
this:  
Design problems are unique, complex, and ambiguous. They are 
considered to be non-routine and ill-structured. Since these kinds of 
problems require the production of innovative solutions, design problem-
solving involves creative thinking. Creativity is concerned with the capacity 
to restructure old ideas to produce novel solutions, and the ability to 
search for unusual design alternatives that transcend the known and 
familiar.  
                                            
3
 ‘Material Culture’ is a disciplinary area deriving from Miller’s (1987) inquiry into relationships 
between people and objects. 
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Casakin shows that the creative revision or restructuring of old ideas involves 
ambiguity in the design problem itself.  
So it is that Stephenson and Bromly (1992) feel that student capability in art and 
design is an individual, practical capability informed by historical and cultural 
awareness. They emphasise that art and design have a reciprocal relationship with 
other social and cultural practices. 
This is the sense in which knowing in design is qualitatively different to other forms of 
knowledge in higher education. ‘Knowing that’ or declarative knowledge (Anderson, 
1983) is not limited to a subject domain – in order to design, one might just as well 
draw on knowledge of Mongolian weaponry to design a new set of cutlery, as use 
the New York City skyline in a woven textile. As far as ‘knowing how’ or processual 
knowledge is concerned, the history of art and design education is marked by 
Kuhnian4 turns of accepted design process: early craft emphasis on design 
execution (Friedman, 2001), the industrial-artisanal approach of the Bauhaus in the 
1920s (Boradkar, 2009), the goal-directed, problem-solving approach of Herbert 
Simon (1996), the design principles that emerged in the 1940s (Grow, 2010), the 
design methods movement of the 1970s (Jones, 1970/1981), and Schön’s (1983) 
reflective practice are a sampling of these. 
‘Knowing that’ has, not without consequence been held to emerge from ‘knowing 
how’ in design education (Prentice, 1995). Stephenson and Bromly (1992, p. 22) 
explain about art and design learning that: 
[c]ontent and process have to occur simultaneously for ideas to be 
expressed visually and materially. This duality is so central to the subject 
that initially much study is taken up in enabling students to develop this 
facility.  
The difficulty with content (knowing that) is that the student’s developing visualisation 
of the meaning of their design happens during the practical design-making process 
(knowing how). Students must then ‘see in the mind’s eye’ (Archer, Baynes & 
Roberts, 2005, p. 3) what their process means as content. But this advanced kind of 
                                            
4
 Kuhn (1970) showed change in scientific knowledge paradigms to follow a pattern of reaction to or 
turning away from established scientific traditions.  
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visualisation thinking often draws upon tacit knowledge (Schön, 1983; Chen & 
Heylighen, 2006; Cross, 2007; Shreeve, 2008; Kolko, 2010). Nevertheless, design 
studio pedagogy entails communication between the student and teacher about how 
the making process is developing significant meaning. 
Herein lies the central concern of this study. Engagements between students and 
teacher often involve different ways-of-knowing – the ‘knowing that’ or content 
aspect of design meaning. When it comes to studio and crit interactions, students 
and teachers attempt to articulate how students’ designed objects engage visual 
meaning. Inevitably, how it is that students’ designed objects might engage others 
becomes a matter of knowing. This is the case whether it is students’ drawings or 
models of their designs that are under consideration. Lockard (2000) in his 
discussion of drawing for design says: 
We must recognize that practising designers spend much more time 
communicating verbally than graphically and that only a fool would ever 
let the drawings “speak for themselves". 
Lockard’s point highlights the fact that pedagogical interactions are communicative 
interactions. But they are communicative interactions about visual design meaning, 
and projected future visual design meaning, at that. The pedagogical problems that 
arise from this are the central concern of this study. 
1.4 The Motivation for the Study 
As a design educator, I have dealt with teaching challenges in the (fashion) design 
studio, and also in theoretical or Contextual Studies for design, across design 
programmes. In my student years, I very much enjoyed the fashion vignettes that my 
own teacher, Robert Pollexfen, described (and even mimed), so I tried to stimulate 
my own students in the same way. In theoretical or Contextual Studies teaching, I 
spent a lot of time on developing my ability to build students’ visual 
conceptualisation. On one occasion I was greatly rewarded when a group of arriving 
students said to those who were ending their session with me, “Clear out, it’s our 
turn”. It seemed I had got rapport with my students right in at least some ways. 
Further encouragement came from the discussions I held with student groups to help 
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with their reflective journals (part of Contextual Studies requirements). Reflective 
journals5 are a learning tool for drawing insights from practical experience. Generally 
speaking, reflective journals commit to writing a retrospective view of how a practical 
process has been planned, implemented and evaluated, so that the benefit of such 
an experience can be retained.  
These discussions with students about what they might say in their reflective journals 
became a surprisingly successful forum of mutual support that generated useful 
insights. 
These happy circumstances were, however, far less evident in my studio design 
development and studio critique teaching. I had constant doubts about critique in 
particular, and my efforts to create the same kind of discussion forum as for the 
reflective journals did not work nearly as well. It seemed that the gap between 
understandings of design meaning relevance amongst students, and between me 
and students was too wide to bridge. It was even worse when I found that some 
students would unquestioningly accept my view of their work, without understanding 
it. Tovey (2011) has in this regard identified the learning vulnerability that students 
must face in design education. Students must deal with ill-defined design problems, 
so they are uncertain and may remain so until tolerance of uncertainty is recognised 
as an essential part of the design process. 
To me, it is extremely important for design teachers to be sensitive to this 
uncertainty, in all interactions with students. As Dannels, Gaffney and Martin (2008, 
p. 12) ask: 
[H]ow often do we consider, within the complex social context of our 
classrooms, that our feedback could potentially shape our students’ 
understanding of who they are as disciplinary members and educational 
participants? 
 
Dannels et al.’s trenchant observation echoes the upshot of my Master’s research 
investigation into assessors’ approaches to assessment in design (Kethro, 2007). 
                                            
5
 The educational use reflective writing in a journal arises from the experiential learning theories of 
Dewey (1933), Schön (1983) and Kolb (1984), and has since been extensively theorised.  
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Different teacher ways-of-knowing about design meaning were pivotal in the analysis 
of my research data. I concluded that there was a pervasive disconnect between 
teacher feedback and student autonomy. Teacher feedback might with the best of 
teacher intentions be directed toward enhancing the meaning relevance of students’ 
designs; but feedback often did not gel with the student’s developing understanding. 
The student was then put in the position of giving up autonomy of thought and 
understanding, in order to learn. In an unstructured knowledge domain such as 
design, where student designers must learn to make independent decisions about 
the future meaning of their designs in social life, this obstacle to learning autonomy is 
cause for deep concern. 
My further thinking about this schism has brought the realisation that different 
teacher expectations about not just what students might know about the meaning of 
their designs but how they might know it are, as Oxman (2003) has pointed out, 
hazy, if they are ever even made explicit. 
Teacher views on student knowing amount to ‘pedagogical ways-of-knowing’. 
Pedagogical ways-of-knowing have been theorised by Shulman as a core aspect of 
the teaching profession. Because pedagogy is teacher interaction with students, 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing very much refer to how the teachers think that 
students might come to know (Shulman, 1991). Shulman is a leading proponent of 
the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning or SoTL movement and says “an educator 
can teach with integrity only if an effort is made to examine the impact of his or her 
work on the students” (Shulman, 1991, p. vii). 
Austerlitz, Blythman, and Grove-White et al. (2008, p. 127) have drily referred to the 
tendency in higher education to try to ‘manage’ student expectations, so that they will 
“no longer be disappointed or expect the impossible”. Their comment is that 
pedagogic approaches need to be examined instead. In line with this view, Blair 
(2003, p. 80) has this to say about design pedagogy: 
If the students' cognitive resources are interfered with in one or more of 
the crit activities, through either a negative experience or a 
misunderstanding of the formative feedback, or by being so apprehensive 
that they cannot listen to or absorb the feedback comments on either their 
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own work or the work of others, then this can impair the student's 
performance and learning experience. 
The reason for doing this research was thus to address my own and other design 
educators’ discomfort about not always helpful engagements with students regarding 
the meaning value of their designs. 
Oak (2000) advocates reflexive examination of what design learning means to 
students and teachers. Although teachers and students share the difficulty of 
divergent meaning interpretation, I put the responsibility for this situation on the 
shoulders of the teachers who deliver design courses and curriculate design 
qualifications. As curriculum designers, teachers need to be aware of the ways-of-
knowing assumptions of their pedagogy. The enquiry into ways-of-knowing in this 
study is then pedagogically motivated. 
Teachers and students together develop design products that might potentially find a 
place in social life beyond higher education. Although teachers and students share 
the knowing difficulty of design object meaning interpretation, Oxman (2003, p. 4) 
remarks on the individuality of teachers’ design pedagogical practice. Design 
teachers’ individual approaches to design meaning find room for expression in the 
“endemic unstructured quality of both [design] domain problems and domain 
knowledge” (Oxman, 2003, p. 8). 
This is one reason why this research concentrates on design pedagogy; further 
reasons lie in my personal experience of design studio and design crit teaching, as 
elucidated in this section. A pedagogical interest in knowing about design object 
meaning, as well as how that knowledge comes about, thus forms the motivation for 
this study. 
1.5 Overview of the Research Design 
Reading for this study, I noticed that the design teacher scholarship that I found 
relevant to the knowing of visual design meaning came from design educators who 
are geographically spread across the world. My tentative research focus then began 
to move away from the confines of a contextualised case study and toward a broader 
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view on knowing design meaning. The research design I describe here is then 
focussed upon the widespread issue of ways-of-knowing in design studio pedagogy, 
rather than any particular design studio or studios, or any particular time frame. 
Knowing design meaning is something of a wild card, as I discovered from reading 
across design educational specialisations where designed objects are produced – 
whether as fully fledged products, or as blueprints or prototypes in the form of 
sketches or models. There are many factors that might potentially affect teachers’ 
studio communication with students – for instance, language and cultural differences 
can mask the knowing of design meaning.  
Therefore I was doubtful about separately investigating students’ ways-of-knowing 
and teachers' ways-of-knowing design meaning. I doubted, too, that I could generate 
sufficient research data about ways-of-knowing design object meaning through 
observing studio tutoring in design studios, or studio critique events. This was 
because I could see no relevant criteria on which to base the selection of such 
events for observation, though select I must, otherwise the study would be 
impracticable. Also, very competent observational studies of studio interactions in 
design education, and very competent interview-based studies of design studio 
pedagogy are available. These inspiring studies helped me to focus on what could 
be done in research, and what, by way of research, could help with the problem of 
knowing the meaning of student designs in design pedagogy. Ultimately this led me 
to focus this study on the time and place transcending issue pedagogical ways-of-
knowing, or how the teachers think the students might know design meaning. 
Further study limitations came from the focus on visual design meaning focus. In this 
study only ways-of-knowing about visual design artefacts are considered, because 
they can be looked upon (perhaps in the form of a model or a sketch) in a teaching 
situation, whereas the design of a health care service, for example, cannot. Utility 
aspects of designed products, and designs as inventions that are confined to 
specialised technological applications are likewise excluded from the focus on 
design meaning. 
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Meanings that do not come from any formal knowledge domain are ascribed to 
student designs in design pedagogy. Though design briefs in design education do 
set a challenge, multiple ways of satisfying that challenge emerge as various visual 
meanings in students’ newly designed objects. 
Therefore I adopted an emergence approach to the study. Emergence was tackled 
from the point of view of Critical Realism (CR), a philosophy emanating from the 
work of Bhaskar (2008). The core idea that I have used from Critical Realism is that 
any empirical social phenomenon, (in this case, knowing design meaning in design 
pedagogy) is a historically emergent phenomenon. In CR, which I discuss in much 
more depth in Chapter Three, for such an empirical knowing phenomenon to occur, 
there must be pre-formed conditions or pre-suppositions that affect the emergence of 
the phenomenon in question (Sayer, 1992; Collier, 1994; Danermark, Ekström, 
Jacobsen & Karlsson, 2002; Lawson, 2004; Bhaskar, 2008). 
I focused on a particular aspect of these pre-formed conditions or suppositions: that 
of pedagogical ways-of-knowing. I mounted a conjecture about how pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing in design might be constituted, and how they would consequently 
influence communication about visual design meaning between students and 
teachers. 
Explaining design pedagogical ways-of-knowing was though still a very broad 
research goal. Initially, a methodologically collectivist approach seemed to be 
indicated. In this ‘macro’ approach, social collectives are regarded as the better bet 
for sociological evidence; the contrary view is that data from individuals, or the 
‘micro’ level, is more authentic (Felin & Foss, 2006, p. 1). But while I wanted to deal 
with the general problem of design pedagogical ways-of-knowing in the design 
studio, I felt that an explanation of pedagogical ways-of-knowing should be locally 
and contextually applicable. 
Resolving this methodological-collectivist versus methodological-individualist issue 
was pivotal in my research design. The CR philosophy is one that specifically rejects 
the opposition of collective to individual knowing, instead advocating an explanatory 
approach to showing how macro, abstract phenomena (like pedagogical ways-of-
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knowing) might play out on a micro concrete level (like the emergence of design 
meaning, in any given design studio pedagogical event). The CR philosophy was 
then an attractive option for explaining how macro pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
might apply in any particular micro design studio event.  
CR seeks to explain what is puzzling about events and experiences (Bhaskar, 2008; 
Carter & New, 2004; Danermark et al., 2002). An analytical strategy for this kind of 
explanation is abductive inference. In CR philosophy, abductive inference is 
theoretical inference of what it is that predisposes to the emergence of an 
anomalous phenomenon, in a particular context (Wad, 2001; Danermark et al., 2002; 
Maxwell, 2004). That anomalous phenomenon, in this study, is knowing the meaning 
of students’ designed objects in design pedagogy. To put this another way, taking a 
CR approach in this study means looking beyond meaning-making in design 
pedagogy to try to find what it is that might predispose toward the emergence of this 
or that visual meaning in any one instance of discussion about a student’s designed 
object. 
The abductive methodology I have developed requires that one places the 
anomalous research phenomenon within a new theoretical context of ideas (Wad, 
2001). This new context of ideas then allows a theoretical conjecture to be made. 
But as Wad also says, for this conjecture to have validity, the relevance of theoretical 
ideas to the empirical context under scrutiny must be established. Mounting a 
theoretical abductive conjecture requires showing how the theory applies 
substantively to the research situation, such that inference from such a conjecture is 
warranted. 
Luhmann’s (1995, 2000, 2002, 2006) theory of the emergence of knowing and 
meaning in communication enabled a contextually relevant research conjecture. In 
Chapter Four I embark upon a detailed discussion of Luhmann’s theorisation, in 
order to show the substantive relevance of this theory to pedagogical ways-of-
knowing. In particular, it was important to conjecture why teachers might favour 
certain and not other visual meanings of student designs. 
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The next step was to submit my theoretically framed conjecture about design 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing to examination in an analysis of design educator data. 
In this analysis, I use Luhmann’s (1995, 2000, 2002) abstract social systems of 
communicable knowing to explain macro effects on micro communication 
interactions where visual design meaning is at issue. 
CR requires that a research explanation ‘outperforms’ rival explanations (Peacock, 
2000). While CR holds that there are real historical and social conditions that come 
to bear on empirical phenomena, there is a caveat to this realism: the ‘real’ 
conditions affecting an empirical context cannot be fully known; so research 
explanations are revisable and fallible (Bhaskar, 2008). 
In saying this, Bhaskar distances CR from postmodernism, where research accounts 
cannot but be endlessly relative. Bhaskar says instead that explanation of real 
effects must be attempted, even if ‘the real’ can never be fully known. Seeking to 
provide an explanation of a deeper reality takes into account that our knowing 
resources are limited. Nevertheless, critical realists say that not all explanations are 
equally ‘practically adequate’ (Sayer, 1992, p. 70). So the research must show why a 
tendered explanation is more ‘practically adequate’ to the research context of inquiry 
than other explanations might be.  
To conclude this chapter, I show how the study research design I have briefly 
outlined above has been structured over eight chapters. 
1.6 The Structure of the Study 
In this chapter, Chapter One, I have attempted to give an overall orientation to the 
concerns of this study. 
In Chapter Two, I elaborate my research focus on pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
The design pedagogical impact on meaning-making in the design studio is 
established. 
30 
 
Chapter Three focuses on how pedagogical ways-of-knowing might condition the 
emergence of design meaning in the design studio. I explain how Bhaskar’s (2008) 
Critical Realism (CR) can be applied to knowing design meaning as the pedagogical 
concern of this study. I take the ontologically realist position that pedagogical ways-
of-knowing form some of the conditions for the emergence of meaning in students’ 
designs, and propose abductive inference as the way to explain what these 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing are. 
In Chapter Four, because CR is a philosophy and not a substantive theory, I move to 
the substantive abductive potential of Luhmann’s theorisation of knowing and 
meaning in communication. Luhmann’s theory is used to re-contextualise the 
problematic empirical research context of design studio pedagogy. This theoretical 
re-contextualisation allows me to make an explanatory abductive conjecture about 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing as cognitively selective and communicatively 
organised, (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). 
Chapter Five sets out the methodology for examining this abductive conjecture in the 
light of the research data.  
In Chapter Six, the abductive conjecture is brought to bear on the analysis of data 
from an online discussion forum. I implement and show my analysis of the 
conjectured macro and micro, abstract and concrete aspects of pedagogical ways-
of-knowing that might lead to the emergence of design meaning. 
In Chapter Seven, the abductive conjecture is further considered in the light of data 
from discussion groups with design educators. 
In Chapter Eight, I examine traditional research criteria of validity and reliability in 
light of the abductive methodology of the study.  
In Chapter Nine, I tender my research explanation of pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
as relational mechanisms that entail recursive distinctions. Then I suggest how my 
explanation might be applied in design studio pedagogy. Finally I explore ways in 
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which my research explanation might extend to other important design pedagogical 
issues.. 
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Chapter Two 
Knowing Design Meaning in Design Pedagogy 
Objects express meaning. This is clear to anyone involved in the study of 
design, architecture, art, archaeology or any of the related fields dealing 
with the production, reception, transmission and survival of artefacts over 
time and place. Just how they do so is one of the great questions, 
perhaps the great question, faced by the different types of scholars, 
experts and enthusiasts who choose to work with object-based research. 
What is it about certain artefacts that make them more expressive of a 
given culture than others of similar origin? Why do some objects retain the 
power to dazzle, to thrill, to awe – in a word, to communicate – while 
others lose their eloquence and fall silent, becoming inscrutable or simply 
dull and uninteresting? The exact nature of the relationship between 
verbal meaning and visual/material expression is certainly complex, and 
perhaps never fully knowable; but the very real difficulty of the task should 
not deter us from engaging in it. 
Cardoso (2004, p. 1) 
The relevance of the visual meaning of students’ designs is at issue in 
communication between students and teachers in design pedagogical interactions. 
But as Cardoso intimates above, the relationship between visual meaning and what 
is said about it is a complex one. Communication about visual meanings happens 
during students’ design development processes, and the evaluation of these 
designs, as a series of events occurring in the pedagogical space of the design 
studio. 
This chapter draws on the scholarship of design pedagogy to show pedagogical 
effects on what happens in teachers’ design studio interactions with students. The 
point of departure was design teachers’ expectations of students regarding a 
particular kind of knowing: knowing about the meaning of students’ designed objects. 
This is the kind of knowing that Cardoso describes above. 
In Section 2.1 of this chapter I clarify the visual design meaning dimension of 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing in this study. Then in Section 2.2, I trace the broad 
historical emergence of design pedagogical approaches and the ways-of-knowing 
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they have embraced.. The following Section 2.3 takes a closer look at what happens 
in the design studio and Section 2.4, highlighting how pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
design meaning may become problematic. Finally, in Section 2.5, I report on both 
positive and negative views of design pedagogy, showing that visual design meaning 
may be disputed or shared. In this last section I identify the aims of the study in 
terms of the overall design pedagogical focus on ways-of-knowing. 
2.1 Design Pedagogy and Visual Meaning 
Deep-rooted differences in the understanding of ‘what design is’ (Roberts, 1990; 
Jackson, 1995; Davies, 2002; Archer, 2005; Smith, Hedley & Molloy, 2009) are 
connected to the issue of design meaning. Visual meaning that is non-verbally 
communicated by designed objects is included in the general sweep of most design 
definitions, but that sweep tends to be so inclusive as to mean very little. 
Jonas (2000, p. 1) elaborates design as a ‘groundless field’: 
a hybrid swampy region of artefacts and social phenomena … No stable 
disciplinary core but a fluid network of ‘chunks of ideas’, re-established in 
communicative feedback at the interface between the contextual and the 
artefactual. Design is permanently re-creating its own ground … [not] 
eternal basics but rather arbitrary entry-points. Therefore ‘fundamental’ 
issues comprise such meta-subjects as: analytical and systemic thinking, 
associative power, synthetic, generative and evaluative competencies, 
and communicative skills. 
Jonas’s paradoxically fundamental meta-subjects are a telling indication of the lie of 
the land in design pedagogical knowing. The terms used to describe design knowing 
in design pedagogical literature, such as ‘cognitive’, ‘creative’, ‘interpretive’, and 
‘conceptual’ are often rather arbitrarily relativised to each other, sometimes as basic 
and taken for granted, and sometimes as all embracing. Jonas’s mention of the 
multiple and arbitrary entry points to design also captures the confusing situation of 
disparate understandings of knowing design meaning. 
Perhaps the deepest vein of ambiguity in knowing the meaning of student designs 
lies in historical differences between design and art. 
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Design is a phenomenon that has grown out of the social division of labour of the 
industrial revolution (McCullagh, 2000) and has been grounded in cultural contexts of 
production and consumption. Design movements (like the art and craft movement, 
art deco and art nouveau) have, as Palmer (1996) points out, been notably specific 
to a particular time and place. The design object obtains its meaning value by means 
of association with a specific context of interpretation. Historically6 the absolutist fine 
art canon of “beauty” as a universal aesthetic then opposes the relativist orientation 
of design to contextual “meaning” (Palmer 1996, pp. 5–6, emphasis added). 
These opposing historical conceptions of art and design aesthetics have long played 
out in both art and design higher education. The art school tradition has given 
students “license to constructively externalize their own ideas and emotions” (Boyd-
Davis, 2000, p. 67). But this individualistic view of creativity has also been supported 
in design education (Dineen, Samuel & Livesey, 2005). There has, equally, been a 
push for design students to work from a knowledge of cultural issues (see for 
instance, Strickfaden, Heylighen, Rodgers & Neuckermans, 2005). As a result, art 
and design values may be ambiguously merged in the aesthetic understandings of 
design teachers. 
Thus the literature suggests that the historical relationship between art and design is 
divided along creativity fault lines as shown in Figure 2.1. There is an ‘art’ view of 
design, and there is a view of design as distinguished from art. 
  
                                            
6Here I only refer to historical divisions between art and design.  
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Figure 2.1 Art in design, design versus art 
Teachers work with students to develop their designs according to a design project 
brief, and the teachers also give feedback on how student designs might 
meaningfully engage others. The aspect of feedback that is under focus in this study, 
that of knowing design meaning, can be loosely described as the ‘aesthetic’ meaning 
value of the students’ designs. 
Before going any further, I must qualify the meaning of the word ‘aesthetic’. In the 
classical philosophical sense, aesthetics refers to the sensory qualities of an object: 
elements such as shape, colour, line and texture (Dikovitskaya, 2005). These 
sensory qualities are called ‘formal’ qualities, because together they constitute the 
object as a physical form. However the word aesthetic has also come to be 
associated with style (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2007), as in a ‘Grecian’ urn – the style of 
the urn is Grecian, whether or not it is of Grecian origin. For Ewenstein and Whyte 
(2007), aesthetics refers also to an informed interpretive faculty, where being 
informed will allow one to discern, for instance, a pop culture graphic aesthetic. 
Being informed about design history allows an attribution to pop culture of the 1950s 
and 1960s attribution to be made, and to be shared. Here, social knowing is 
involved. As aesthetic apprehension, the stylistic and the interpretively informed 
faculties are confined to social rather than natural objects. Vitta (1996, p. 32) finds a 
‘social logic’ in designed objects which is “not that of the individual appropriation of 
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the use-value of objects, but, on the contrary, that of the production and manipulation 
of social meanings”. 
Designed objects are referred to as artefacts because they are the result of 
intentional human agency. As purposively planned and human-made objects, they 
bring qualities to social life which would not otherwise be there (Smith, 2007). 
Barnard (1998) has described these qualities as historically falling into an object-
based meaning camp and a structure-based meaning camp. Object-based meaning 
is based in the tradition of philosophical aesthetics, where such features as the 
colour, line, shape, and texture of an object could universally inspire a sense of truth 
and beauty, and aesthetic purity (Bell, cited by Barnard, 1998, p. 34). Structure-
based ideas, by contrast, have to do with context-bound normative associations such 
as what is seen as feminine, or exotic, or technological. 
So prevalent is the visual in social life, says Barnard7 (1998, p. 3) that:  
Western philosophical and religious traditions which underlie our everyday 
habits of thought and much unexamined everyday behaviour are almost 
completely dependent on visual metaphors, allegories and ‘images’ to 
describe and explain subjects such as life’s meaning. The ways in which 
Western cultures understand and experience human knowledge and good 
and evil, for example, are highly dependent upon visual imagery. 
Philosophy is full of examples of light, dark, sight, blindness, reflections, 
shadows, mirrors and other visual phenomena being used to get to grips 
with the intricacies of such momentous subjects. 
Visual meaning is not just a phenomenon of social life; it amounts to relevant cultural 
expression, as the examples of ‘Grecian’ and ‘pop culture’ indicate. For this reason, 
art and design education have adopted the term ‘visual culture’ as a theoretically 
accommodating description of the cultural meanings of visual objects (Verstegen, 
2006). The theoretical thrust of the visual culture ambit corresponds with Barnard’s 
structure-based ideas, embracing the study of meaning engagement between people 
and visual objects. 
                                            
7
 Barnard refers only to Western visual culture here. Presumably the iconology of visual imagery in 
other cultures may function differently. 
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Significantly, as Barnard (1998, p. 34) puts it, “The way a piece of visual culture 
looks cannot simply be explained by referring to the way that piece of visual culture 
looks”. Rather, it is the structures of thinking and knowing that we invest in objects 
that explain how we see them. As far back as 1958, Dewey (cited by Moore, 2010, p. 
155) argued that mental conception and sensory perception join in our experience of 
objects, and that our experience of objects is how we know them. In other words, 
speaking of visual meaning is speaking of visual knowing: ‘seeing’ as opposed to 
‘looking at’ is a cognitive activity in which experience of the object becomes 
classified (Friedman, 2001, p. 13).The design educator Katherine Moore firmly states 
that “what we see cannot be separated in any way from what we know” (2010, p. 
13). Taking this assertion further, Büchler and Biggs (2006, p. 10) say, “What this 
means in the material culture context is that the physical design of a product may 
have less impact on our visual perception than the knowledge that we attach to it”. 
Artefacts are typically intentionally designed to echo past social meaning attributions, 
using well-known visual allusions – like already cognitively framed geometric forms 
of the art deco movement, or the spare plainness of Shaker furniture. So a designer 
may design ‘new’ art deco jewellery, or ‘new’ Shaker furniture, updating traditional 
object forms by juxtaposing the new with the old. The meaning relevance in this case 
is the design precedent or forerunner that has become able to engage people over 
time and across locations. If, then, a student’s designed object can engage with 
established visual meaning, that design has a good chance of being found relevant 
in social life. 
Cognitive framing can nevertheless also involve a stretching of credibility. In 1975 
Tom Wolfe lampooned the art critic tendency to ‘read’ social meaning off abstract art 
splatters and splotches in his book ‘The Painted Word’. This rather suspect capacity 
for the detection of hidden visual meaning is still alive. As an example of the 
stretching of cognitive framing, I venture the prize-winning photograph of a cow 
(Figure 2.2). I purposely footnote the competition judges’ cognitive rationale for 
awarding first prize to this photograph and I ask my reader to first ‘cognitively frame’ 
their meaning of the prize-winning photograph depicted in Figure 2.2 overleaf, and to 
compare their interpretation of the photograph with the footnoted cognitive frame 
rationale for the first prize award that was agreed by the competition judges. 
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Figure 2.2 Wendy Erlendson’s prize-winning photograph of a cow8 
Source: National Geographic Magazine, May 2009, p.114 
The cognitive framing of visual objects is sometimes referred to as ‘visual literacy’ 
(Smith, 2007). Visual literacy9 has historically been thought to be a sensory rather 
than a cognitive function, because of the notion that great art can be universally 
visually sensed as great (Bryson, cited by Moore, 2010, p. 37). By contrast, the art 
criticism perspective of the 1960s and 1970s took a very literate semiotic approach 
to visual meaning. The tendency was to superimpose politicised viewpoints on 
paintings. A hypothetical example of such a viewpoint might be along the lines of 
‘these splatters are about the alienation experienced in the city’. Here the 
intellectually high-brow conception of design pursues the “grail-like lure of the 
invisible” (Moore, 2010, p. 54). Moore thinks this approach is of no help to students 
learning visual literacy. In her view the sensory perception of what is seen and the 
knowledge-based cognitive conception of what is seen must be brought together in 
order for visual meaning to be known. 
What Moore seems to refer to is a kind of visual literacy that allows existing 
knowledge to be selectively applied to design artefacts. Design literacy or cultural 
literacy (Kolko, 2005; Russell, 2008) are alternative terms that apply to visual 
                                            
8
 The judges awarded the prize to Erlendson’s cow photograph because they were captivated by the 
cow’s “sense of dignity”. Is this what my reader also discerned? 
9
 Visual Literacy is a widely interpreted concept. It is either referred to in very general terms, or 
explained in a number of overlapping ways (Messaris, 1994). 
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literacy. Nevertheless, this is a kind of literacy that involves highly specialised 
knowledge. Mermoz’s (2006, p. 80) elaborate definition of design literacy is as 
follows:  
Beyond fads and fashions, design literacy, in my mind, refers to the 
capacity of the designer to infer the mental processes and the theoretical 
basis of the design choices which led to a given design, as well as the 
capacity to consider their implications in terms of how they might 
implement a reference, and how it might be interpreted in the 
viewing/reading process. 
Mermoz’s explanation of design literacy refers to nothing less than inferring the 
processes of design from the designed artefact. Though Rust, Hawkins, Roddis and 
Whitely (2000) and Bowen (2009) have actually used the inference of process and 
ideas from artefacts in their design research, there is an undeniable variety of 
cognitive processes and resources used for this explicit inference of knowledge 
tacitly held in the artefact inference. Mermoz’s account at the very least involves 
information, theory, interpretation and analysis for design literacy as relevant to the 
knowing of visual design meaning. 
Design literacy also surfaces in a somewhat different way in the growing field of 
design journalism and television coverage. In a newspaper article, design critic 
Steven Bayley (2010) wrote of the world’s tallest skyscraper (170 floors), the Burj 
Kalipha building in Dubai: 
Corporations want, or wanted, supertalls to exploit what Tom Wolfe called 
"kerbflash", that liminal effect which a dramatic architectural profile 
achieves. Paradoxically, Burj Khalifa is not a truly modern building. It is a 
hangover of a demented spending binge. It is a subprime Great Pyramid. 
It is queasy nostalgia for a version of the future that looked old-fashioned 
a generation ago. It is kitsch retro fantasia, a glassy memorial to 
something not so much forgotten as never known … Sublime to the point 
of being frightening, Burj Khalifa is archaically greedy with energy and 
resources … it was built for vainglory rather than for purpose. Vast in size 
but small in meaning, Burj is a lot more stuff, but less idea. 
Whether or not one agrees with Bayley, his descriptive terms in this piece are 
significant. He invokes the historical past (the pyramids, ‘kitsch retro’, a glassy 
memorial, old-fashioned); he refers to cultural attitudes and values (hubris, greed, 
vanity, queasy nostalgia) and he makes some very pointed remarks about capitalist 
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power relations (vainglory, demented spending binge, more stuff but less idea). 
Bayley’s newspaper piece is written with persuasive intent – rhetoric, to be precise, 
and rhetoric that assumes particular understandings and sets out to convince. 
Bayley refers to a building, but his terms of reference expose the scope of meanings 
and ideas that a designed object might carry. 
More than simply conveying ideas, designed artefacts and products are 
communication instruments (Vitta 1996, p. 32). It has also been Baudrillard’s (1996) 
argument that through advertising and other media influences, objects lose their 
original meaning. They become simulacra of themselves, mere informative 
instruments that transfer the image of themselves onto the individuals who consume 
them, becoming completely identified with the manner in which they are consumed. 
This results in a process of meaning classifications and social differentiations that 
overrides attention to the objects themselves. 
Design educators are comfortable with the assumption that designs are about ideas. 
But what is further often assumed in design pedagogy is that students are aware, in 
their practical design processes, that designed objects are intended to produce a 
meaning interpretation response in at least one other person. 
2.2 A Current History of Design Pedagogical Approaches 
Some historical background to present-day design studio pedagogy can begin to 
expose the divergent origins and paths of development of design pedagogical ways-
of-knowing. 
What is now called design education has its origins in the apprentice tradition of the 
14
th
 century craft guilds (Friedman, 2002). Craft guilds established standards for 
carpenters, tailors, engravers, builders and cabinetmakers (Barnard, 1998). These 
standards were to be conveyed to apprentices through a pedagogy of tacit 
knowledge transmission (Gamble, 2002). Apprentices were expected to learn how to 
execute the tacit principles of the craft by observing the techniques of master 
craftsmen. 
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When the 18th century Royal Academy of the Arts in Britain was established, it 
distanced itself from some of the more manual or mechanical activities of the craft 
guilds, seeking to provide a liberal arts education (Barnard, 1998). The academy was 
concerned with the European beaux arts (fine art) ideal of abstracting the universal 
‘real’ of essential form through imagination (Dodson, 1996). Hall Jones (1996 p. 132) 
has described how, in the Beaux Art system, the student was regarded as a ‘vessel’ 
for the tutor’s insight.  
After the applied arts and fine art were separated as knowledge fields, the idea of 
design as a field of education gained prominence. Design was an art-based 
development on hitherto purely craft-based training. In the United Kingdom the 
Government Schools of Design grew to some twenty-one institutions by 1849 
(Schmeichen, 1995). These institutions were however forced to tread a somewhat 
difficult path between art, design and technology in that they were divided between 
the manufacturer requirement for specialised artisanal expertise, and a more holistic 
art and design education (Schmeichen, 1995, p. 176).  
The late 19th century Arts and Craft Movement in Britain resolved this dichotomy by 
adopting a socialist applied arts perspective, distanced from the elite fine arts 
aesthetic. With the establishment of the post-World War 1 Bauhaus movement, 
design became an applied art which adopted the art academy or ‘atelier’ (studio) 
approach. The Bauhaus and Ulm design schools followed the atelier apprenticeship 
model where leading avant-garde artists such as Paul Klee and Wassily Kandinsky 
imparted their mastery to student apprentices (Kim, 2006).  
It is interesting that both the older tradition of fine art and the modernist Bauhaus 
movement held to a context-free, universalistic notion of visual aesthetic value. 
Achieving the Bauhaus aesthetic ideals required adherence to “pure, abstract and 
reasonable” (Grow, 2010, unpaged) design principles. These principles attempted to 
establish rules for a visual language of design: visual elements of shape, colour and 
line could convey meaning. These principles were later rejected because they 
assume a universal response to visual elements, and ignore cultural influences on 
visual meaning (Lupton, 1988, pp. 3–4). 
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However, the Bauhaus design school developed a basic or foundation course for 
learning these design principles as a visual language which was widely adopted in 
art and design education after World War I (Lupton, 1988).The Bauhaus 
apprenticeship pedagogy embraced the idea of visual design attributes that could be 
imbued in a designed object under the tutelage of master practitioners. This has 
been called the ‘master/mystery model’ of design pedagogy (Jacks, 2002 ; Salama, 
2006). Only under a master’s tutelage could an apprentice hope to penetrate the 
mysteries involved in inscribing visual meaning in an object. The idea of creativity as 
a mysterious gift survives to this day, as Polaine (2011, p. 44) explains: 
Designers have for too long been complicit in perpetuating the myth of 
design ability stemming from talent and inspiration. Both of those may 
play a part in successful design activities, but they do in any discipline. To 
accept that creative thinking is just the result of a special gift is to deny the 
effort that goes into practice and experience. This is perhaps not 
surprising. Relegated to being non-academic in school early on, designers 
can fall back on the magic of how they come up with great ideas to restore 
their sense of self-worth. Later, in agency form, this mystery is sold to 
clients, perpetuating the mythology. 
The survival of the studio apprenticeship teaching method and its subsequent 
disrepute has been famously evoked in Swann’s ‘Sitting by Nellie’ pedagogical 
scenario (Davies, 2002, p. 168). Writing in the 1980’s, Swann described how a 19th 
century apprentice would be inducted into the weaving industry by ‘sitting by Nellie’, 
an adept weaver, and watching her work. In this apprenticeship scenario, skills 
would be absorbed through a tacit ‘osmosis’ process of seeing and then doing. 
Teaching in the design studio has since undergone a series of transformations. 
Salama (2006) has made a distinction between three studio teaching models in 
architecture: the traditional apprentice model of tacit learning, the revolutionary 
model where conceptualisation is informed by such learning theories as Piaget’s 
(1963, 1977) assimilation and accommodation and Kolb’s (1984) theory of 
experiential learning, and the virtual model. The virtual model brings digital 
visualisation and simulation tools for developing and rendering design ideas. What is 
interesting, as Salama points out, is that none of these studio-teaching models has 
replaced another. Schools of Architecture may individually adopt any of the three 
models, and some schools have integrated all three. 
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Schön’s (1983; 1987) ‘reflection in action’ is the best known revision of 
apprenticeship design pedagogy. Reflection in action entails a reciprocal framing of 
design problems and solutions between teacher and student, developing through 
experimental design stages. The ‘frame experimentation’ process involves the 
teacher’s suggestion of design moves to the student that manipulate the materials 
and techniques being used to explore visual meaning alternatives. In this 
experimentation process, the student responds to the physical materials of the 
design, which may indicate meaning framing revisions, improvements, or even 
outright rejection of a frame or of a material/technique (Schön, 1987). In this way, the 
student’s understanding is transformed in a process of learning by doing. 
A later still view of design apprenticeship pedagogy is styled on the community of 
practice model of Lave and Wenger (1991). This style of pedagogy still involves the 
teachers’ skilled experience and approach to design as a practice. However, instead 
of universal notions of aesthetic worth, in a community of practice students 
increasingly participate in a ‘situated’ or shared practice. Here the ‘legitimate 
peripheral participation’ of the novice design student allows inculcation of a visual 
design culture that reflects professional design values (Drew & Shreeve, 2005; 
Logan, 2007)10, or, as Coe describes situated learning (2001, p. 394), it is 
participation in “the complex structure of people acting in a [particular] context”. 
Essentially, this pedagogical approach regards visual knowledge as not somewhere 
‘out there’, as something that can be tracked down if one looks hard enough. 
Instead, there is participation in learning the partly tacit and partly explicit practice 
discourse of a professional field of knowledge (Lave & Wenger, 1991). 
The whole question of repertoire, as Smith (2001, 2011) remarks, is at the centre of 
Schön’s frame experimentation. I think the same applies to the situated community 
of practice model of Lave and Wenger (1991). The ways-of-framing or ways-of-
knowing repertoire that a design teacher draws upon is not necessarily shared by the 
novice student, and the inculcation of such a shared repertoire presents some 
                                            
10
 Situated learning seems to mean different things to different design educators. One understanding 
is that of the situated learning of professional knowledge cultures where the learning environment and 
the understandings fostered in it are “inseparable and co-constitutive” (Logan, 2007, p. 6). In another 
understanding, situated learning means embodied learning “in a durational framework … [which is] 
not halted or gestalted” (Thomsen, 2005, p. 5). 
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problems. Precedent in the form of visual images, ideas, exemplars, and techniques 
comes from experience, but this experience is not necessarily shared. 
Problematically, this experience is so much taken for granted that it need not be 
mentioned (Smith, 2001, 2011). Visual design meanings depend on their connection 
to design actions (Schön, cited by Waks 2001, p. 48), but design actions also require 
words to explain their purpose, and any repertoire of design practice must face the 
difficulty of articulating what is ‘in’ that repertoire. 
At least two characteristics of the apprenticeship model of design teaching survive in 
contemporary design education. Firstly, tacit teaching and learning practices are still 
endemic to design education (Oxman, 2003). The old apprenticeship model, and 
newer forms of it like Schön’s reflection in and on action, as well as the community of 
practice model all endorse learning through practice. 
Secondly, there is a vocational connotation to design education (Cross 2007), 
inherited from the previously mentioned craft industry origins of design education. 
Design is now seen in a more professional light, but if design professionals become 
design teachers, this does not necessarily mean that they receive training in 
teaching (Chen & Heylighen, 2006). Professionals are also not necessarily better 
teachers (Chen & Heylighen 2006), and Wenger (2006), one of the original 
community of practice theorists, has commented on the difficulty of enacting 
professional ways-of-knowing in educational contexts. 
A currently favoured view is that designers should collaborate, a view in some ways 
seated in the community of practice ideal of Lave and Wenger (1991). The 
collaboration drive is often voiced within a social ethics approach that is critical of the 
‘acquire more things’ syndrome of consumerist excess (Naish, 2009). Faced with the 
consequences of inflation and enormous waste of resources, designers – this 
approach argues – should collaboratively address sustainable design issues. For 
Marshall (2009, p. 3) engaging with this meta-issue has the effect of bringing design 
disciplines together: 
Design expertise in this context becomes the ability to edit, organise, and 
integrate various expert perspectives and their respective data sources. 
The design process repeatedly visualises and prototypes collaboratively 
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proposed actions and these are taken back to the multi-disciplinary teams 
in the hope of determining an effective intervention. 
Marshall’s view seems to entail a social ‘learning together’ approach (Brown, Collins, 
& Duguid, 1989, p. 32) through student group collaboration on studio projects, now 
widely pursued in design education (du Preez, 2010).  
Design collaboration does, however, meet with resistance from some students (du 
Preez, 2010). The individualistic, personal self-expression view of visual design 
survives, (Danvers, 2003; Fernando, 2006; Hadjiyanni, 2008; Orr, 2010) perhaps as 
a heritage of the master-apprentice tradition. Simplistically, the old master-apprentice 
pedagogy seems to pursue the ideal of the master as ‘one who knows all’, and the 
community of practice apprenticeship pedagogy seems to pursue the ideal of 
students and teachers as ‘all who know, as one’. This is admittedly a reductive 
polarising of visual knowing ideals but it does illustrate the deep chasms that can 
exist between design pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
2.3 Design Studio Interactions  
In this section I call on the literature to try to give a sense of what it is like to be a 
teacher or a student in a design studio. What I particularly want to show is the inquiry 
nature of design study, and the ambiguities that are endemic to such inquiry, that 
‘come with the territory’ of design pedagogy. 
Oak (2000) has given a detailed description of the method of practical design 
teaching in the design studio. At the core of this method are design briefs given to 
students which require solutions in the material form of objects – whether graphic 
imagery, jewellery, textiles, garments, interiors and furnishings, household and other 
goods, photography, multimedia or interaction design11. Briefs loosely outline a 
design requirement in a context, but cannot be too closely defined, as there is no 
‘correct’ solution; multiple solutions can be successful, and each student (or student 
group) will come up with their own solution as an interpretation of the given brief. 
                                            
11
 Interaction design initially focused on human–computer interaction as a matter of the functionality 
afforded to human ‘users’ by the design of computers. This focus now embraces a more interpretive 
leaning toward social artefact meanings (Hanington, 2006). 
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Importantly, the design brief does not specify the visual design requirement in exact 
terms. For instance, if an informational HIV/Aids poster were required in graphic 
design, there might be a project brief directive that requires the poster’s visual design 
to accommodate low literacy levels. But students will still have to further specify the 
problem: do they need to deal with how HIV/Aids is transmitted, or do they need to 
deal with HIV/Aids denialism, or do they need to deal with folk cures for HIV/Aids? 
Similarly, if fashion students are asked to design for a theme such as ‘Fusion’, the 
options for fusion are almost limitless – national and historical costume elements 
may be (and have been) successfully combined; so have industrial and hand-crafted 
fabrics. 
Design problems are, in Rittel and Weber’s (1973) terms, ‘wicked’. The term ‘wicked’ 
has been accepted into design academic parlance because of the centrality of the 
‘wicked’ concept and the scope of its consequences. Wicked design briefs are 
wicked because the field of design needs is indeterminate and changing; design 
briefs are therefore ill-defined, and concerned with emerging social issues that can 
be satisfied in multiple ways. Design briefs typically simulate real world design 
challenges, but they state requirements in such a way as to only loosely limit 
possible design solutions. Students learn about design problems by trying out 
solutions. This is an inverse process to that of problem-based science, where the 
emphasis is on the ‘rule presented by the problem’, rather than the solution (Russell, 
2008).  
What is inescapable though is that, according to Austerlitz et al.’s (2008) view, 
however wicked a design brief may be, student designs should non-verbally express 
a visual meaning position through their designed objects. 
As Oak (2000) describes, usually students will do some kind of information gathering 
about the context in which the design solution should be visually meaningful: they 
may use reference books, may visit physical locations, and may find out about 
materials and processes. The main effort though will be put into planning the design 
as a prototype, drawing, model or process. As Gedenryd (1998) has described, this 
is where the design inquiry spade-work is done. Drawing iterations try out ideas, 
revise ideas, suggest ideas, just as prototype models or blueprints do; in these ways 
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a designer creates a visually relevant design. Prototyping, as a blanket term, is – as 
Gedenryd (1998, p. 174) points out – a future situating strategy for design ideas. 
Most of students' time and attention is directed to this planning and making of the 
object which will be their solution to the problem. Students need to make informed 
assumptions as to how to proceed, and their assumptions are refined and translated 
into material form in conjunction with the advice or comment of tutors (Oak, 2000, p. 
87). In this process students must ‘see in the mind’s eye’ what their process means 
as content. ‘Seeing in the mind’s eye’ is what Archer, Baynes and Roberts (2005, p. 
3) refer to as ‘cognitive modelling’. Students’ cognitive modelling happens in 
consultation with teachers even though what is seen in the mind’s eye, is, at least to 
begin with, tacit knowledge (Schön, 1983; Chen & Heylighen, 2006; Cross, 2007; 
Shreeve, 2008; Kolko, 2010). 
After the students’ designs have been completed, there is a feedback ‘critique’ 
(known as a ‘crit’) which may or may not also constitute a summative assessment. 
Crit interactions take place in a number of scenarios: one-on-one teacher–student 
interaction, small groups, whole class and crits that are formally or informally 
structured. Oak says that in most of her research into crit interactions, there were at 
least two teacher critics, and there was debate with the student and/or other 
students. As Oak (2000, p. 89) says of the student reaction to crits: 
Although they may not always vigorously dispute the critic's comments, 
the students usually pay close attention to what is being said, as the 
critic's words indicate whether the objects under discussion are 
considered 'good' or 'bad'. If the explicit content of the critic's remarks is 
not understood, then the students attend to cues of form, as Donald 
Schön notes when he quotes an architecture student who says “'You hang 
on the inflection of the tone of voice in your crit to discover if something is 
really wrong.  
This last remark quoted from Schön intimates that there might be designerly ways-
of-knowing that are less than explicit in teacher interactions with students around 
visual meaning-making (Cross, 2007). There are also warring expectations at work, 
at least initially. 
Austerliz et al. (2008) show how design pedagogy confounds expectations: they 
describe how a student’s parent, himself an educator, appealed to reason in his 
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complaint about the teaching of his son’s chosen design course. Then they describe 
the design teacher’s response to the concerned parent. Four weeks into the course, 
the father found that: 
The openness of briefs leads to little or no direction. When students ask if 
they are on track they get no direct answer, therefore students are 
constantly unsure whether they are performing to standard i.e., no 
ongoing evaluation or critiquing of student work. There appears to be no 
planning of tutorials, so a lot of time is wasted. 
This very reasonable parent complaint acknowledged that tutors on this course had, 
in one of the course modules, demonstrated design techniques along with clear 
explanations as to how performance might progress. This is what the father had 
expected of the institution. 
The tutor’s response to the parent’s charge was just as reasonable. In Austerlitz et 
al.’s (2008, pp. 7-9) quote from the tutor’s response, the tutor offers her 
understanding of the differences between a more traditional transmission-type 
pedagogy and the ill-defined problems of design pedagogy:  
Because of the open nature of the brief and the desire of students to be 
directed, students will often ask if what they are doing is ‘right’ and our 
response will be to explain that rather than ‘right’ or ‘wrong,’ we are 
expecting students to engage with the themes of the brief and develop a 
position in response to that engagement. 
In this teacher’s testimony, design problems require that students take a position in 
response to the design brief or problem. Here there is a clear illustration of the 
nature of design ‘problems’. They are not just problems that require a solution; they 
are problems that required a positioned solution that is visually expressed. 
For Gedenryd (1998, p. 15), design is an endeavour of inquiry, and this is the more 
so because although there is a brief, the design task parameters only emerge after 
design begins. Design problems do not come ready-made; students must identify the 
issues that impact upon the problem before they can start to shape a solution, and 
that solution comes from taking a position in relation to the design problem. The 
word problem is somewhat anomalous in design education, as it suggests an 
identified set of parameters and a solution that corresponds with these. Design briefs 
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present unstructured visual problems. Also, design knowledge is unstructured 
(Oxman, 2004), so it is unavoidable that design learning involves multiple visual 
ways-of-knowing. 
2.4 Tensions in Design Ways-of-Knowing 
There are many variants of the visual referential context used by designers; among 
them are design precedent, memory, personal experience and history. However vivid 
a student designer or teacher’s conception of a referential context might be, such a 
conception cannot always be shared between design students and design teachers. 
This is due to the highly varied ways in which visual referential contexts may form 
the basis of inquiry. Information from reference resources, design precedents 
(Lawson, 2004; Oxman, 2003), reflective inquiry into personal experiences of social 
phenomena, and observation of social phenomena are just a few of these. 
Dilnot (2006, p. 5) sidesteps the attempt of a definition of design by astutely 
observing that “An adequate ‘theory’ of design is a theory of design as a capacity or 
a potentiality.” This is potential meaning in a life-world context of the immediate 
future. Designing a design product within the confines of a design studio, designers 
envisage a design’s future visual meaning potential from the perspective of present 
or past life world contexts (Gedenryd, 1998). Though designers may research these 
contexts, they are contexts in which the designer is generally not physically present 
(Gedenryd, 1998, p. 156). There is then a widely acknowledged view that design is 
above all an inquiry-based discipline (Gedenryd, 1998; Waks, 2001; Danvers, 2003; 
Lawson, 2004; Cross, 2007; Logan, 2007), that deals with ambiguities (Strickfaden 
et al., 2005; Fleming, 1998; Friedman, 2007; Smith, Hedley & Molloy 2009; Moore, 
2010). 
Design pedagogy has been called a pedagogy of ambiguity (Austerlitz et al 2008), 
because in design the boundaries between knowing structures, technical processes 
and visual artefacts are blurred. My research focus is on this meaning ambiguity as 
the pedagogical concern of design teachers; a concern which is about ambiguous 
and multifarious ways-of-knowing about visual design meaning. 
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Ambiguity in the knowledge frames used in studio teaching persist (Oxman, 2004). 
What these knowledge frames might include and exclude is far from clear. Fleming 
(1998, p. 41) contrasts the primarily cognitive view of knowing design meaning with 
the primarily romantic view of knowing design meaning. The latter is described by 
Fleming as “the creative emanations of a gifted soul”. Here ‘cognitive’ seems to refer 
to knowledge, and creativity to self-expression. But creativity certainly requires 
cognition. In design pedagogical scholarship, a slew of different terms 
interchangeably characterise the cognitive and the conceptual, and these terms tend 
to represent inimical design way-of-knowing interests. A strong view prevails that it is 
conceptual understanding that is needed to solve visual design ‘problems’, after 
technicalities of making have been addressed. In Moore’s (2010) view the 
conceptual rationale for a designed object cannot be replaced by arbitrary subjective 
responses to sensory qualities; here Moore casts ‘the conceptual’ as something 
more than personal knowing, and something more than a sense perceptual 
response. How conceptual understanding is to be achieved in design pedagogy 
remains a topic of contention. The reason for this, as Oxman (2003, p. 3) explains, is 
that: 
The actual practice of design in the problem-related studio situation of 
most design schools rarely, if ever, treats the cognitive processes of 
design thinking as a form of explicit teaching content. [Author’s emphasis] 
Tensions occur where ‘conceptual’ ways-of-knowing visual meaning are differently 
understood. For instance, Teymur (2008) complains that professional knowing is 
preferred over academic knowing. But both academic and professional knowing 
involve conceptual skills. Professional design practice is often held up as the ‘right’ 
example to follow. In Teymur’s view, however, the practice of professional 
architecture does not much help with the broad understanding of architecture as an 
historical discourse. 
As another example of mixed perspectives on the conceptual, Webster’s (2005) 
study shows that students were required to produce drawings that could equally be 
read by the student and the tutor. This happy circumstance did not always 
eventuate, because some students could not penetrate the reigning architecture-
pedagogical discourse in their school of architecture. As Webster says, this meant 
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that the dominant teacher paradigm of architectural discourse remained 
unassailable. Regarding this particular architectural discourse, students noted that 
there were particular words and phrases that were “cool to drop in” during studio 
critique (Webster, 2005, p. 277). 
At the third year level however, as Webster (2005) reports, students began to 
understand that notions of value in architecture were contested not only within the 
discipline but also in the cultural milieu beyond the architectural community of 
academics and professionals. Nonetheless, students were not able to understand 
the differences between these values.  
Webster cites one student’s telling observation that “There must be universal notions 
of quality. I guess they stem from what we find beautiful going back to geometry in 
Greek architecture or something” (Webster, 2005, p. 275). A critical valuing of 
contested architectural mores contradicts the idea of a universal architectural 
discourse. Such a critical conceptual stance also does damage to the myth of the 
architectural review as “a collective and liberal celebration of individual student 
creativity” (Webster, 2005, p. 280). 
Dannels, Gaffney & Martin (2008) go so far as to describe feedback in design 
teaching as shaping the entire pedagogical field of design. But in their study there is 
evidence of conflicting expectations of students: teachers tried to make students 
more aware of the need to explain their work by urging them to persuasively 
articulate formal visual design choices (what the design looks like) with what the 
design is ‘saying’ (what the design means). The pedagogical stance was that 
students must supplement the nonverbal meaning communication of their designs 
with verbal communication about this meaning. But teachers also wanted the 
students to benefit from their feedback, and wondered why the students didn’t “get it” 
(Dannels et al., 2008, p. 2). For example, a teacher comment in a studio crit was: 
The box for me is just … terrible. I mean I expect Count Dracula to come 
out. You know, think about those things. These compositions are so 
beautiful. You want to think about your typography the same way you 
think about the composition on the page. You wouldn’t draw a boomerang 
that looked like that ‘D’ there for instance. Make everything as beautiful as 
you did up here. 
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One outcome of that study was the thought that a set of blueprints for 
communication within the discipline might help. With this thought came the 
understanding that communicating about the discipline is knowing what the discipline 
values – which students were however still learning. Dannels et al. therefore 
explored what it was that teachers were intentionally or unintentionally saying about 
design expertise – as in the teacher comment “You understand? It's about 
graphically how we read things” (Dannels et al., 2008, p. 7). However, this study 
reports that teachers gave students very different messages about knowing visual 
design meaning as design expertise. Students were at various times urged to 
articulate quite divergent conceptual stances: a teacher wanted to see the “linear” 
process by which a student developed a design students should provide a 
“persuasive rationale” (Dannels et al. p. 7) and then they should “see their own work 
from a different perspective ” (Dannels et al. p. 10). 
In Oak’s (2000) study, personal conceptions versus social conceptions of visual 
design meaning had resonating effects on studio interactions between students and 
teachers. Oak (2000, p. 87) says that “designed objects result from compromises, 
not from the unconstrained individual personality”. In her analysis of design critiques 
as a form of assessment, she highlights the tension between the vocational 
imperatives of design, and those that are more personal (Oak, 2000, p. 89). Students 
were made aware in these design critiques that they must bridge these polarities, 
that “they must speak both their own and another's language” (Oak, 2000, p. 90).  
The polarities Oak speaks of were enmeshed in a network of commercial needs for 
socially expressive and innovative products, and the personal creativity of designers 
(Oak, 2000, p. 87). There were concurrent tensions between the immediate 
educational setting and the projected professional design field in which any design 
problem has relevance. Assumptions on either count might equally be tacit or explicit 
in talk about a student’s designed objects (Oak, 2000, p. 89). 
Fleming (1998) brings some insight to the tacit/explicit divide in design pedagogy. He 
suggests that design might be seen as situated action that draws upon two different 
visual meaning resources. First, visual meaning refers to ‘language-laden objects’ 
that are ‘out there’ in the world – for instance, the circus, climate change or Doric 
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columns. Second, there is ‘object-laden language’ which refers to the student’s 
actual designed object. Object-laden language is completed by the student’s actual 
designed object or sketch that is being discussed by the teacher and student. 
Comments such as “It needs softening on the edges” refer directly to the designed 
object that is viewed by the teacher and student. Such a comment would not make 
sense outside of the actual student–teacher interaction about the object. So on one 
hand object-laden language tacitly ‘stands in’ for explicit visual knowledge. On the 
other hand, language-laden objects require explicit knowledge of the past or present 
existence of such visual objects in the world beyond the design studio. This ‘in 
here/out there’ tacit/explicit divide may be seen as a typifying and almost definitive 
feature of design studio pedagogy. 
There are underlying tacit/explicit fault lines in much of what is advocated in design 
knowing. For Reid and Petocz (2004, p. 50) there should be a conceptual interplay 
between students’ own experiences and intentions, professional knowledge, and 
social/cultural expectations. Ironically they then ask how it might be possible to set 
up a ‘total learning environment’ where this variegated conceptual learning might be 
evident in the products of learning, i.e. students’ designs. Here Reid and Petocz 
expose the difficulty of design ways-of-knowing: they speak of divergent conceptual 
trajectories, and then wonder how these might be visually discerned in students’ 
finished designs. 
It is easy to advocate conceptual flexibility in design, but not so easy to conduct 
formative and summative assessment of students’ designs in a conceptually flexible 
way. In this regard, James (2000, p. 157) mentions how Heron has shown a 
mismatch between the level of rationality we assume students can bring to learning, 
and that which we give them credit for in assessment and other processes. In the 
assessment of design learning, it seems that various ways-of-knowing jostle for 
position in the knowing of visual design meaning. 
At the crux of these tangled ways-of-knowing is the implicit ‘pedagogy of ambiguity’ 
(Shreeve, 2011) of design education. It is perhaps due to this ambiguity that there 
has been a focus of attention on the norms of studio pedagogy in art and design (for 
instance Dannels, Gaffney, & Martin, 2008; Fleming, 1998; Logan, 2007; Oak, 2008). 
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2.4.1 Pedagogical Views on Design Teaching 
There is a view that the design curriculum “can only come mediated through the 
person of the teacher; the tasks, materials, goals of the lesson come infused with the 
teacher’s personal identity” (Salmon, 1995, pp. 23-24). Prentice (1995, p. 4) sums up 
this thought:  
Of particular significance for teachers of art and design – given the 
diverse specialisms included in the subject-field along with the 
problematic nature of art – is the claim that teachers represent more than 
their subject: they represent their personal stance towards it. 
Prentice’s statement is precisely mirrored in Oxman’s reference to the individuality of 
design pedagogical practice, an individuality that finds room for expression in the 
“endemic unstructured quality of both [design] domain problems and domain 
knowledge” (Oxman, 2003, p. 4). Again the lack of structured knowledge puts 
emphasis on the way in which the teacher communicates with students. 
Oxman’s observation echoes the old master/apprentice pedagogy, which also came 
in the person of the individual teacher. While Schön regards conjoint reflection 
between the student and the teacher as essential to developing design knowing, he 
admits that there are difficulties in making expert knowledge accessible to students. 
This is a pervasive difficulty of design education, where the ‘tacit theories’’ of design 
teachers (Schön, 1983, p. 321) hold sway. Ng (2011), too, says of his study of art 
and design education that students found some teacher facilitation styles meaningful 
in critique, and not others. 
Blair, Blythman and Orr (2007), in their substantial study of crit interactions in six UK 
universities, provide a glossary of design-specific terms with, however, a disclaimer 
that these terms might hold different meanings in different specialisations, and that 
these meanings would have to be explained per the design specialisation and the 
individual tutor’s intention 
A number of studies show that design studio pedagogy is not always regarded as 
beneficial by students: Shreeve (2011, p. 116) says some students experience a 
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design studio transmission-like style of teaching where tutors dispense advice while 
‘studio-cruising’.  
In Logan’s (2007) view, teachers who are themselves experienced design 
practitioners are better able to articulate design meaning scenarios. However, 
professional design practitioners and academics can subscribe to different values, 
and as Logan says, these differences tend to become evident when student designs 
are evaluated. This point echoes Chen and Heylighen’s (2006) view that 
professionals are not necessarily the best teachers. 
Klassen’s (2002) contrasting emphasis is on cultural inquiry through discussion 
between students and teachers, because design projects do not exist in and of 
themselves, separated from culture and social life. Dutton’s (1991 ) study of the 
hidden curriculum in the design studio also maintains that the production and 
distribution of knowledge in design studios is affected by the same political, 
economic and social tensions that operate in the world outside of design education. 
2.4.2 Teacher–student contention about design studio critique 
Doman, Laurie & Duvenage (2009, p. 76) have written about reflective journalling in 
design. In the following example Doman et al show a student’s written journal 
reflections on the reasons behind teacher assessment and feedback on her work. 
The student first quotes teacher crit feedback on her photographs:  
There are very strong images (these two depict deep emotions). That the 
other three which do not have the same emotional strength bring (sic) the 
entire body of work down to an average and therefore does not get a 
distinction. 
The student responds to this teacher comment in her journal:  
I did not intend to pose/fake expressions and captured it as natural as 
possible. Three of the women I photographed did obviously not want to 
expose a certain personal emotion.  
The student then quotes her teacher’s response to her reply above:  
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Maybe you don’t have the ability to evoke the emotion required … 
The student’s final journal entry responds to this teacher remark: 
I am a white/European female – maybe this was partly why they didn’t 
want to express a very sensitive emotion and maybe they wouldn’t have 
to any person anyway. 
In Figure 2.3 below I show the student’s actual reflective journal entry, with her 
underlined emphasis on her reaction to teacher feedback. 
 
Figure 2.3 A student’s reflective journal entry after studio critique 
Source: Doman, Laurie and Duvenage (2009, p. 76) 
Reproduced by kind permission of the Design Education Forum of South Africa 
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From my second-hand perspective on this reflective journal example, it seems that 
the teacher was looking for a photographic portrayal of emotion, which would 
evidence a sophisticated representational design way-of-knowing. The student did 
sense an emotion in her subjects, but denies that capturing it was either necessary 
or desirable: her whiteness would preclude the showing of emotion by the 
photographic subjects. In this situation, the teacher way-of- knowing design meaning 
rests on the idea that an emotion, as the design meaning, can be purposively and 
intentionally evoked in the photograph, as a design learning exercise. 
On one hand, the student seems to feel that her photographs should stand on merits 
only she understands. She resents being tied down to capturing a pre-specified 
meaning, and possibly expects the teacher to appreciate her personal way-of-
knowing. 
On the other hand, the teacher seems to take it for granted that the student should 
understand the need to represent recognisable emotion in a photograph. How, 
however, the recognisable emotion might be knowable is far from clear. Teachers 
routinely expect students to appreciate their personal ways-of-knowing. As Moore 
(2010, p. 149) says: “for too long criticising [design work] as merely visual or 
subjective has been used as a smokescreen for personal preference and bias”. 
More acrimonious comment comes from Till’s debunking of the default design 
pedagogical defence of studio crits as authentic professional learning (cited by Blair, 
2003, p. 92):  
“It [the design crit] prepares for the real world” (come on, a tutor hardly 
shares the same priorities as a client). “I did it and survived.” (Yes, and 
people fought in the Iraq war and survived; that doesn’t make the war 
right). “It is part of our history, right from the nineteenth century”. 
Criticism of the design studio crit has been published since the 1990s ( for instance, 
see Dutton 1991; Jackson 1995; Davies, 1997; Atkinson, 2001; Oxman, 2003; 
Ehmann, 2005; Dannels, 2005; Beuchel et al., 2010; Moore, 2010). However such 
criticism of design teachers must be put against Waks’s (2001) observation that 
design teachers, unlike other teachers, do not have the opportunity of rehearsing a 
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teaching event that has a topic and frame of reference. Most importantly, most other 
forms of teaching do not entail a search for meaning innovation. 
2.5 Pedagogical Ways-of-Knowing and Shared or Unshared Visual 
Design Meaning 
The censure of design studio pedagogy reported in the previous section is balanced 
by positive student experiences. In Logan’s (2007) study, students enjoyed their 
participation in a studio community of practice, where they felt a strong sense of 
belonging. Other positive effects of the crit have also been noted. For instance, in 
Blair, Blythman and Orr’s (2007) study, students identified the benefits they derived 
from studio critique. As a way of learning, crits provided relief from a purely ‘marks’ 
perspective, opportunities to engage with other students’ work, opportunities to 
tackle deeper issues, and access a variety of perspectives. Crits further provided 
individual attention, experience in articulating design meaning and thinking critically 
and “getting to know yourself better” (Blair et al., 2007, pp. 6-7). By this account, the 
crit can be a transformative, collaborative experience that also accommodates 
individual attention to students and brings about their personal growth.  
This account, and those following below suggest that design studio pedagogy may 
also lead the sharing of visual design meaning between students and teachers.  
Shreeve (2011, p. 116) cites a design teacher interview from a large design 
pedagogy research study12 over several subject areas and institutions which shows 
very positive teacher attitudes toward students: 
…your relationship to students is different from student to student. There 
are some students that come to an idea which I just can‘t get my head 
around. But I trust them and I‘ll say go with your instinct because they‘re a 
strong student. 
Shreeve (2011) explains too that design studio interaction with tutors helps students 
to organise their own learning in the ‘home base’ of the studio, in the absence of 
formal lectures that might structure knowledge. Design students cannot be given a 
                                            
12
 Shreeve refers to the CLIP CETL Funded UAL Research Project Report titled ‘Teaching Landscapes in 
Creative Arts Subjects’ (Sims, 2008).  
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demonstration on ‘how to design’, but they do enjoy the advantage of direct contact 
with teachers and other students in the practical learning experience of the design 
studio. Student contact with teachers is often on a one-to-one basis, so there is the 
opportunity for deep engagement with the teacher about design development issues.  
But conflict between teachers and students concerning visual design meaning may 
equally occur. 
Regarding the divergent ambiguity of student and teacher ways-of-knowing, Fleming 
(1998, p. 43) cites Forester on design conversations: 
When form-giving is understood more as an activity of making sense 
together, it can then be situated in a world where social meaning is a 
perpetual practical accomplishment. Designing takes place in institutional 
settings where rationality is precarious at best, conflict abounds, and 
relations of power shape what is feasible, desirable and, at times, even 
imaginable.  
Sharing design meaning is then at least partially dependent on variable pedagogical 
ways-of- knowing in the design studio. There might be ambiguity and inconsistency 
in the ways in which the teacher expects students to know, and the ways in which 
the teacher him- or herself knows, on any one occasion. As the studies I have 
reviewed in this chapter suggest, ambiguity is endemic to both the conception and 
the articulation of relevant design meaning in design pedagogy.  
How talk and artefacts combine in design education is key to design as a practice in 
which the object mediates between the designer and others (Oak, 2008, p. 1). For 
this study, the entwining of knowing with communication then seemed to lie at the 
heart of conceptual ambiguity and divergence in design studio pedagogy. I depict 
this in Figure 2.4 as a triangular relationship where pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
and communication in the design studio converge on the possibility of sharing an 
understanding of design meaning.  
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Figure 2. 4 The convergence of pedagogical ways-of-knowing and 
communication  on shared or unshared visual design meaning. 
As I have briefly explained in Chapter One, my research approach is one that uses 
abductive explanation of an anomalous situation. The divergences and ambiguities 
of design studio pedagogy elaborated in this chapter constitute this anomalous 
situation. 
In the next chapter I target this abductive explanation through the formulation of 
research questions about knowing and articulating design meaning. In doing so I 
also grapple with the ontological possibilities for articulating such knowledge in the 
design studio, by drawing on Critical Realist philosophy. 
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Chapter Three 
Critical Realism and Pedagogical Ways-of-
Knowing Design Meaning 
This chapter gives an account of Critical Realism (CR) as the overall philosophy that 
guides the research explanation in this study. As I mentioned in Chapter One, CR 
moves from observations about a research phenomenon to explanation of the 
conditions of possibility for this phenomenon to occur (Collier, 1994; Danermark et 
al, 2002; Lawson, 2004; Bhaskar, 2008). In other words, the CR ontology concerns 
what makes the occurrence of a particular social phenomenon possible. 
This means that CR is a philosophy of social emergence. Bhaskar’s (2008) CR 
approach regards social aspects of empirical situations and events as emerging 
through the influence of historically formed social structures. To put this very simply, 
the CR view is that whatever happens (in the social world) happens because of 
something else, or a combination of some other things. 
In Chapter One I also referred to abductive inference as an analytical strategy for 
research explanation. The abductive approach is a form of inference that is closely 
aligned with the CR project of accounting for emergence. Abduction generally 
proceeds by means of a theoretical re-contextualisation of research circumstances to 
explanation of what makes these circumstances emerge.  
Over the course of this chapter I position my research concern with design pedagogy 
within a critical realist explanation, moving toward a fuller account of my choice of 
the abductive research method.  
3.1 Targeting the Research: Emergence and Design Meaning 
In Chapter Two, design education scholarship showed that there is a variety of 
teacher expectations about knowing and articulating the visual meaning of students’ 
designed objects. Across the studies I reviewed in Chapter Two, divergent 
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pedagogical ways-of-knowing were evident in communication between teachers and 
students in the design studio. 
Unlike academic disciplines with a more defined knowledge base, knowing the visual 
meaning of student designs is not a matter of drawing upon formal knowledge 
content. For instance, knowing in Geology proceeds from knowledge of solid earth – 
from physical matter. Such knowing might come to revise existing knowledge of solid 
earth or rock formations, but such revisions refer to a defined knowledge base.  
To exacerbate the lack of defined knowledge base, design briefs tend to have 
unfamiliar and ill-defined parameters (Lawson, 2004, p. 18) that require some form of 
inquiry. It was for this reason, initially, that I began to regard the matter of knowing 
visual design meaning as a matter of emergence. 
Students generally respond to design briefs by producing ‘new’ designs. These 
designs are innovations or re-interpretations of preceding designs, rather than totally 
original inventions. These student designs emerge with reference to some sort of 
predecessor artefact (Michl, 2002) so new design meanings emerge more as 
transformations. 
Then there is the matter of communicating about this visual meaning. For 
communication about nonverbal, visual meaning to proceed, relevant previous 
meaning must emerge in communication. Often this is tacit knowledge about visual 
meaning, that must somehow be made explicit. A student may explain what 
information has been collected in order to design their designed object. However, 
this information used in the process of design must still be related to the student’s 
newly designed object.  
The visual meaning of designed objects is in any case emergent in social life, as 
Bayley’s (2010) critique of a skyscraper building showed in Chapter Two. So yet 
another emergence trajectory is involved in inferring the potential meaning 
emergence of a student’s design in the social world beyond the design studio. As I 
mentioned in Chapter Two, this future visual meaning is part of the design 
conceptual process (Gedenryd, 1998). 
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The visual meanings of student’s designs are, then, emergent in studio 
communicative interactions between students and teachers. What is of primary 
importance to this study is shared visual meaning emergence between teachers and 
students, because without this, there is little chance that students can learn from 
design studio interactions. In studio communication between teachers and students, 
it may happen that there is no divergence in the understanding of visualdesign 
meaning, and it may happen that there is.  
In Chapter Two, the design pedagogy literature placed a strong emphasis on the 
design teacher’s role in visual meaning-making in the design studio. Pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing are hugely important to studio communicative interactions, because 
they are both tacit and equivocal (Austerlitz et al., 2008, p. 9). 
Therefore, I targeted pedagogical ways-of-knowing as a highly significant factor in 
the sharing of visual design meaning. What seemed most important to find out was: 
how do design teachers consider knowing visual design meaning to be possible for 
students? This is not a matter of possibility in the sense of serendipity, but a matter 
of what makes for the emergence (or not) of shared visual design meaning in studio 
communication interactions. 
In my view, pedagogical ways-of-knowing may operate, even where design 
educators consider design visual meaning to be essentially ‘undecidable’ as in a 
post-structural or postmodern approach to design meaning. Even undecidability13 
needs references which may not decide, but instead, open meaning in particular 
ways, and even the “endless ironic regress” of postmodernism (Eschelman, 2008, p. 
3) is ironic about something. 
However, I wish to be clear that I do not privilege pedagogical way-of-knowing, but 
investigate them because of their undeniable effect (as demonstrated in Chapter 
Two) as conditions of possibility for the emergence of shared visual design meaning.  
                                            
13
 Undecidability (Derrida, 1978), is a cornerstone of postmodern or post-structural meaning and 
knowing.  
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As core research questions about how design pedagogical ways-of-knowing might 
affect the sharing of design meaning, I asked: 
• In what different ways do teachers think the visual meaning of students’ 
designs can be known? In other words, what are the different pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing that operate in the design studio? 
• How does verbal communication affect pedagogical ways-of-knowing visual 
design object meaning?  
• Why might particular, non-arbitrary visual design object meanings be 
articulated by design teachers?  
I felt that design educators might share an uneasiness about the validity of visual 
meaning attributions that might emerge in any studio interaction – either their own or 
those of students. In this I intend no disrespect to my colleagues (or myself). Argyris 
and Schön’s (1974) premise that teachers’ espoused theory might differ from theory 
they actually use in practice would, in my view, be unfairly applied to the 
extraordinary difficulties entailed in articulating the visual meaning of students’ 
designed objects. Communication in the design studio is not just about the visual 
meanings of students’ designs; it is about how that visual meaning might emerge for 
others in some other place at some other time.14 
There are, as I have shown in Chapter Two, disparate views on how visual design 
meaning might be articulated as knowledge. Since this knowing of visual design 
meaning also comes through the filter of verbal articulation, I decided to take an 
emergence research approach to knowing design meaning. I turned to CR 
emergence philosophy, pioneered by Bhaskar in the 1970s but now widely and 
authoritatively theorised beyond Bhaskar’s work. CR asks what makes things 
possible, and it looks to underlying factors that condition possibility (Bhaskar, 2008). 
The CR approach is a social approach to reality, in which social conditions are held 
to enable or constrain (and to enable and constrain) the emergence of a particular 
                                            
14
 I discussed this issue in Chapter Two, calling on Gedenryd (1998) and Fleming (1998) with regard 
to the nature of design meaning 
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phenomenon. Most often such underlying conditions are historically formed 
(Bhaskar, 2008), and affect the possibilities for what might be experienced in any 
situation – the studio in design pedagogy, in this instance. 
The benefits of taking a CR approach in this particular study rest on differences 
between CR and other paradigmatic approaches. I sought to explain the effect of 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing on the sharing of visual design meaning between 
students and teachers in the design studio.  
Such an explanation aspires to reach beyond the undecidable and endlessly relative 
multi-voiced approach of postmodernist and post-structuralist research. The CR 
approach is a relational approach, but one that prioritises historical relationality and 
seeks through historical relationality a provisional but ‘practically adequate’ 
explanation for local and particular circumstances (Sayer, 1992).  
The provisional aspect concerns the CR admission that knowledge is revisable and 
fallible (Moore, 2007). Then, some explanations are more practically adequate than 
others (Sayer, 1992, p. 70). So CR is a philosophy that works toward useful and 
emancipatory relational explanations that should demonstrate something more than 
a standpoint, but are still revisable (Moore, 2007). 
This is not to say that ideological standpoints can be dismissed in the CR approach. 
But for this study, it seemed that ideological domination was too hefty an assumption 
to bring to the attempt to explain pedagogical ways-of-knowing visual design object 
meaning. 
A further an most important ontological consideration was my own belief that when 
triggered, social history and social events influence concrete situations. I realised 
that this belief had been implicit in my own thinking as a professional fashion 
designer, before I became an educator. Though I did not realise it at the time, my 
design thinking rejected the notion of individually subjective reality as the only reality. 
But at the same time I also implicity understood that larger influences tended to 
occur in particular contexts, so the collective subjectivity of social constructionist 
thinking (Cohen, Manion & Morrison) did not fit my thinking either.  
66 
 
It was clear that the issue of divergent and ambiguous pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
in the design studio is not confined to time or place, as I have said in Chapter One. 
Because CR is a philosophy that supports the linking of macro forces with micro 
effects, (as I explain further in Section 3.3 of this chapter). I recognised the 
opportunity CR provided for the particular kind of contextual but not localised 
explanation that I have found it important to pursue.  
3.1.1 Explaining Teacher Ways-of-Knowing Visual Design Meaning 
My research strategy was to see pedagogical ways-of-knowing, (the ways in which 
teachers think students might know) as conditions that influence the design object 
sense-making that happens in design studio communicative interactions. 
To re-iterate, there is always some kind of preceding or anterior knowing going on in 
the making of design meaning, but why do certain and not other ways-of-knowing 
operate on any given occasion? 
To ask this question, and to ask it in this way, means that one is dealing with the 
concept of emergence. Emergence in the CR philosophical tradition embraces the 
above-mentioned ‘conditions of possibility’, that is, what it may be that conditions the 
emergence of a phenomenon in a particular context (Bhaskar, 2008). As I mentioned 
in Chapter One, Bhaskar’s realist approach seeks to explain how it is that particular 
circumstances come to obtain; any occurrence or experience assumes some prior 
categorical necessity, which predisposes things to be how they are. In this approach 
then, there are social reasons why poverty occurs, just as there are natural reasons 
why the weather changes. 
3.2 Critical Realist Explanation  
According to Bhaskar (2008), social reality is manifest on different levels, so any 
straightforward claim about what is real on one level is still subject to different forms 
of manifestation on other levels. Reality is stratified on levels of the real, the actual 
and the empirical (Bhaskar, 1997, 2008). As shown in Figure 3.1 overleaf,  
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• the real consists of relatively enduring structures and mechanisms that exist 
apart from our knowledge of them;  
• the actual consists of events, whether or not they are observed, and  
• the empirical consists of experience. 
 
Figure 3.1 Bhaskar’s (2008) realist ontology 
Taking Bhaskar’s stratified levels of reality in reverse order, the empirical as 
experience may mean experience of real but abstract phenomena, like ‘the 
economy’ through a sudden drop in the value of a currency. ‘The empirical’ is, as 
Scheuer (2001, p. 21) puts it, “where what goes on does meet the eye”, rather than 
how something is personally experienced. Empirical experience is nonetheless still 
concept-dependent; people do not apprehend phenomena of any kind without prior 
conceptualisations that they bring to this apprehension (Sayer, 1992). An empirical 
experience might conceptually refer to the abstract real or to an actual event 
(witnessed or not), but it may also simply (but still concept-dependently) fasten upon 
a material object (Sayer, 1992). 
The actual level includes what we observe at first hand and also what occurs outside 
of our experience, or has occurred in the past, as the manifestation of real 
structures. The ‘actual’ is then what is taken to have occurred, whether observed at 
first hand or not. Again the example of currency devaluation may serve as the actual, 
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event manifestation of the structure called ‘the economy’. We trust in the report of 
such an event whether or not we observe or experience it, and people who were 
born in the 1960s take it for granted that the Great Depression as an actual event 
happened in the 1930s. 
Lawson (2004, p. 2) thinks that the real level of ‘enduring structures’ should rather be 
described as ‘relatively enduring’ structures, and gives the example of Cambridge 
University as a relatively enduring structure. Lawson’s qualification is important to 
understanding the sense in which Bhaskar’s ontology applies in the social world. 
Enduring structures are not monolithic edifices that have endured from time 
immemorial. However, the enduring structures on the level of the real are termed 
‘intransitive’ (unchanging) by comparison with the transitive (changing) actuality of 
events and experiences (Baehr, 1990, pp. 769-770). 
But, as Baehr asks, how can social reality be unchanging? Bhaskar’s answer, 
quoted by Baehr (1990, p. 769), is that real social structures are “activity-, concept-, 
and space-time dependent”, but once they have formed as, for instance, social 
institutions, real social structures have real enabling and constraining effects. 
Bhaskar’s “transformational model of social activity” (1989, pp. 34–54) expresses the 
activity, concept, and space–time dependency of social structures on human agency: 
“Society is both the ever present condition (material cause) and the continually 
reproduced outcome of human agency”. 
The stratified CR ontology is, as I have shown, nested, so that experience and 
events are to be considered part of the real. Causes and effects are embedded in 
the superimposed and layered domains of the social realm. This is a key feature of 
the CR ontology, which should not be taken to represent a hierarchy. The domain of 
experience is a subset of the domain of the actual, and the domains of the actual 
and the experiential are both subsets of the real (Carter & New, 2004, p. 16). The 
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CR idea is that social processes represent the relational dynamics between these 
domains.15  
I regard it as extremely important that the CR ontology not be taken too literally. The 
real, the actual and the empirical are very broad terms for very ordinary aspects of 
social life: abstract structures, events whether witnessed or not, and the direct 
experiences of human beings. There is no reason to doubt that there are abstract 
structures that form part of social life (we take it for granted that politics, marriage 
and geology exist, without our direct experience of them), that actual events take 
place (we take note of news reports, though we do not witness the events that are 
reported), and we have first-hand experiences (of child-raising, of world travel, or of 
illness). What Bhaskar maintains is that first-hand experiences do not simply arrive 
on our doorsteps, and neither are they understood in a tabula rasa or blank slate 
kind of way. Abstract structures of knowledge and awareness of events are brought 
to the understanding of direct experience ( Bhaskar, 2008). 
That social reality might then be constituted by these abstract, semi-abstract and 
concrete components – structures, events and experiences – is not a particularly 
surprising claim. A too technical view of structures, events and experiences is then 
inappropriate to what are really aspects of everyday life as it is known. Such a view 
would mitigate against the common sense usefulness of Bhaskar’s realist ontology. 
As Pratt (2007, pp. 27-28) has put it: 
Critical realism is not an Enlightenment-type rationality, or a return to a 
one-dimensional positivism based on an accumulation of observable data, 
but a highly flexible meta-view which can accommodate inquiry in both the 
natural and social sciences … From a critical realist viewpoint, broad 
social conditions are as much ‘givens’ of the human condition as the 
landscape, and, once set in place, are not amenable to attempts at human 
control. While the term “under-labourer” (Locke 1690:3) for the natural and 
human sciences frequently recurs in accounts of critical realism, it should 
possibly more properly be treated as an overview or meta-perspective, or 
perhaps even something of an interface stretching beyond socially 
constructed views of reality towards reality itself, which is not necessarily 
a realm of solid objects (Norris 1999:6) but a state of being we all tacitly 
acknowledge to exist by virtue of our everyday functioning. 
                                            
15
 Bhaskar’s early work on Critical Realism has been elaborated and extended in his books on 
dialectical Critical Realism. This study follows the early form of CR as a matter of epistemological and 
ontological orientation. 
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Pratt describes the value of CR as a philosophical rather than a theoretical 
approach, a view that is echoed by Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson and Norrie 
(1998) as key CR proponents. I recognised that it is on this philosophical level that 
the emergence ontology of CR might guide my inquiry into what sorts of teacher 
ways-of-knowing might allow visual design meaning to emerge in design 
pedagogical interactions. CR does not provide the researcher with the means to 
connect an explanation to an empirical situation, but it does espouse a socially 
relational and processual ontology of emergence, where experiences and events are 
inescapably influenced by real abstract structures. Kaboub (2001, p. 1, author 
emphasis) defines the ‘real’ in CR: 
The critical realist philosophical ontology states that something is real if it 
can bring about visible/material consequences. In other words, in critical 
realism something is real if it is relationally efficacious (e.g., a magnetic 
field, unemployment, poverty).  
Abstract phenomena like those Kaboub mentions have discernable social effects, 
and these phenomena translate into the processes of emergence that result in our 
experience of the world (Carter & New, 2004). CR then embraces a non-positivist 
emergence relationality that is concerned with the effects of social processes. 
The CR ontology holds that ‘conditions of possibility’ are underlying structural 
mechanisms of a kind that generate the emergence of the phenomena experienced 
in social life (Bhaskar, 2008). In this study, the experiential phenomenon is the visual 
meaning of students’ designed objects which emerges within the confines of the 
design studio in design education. 
Another way of putting the idea of these conditions of possibility is to think of them as 
mechanisms that make it possible for things to be related – relational mechanisms. 
The term ‘mechanism’ here does not refer to anything mechanical. Instead, as 
Sawyer (2004) has explained, in sociology mechanisms are associated with the 
unobvious reasons for the emergence of social phenomena. 
Relational mechanisms entail the simultaneous emergence of antecedent and either 
similar or different present phenomena at a particular moment or in an event (Elder-
Vass, 2007a, p. 230). This is not the kind of relational emergence where historical 
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social structures emerge over time, but the mechanism of emergence that brings an 
abstract historical structure to bear in an empirical context, as Elder-Vass (2007a) 
explains. Relational emergence therefore refers to the nesting of Bhaskar’s stratified 
levels of real structures, actual events and empirical experience; the real structures 
come to bear on actual events or empirical experiences (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 
2008). For instance, one may say that relational emergence occurs when historical 
traditions influence a particular event, like a wedding, a carnival or the winning of a 
trophy. 
The CR ontology holds that ‘conditions of possibility’ are underlying relational 
mechanisms of a kind that generate the emergence of the phenomena experienced 
in social life. CR explains how mechanisms may be relationally efficacious, bringing 
structures into relation with our experiences and interactions, in unobservable ways 
(Archer, 1995; Sawyer, 2004; Elder-Vass, 2007a; Bhaskar 2008). Our experiences 
are of a reality that is never ‘simply present’; processes and events have come into 
relation or linked up and the conditions we experience have emerged from these 
linkages. 
This is the philosophical position I take in this study regarding the emergence of the 
visual meaning of students’ designs. I regard this emergence as being influenced by 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing as relational mechanisms. Clearly, and very 
importantly, this is not the only influence on the emergence of visual design meaning 
in design pedagogy, but it is the influence that I focus upon. 
The CR stratified ontology and relational mechanisms explain each other, as Vincent 
(2005, p. 9), points out:  
Subjective positions and agency groups, material products, businesses 
and market structures, institutions and other national governance 
mechanisms all have relational powers that interact and, depending on 
their combination, they simultaneously and selectively influence social 
action and agency in specific organizational contexts. This suggests a 
“stratified and transformational ontology” (Ackroyd & Fleetwood, 2000), in 
which various levels and types of force are considered for how they affect 
social action in particular locations. 
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It would, however, be a mistake to take it that relational mechanisms are always 
seated in macro social institutions. Vincent’s (2005) portrayal of how relational 
mechanisms operate shows their appearance at different social levels. For instance, 
students’ experience of design pedagogy might be affected by the appointment of 
ex-professional designers as teachers, who have no knowledge of how learning 
might happen. This could be the structural effect caused by an institutional view of 
design education as vocational education. 
As another example, stratified levels of emergence could also mean that an anti-
consumerist design philosophy might underlie the way in which critique is handled in 
studio interactions, with the result that students graduating from such a design 
programme are preferred by socially responsible design consultancies. 
Relational mechanisms are also generative mechanisms of emergence, as the 
previous examples may show. CR relational mechanisms can account for the 
emergence of abstract and concrete aspects of contextually confined, direct 
experiences (Archer, 1995; Sawyer, 2004). The mechanisms that might operate in 
design pedagogy, specifically mechanisms of pedagogical knowing, would not be 
obviously discernable in crit and studio interactions. Teachers’ notions about 
knowing visual design meaning might be generated over time, through processual 
relations (not necessarily linear) between social structures, social events and social 
experiences. 
3.3 Critical Realist Explanation: Research Challenges 
The challenge one faces when adopting a critical realist theoretical approach is to 
explain the deeper, abstract layers beneath the concrete surfaces of experience. 
A good example of the background operation of relational mechanisms is Marsh, 
Rosser and Harre’s (1980) study of football hooliganism (cited in Carter & New, 
2004, p. 6). This study found that there are social benefits and a moral rationale to 
hooligan mob membership that operate behind the scenes of the actual football 
match events. In this case there is no obvious link between the first-hand 
observation or experience of football hooliganism and its relational emergence. Also, 
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observing football matches where hooliganism might occur will not reveal these 
relational mechanisms. The lack of explanatory information at the empirical level (as 
in this example of hooliganism at football matches) is a challenge to be faced in a 
CR-based research study. 
The processual, social kind of relational mechanism may or may not pertain in 
particular contexts and circumstances, and it is the researcher’s task to explain why 
a relational mechanism might partially account for the circumstances experienced in 
a particular context. The activation (or not) of the relational mechanism depends on 
the context in which it occurs (Maxwell, 2004, p. 6). So relational explanation of 
mechanisms of emergence includes, as part of the explanation, the concrete context 
in which the relational mechanism operates. Here lies the difficulty: CR rejects the 
idea that one could, in the empirical sense-data tradition, observe reality. Bhaskar’s 
position, in my understanding, is that whatever occurs is made possible on some 
other level. To reiterate, Bhaskar’s levels are: 
• the empirical (but the empirical as experience, which is someone’s 
experience, or some collective experience)  
 
• events, or the ‘actual’; events that take place whether they are experienced or 
not, and  
 
• the real, which engenders each and both of the above. 
The upshot of this is that there are emergence mechanisms at the level of the real 
that are responsible for what occurs, or what is experienced. But the further upshot 
of this is that if experience is influenced by events and mechanisms, researcher 
accounts of what is experienced in any given context are the most intractably difficult 
to account for with any methodological validity. 
Neither micro social explanation in the tradition of methodological individualism, nor 
macro social explanation in the tradition of methodological collectivism is accepted in 
the CR project. This is because social reality is neither held to be the result of 
individual agency nor the result of the collective properties of social structures. 
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Furthermore, critical realists dismiss as ‘central conflation’ the idea of agency and 
structure as mutually constitutive (Archer, 1995). Abstract structures, at the level of 
the real, and concrete agency at the level of the empirical, function interdependently 
and independently (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1993). Individuals are born into social 
structures that shape their lives. But individuals can also be agents of change in 
social structures. 
This macro-micro issue maps respectively onto abstract and concrete relationships. 
The significance of this for this study is that there is little point in researching a 
number of cases of design pedagogy on a micro level, in order to find out what 
makes visual design meaning possible, because that is a macro matter and it is likely 
to be hidden though effectual in any one design studio session or event. However, 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing are here conceived as macro relational mechanisms 
that might have effects on design studio events, while acknowledging that they are 
not the only relational mechanisms that might do so. 
This study concentrates on pedagogical ways-of-knowing as significantly enabling 
and constraining the emergence of shared visual design object meaning, but other 
relational mechanisms are also sure to be at play. Together with this awareness, the 
CR position for Carter & New (2004, p. 5) is that: 
[t]he world to which our concepts and theories more or less adequately 
refer … is neither a product of, nor constituted by, our theories about it. It 
is fashionable to attribute the properties of knowledge (its partial, 
provisional nature) to the objects of knowledge, a mistake which Bhaskar 
terms the ‘epistemic fallacy’ (Bhaskar 1989a, p. 133). 
In this light, relational mechanisms must be considered to be tendencies (Bhaskar, 
2008) and not certainties. Explaining the activation of an abstract mechanism in a 
concrete context is then no easy task. While the CR ontological claims of a social 
reality might be pursued, they are not held to be fully attainable. In the next section I 
examine the analytical challenges that attend a partial but ‘practically adequate’ 
(Sayer, 1992, p. 70) explanation of the fully real. 
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3.3.1. A Discourse Analytical Approach to CR Explanation 
Because the discourse- analytical approach of Fairclough (1992, 2005, 2010 ) is 
widely used in CR-orientated research analyses, I explore this approach here, and 
give reasons why I have elected not to use it.  
To start with, discourses and discursive formations have long been a favoured 
analytical strategy for finding linkages between abstract and concrete phenomena. 
Broadly, there is discourse analysis that sees social practices and activities as the 
expression of consolidated thinking patterns that enter every crevice of human 
experience. Then there is discourse analysis that works the opposite way. This is 
discourse that arises from material practices, in the Marxist tradition (Banfield, 
2003).16 Such discourses can account for relational mechanisms in CR research 
(Fairclough, 2005).  
CR prioritises material practices over language, and requires that extra-discursive 
referents be identified (Laclau & Bhaskar, 1998, Fleetwood, 2005; Curtis, 2007; 
Riley, Sims-Schouten, & Willig, 2007) Extra-discursive referents are non-textual, 
material referents. Bhaskar’s (1998, p. 14) separation of the extra-discursive and 
material referent ‘water’ from the referenced ‘desire to drink water’ is illustrative: “If I 
desire water, I must detach the water from the desiring subject; this is the referent of 
my act of desire”. 
Fairclough takes the latter view I have described, that of discourse as arising from 
human material activities and practices. Since there is no easy path to establishing 
an abstract knowing link to material phenomena, I first looked at what Fairclough’s 
discourse analytic approach might afford this study. 
Fairclough’s approach looks at how particular individuals or groups select and 
combine elements of micro discourses within macro discourse perspectives (Ruiz, 
2009). Macro orders of discourse, might, for instance, be ‘mental illness’, ‘citizenship’ 
or ‘literacy’. These are macro layers of discourse that comprise of a multitude of 
                                            
16
 The philosophy of emergent materialism is roughly in line with this view. It is through material 
practices that knowing emerges (Banfield, 2003). 
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linked social elements. Such macro discourses have the micro effect of discursively 
positioning people (for instance, patients within the macro mental illness order of 
discourse) and their interests (Fairclough, 1993, pp. 3-4). 
Initially, this macro-micro relation looked promising for investigating how macro 
abstract structures might bring the emergence of empirical circumstances at a micro, 
research context level.  
Macro discourses, for Fairclough, need to be considered in the light of historical 
change. For example, ‘Aids’ is a macro order of discourse that might call upon 
historically formed attitudes to venereal disease or illicit sexual practices (Fairclough, 
1993, pp. 3-4). Then, to extend this example, micro material practices such as 
contraception or promiscuity will mesh with the macro orders of discourse, and the 
circumstances in which language and practices combine (“text and interaction”) will 
form another layer of meaning (Fairclough, 1993, p. 134).  
In Fairclough’s overall view, the layered effects of orders of discourse, historically 
merging and emergent discourses, and social interactions represented in textual 
forms17 must be considered in terms of their separate and combined effects. 
However, Curtis (2007) mounts a critique of Fairclough’s discourse-analytical 
process.18 The gist of Curtis’s criticism, based on examples of Fairclough’s discourse 
analyses, is that interpretive construction is required to progress from one layer of 
discourse to the next. This is for Curtis particularly true of the discourse ‘genres’ 
Fairclough identifies in the different layers. Curtis cannot ‘find’ the genres Fairclough 
identifies in these examples, and suggests instead that they are interpretations, even 
narrative productions of layers that can then be used to analyse another layer.19 
Perhaps though, what Fairclough does is to infer, rather than ‘find’ genres; CR has 
after all always denied that we can unproblematically discover the realities of any 
empirical phenomenon, in a positivist way. 
                                            
17
 My understanding of ‘textual’ is anything that can be interpretively read off an object, including a 
visual object. 
18
 Uldam (2010) takes a similar view on Fairclough’s ontological discourse analysis approach.  
19
 I do not presume that Fairclough advocates a progression from micro to macro, or the other way 
around.  
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To attempt relational explanation by means of a series of interdependent inferences 
might be credible if these inferences pertain to dominant and ideologically 
recognisable discourses. But as I mentioned earlier I was afraid that the idea of 
dominant discourses as pedagogical ways-of-knowing very different student designs 
was a somewhat pre-emptive framing. 
My sense was that conditions of possibility that translate into relational mechanisms 
needed to prioritise relations over structures. Put differently, I favoured the abductive 
inference of structures through evidence of relations, rather than the abductive 
inference of relations from evidence of structures. The explanatory goal of the study 
is a one of accounting for a process; for how pedagogical ways-of-knowing might 
lead to the emergence of visual designed object meaning, rather than the meanings 
themselves. 
Because of the scope of visual design meaning, it was necessary to maintain a very 
open approach to the idea of relation mechanisms that might account for different 
ways-of-knowing, for how they might affect communicative interactions in the design 
studio, and why certain and not other visual design meanings might emerge. 
The pursuit of such openness as the CR philosophy espouses did, however, still 
need to deal with mechanisms as macro-micro and abstract-concrete relations that 
lead to visual design meaning emergence on any given occasion. Since, as I have 
earlier said, the research context itself is an important component of the explanation 
of what is going on in that context, theoretical abduction from the research context 
looked like a viable strategy. 
In the next section I explain how theoretical abduction provided an opportunity to 
address the empirical research context of design studio pedagogy within the overall 
CR approach of the study. 
3.4 Critical Realist Explanation: Research Opportunities 
CR studies often use ‘retroduction’ or ‘abduction’ as the methodological thrust behind 
explanation (Sanghera, 2000; Wad, 2001: Danermark et al, 2002; Lawson, 2004; 
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Breese, 2008). In the case of retroduction, the strategy is to look for what is 
presupposed, or what pre-conditions may be invoked by research phenomena that 
define them as substantially different from other phenomena (Dick, 2005; Quinn, 
2006). In the similar case of abduction, conditions of possibility are inferred using the 
lens of a theoretical or conceptual framework (Roberts, 2001; Wad, 2001; Kelle, 
2005; Quinn, 2006; Breese, 2008). 
To avoid confusion, ‘retroduction’ is often used as the general term for both 
retroductive and abductive strategies. The retroductive search for conditions of 
possibility has been criticised as a “linear movement of concrete to abstract and then 
from abstract back to concrete” (Roberts 2001, p. 557). Roberts allows, though, that 
if relevant theory can be applied in a methodologically compatible way, both 
tendentiousness and reductive inference might be avoided. This use of relevant 
theory is the mode of inference properly known as abduction. In CR-oriented 
research, this requires substantive conceptualisation of conditions of possibility or, 
synonymously, the mechanisms that make a situation what it is (Wad, 2001). 
The abductive method finds the relational processes or mechanisms of emergence 
that account for an anomalous empirical situation. In this study these are relational 
mechanisms. The empirical situation is the situation of ambiguous and divergent 
ways-of-knowing of design studio pedagogy described by design education 
researchers in Chapter Two. From an abductive CR perspective, the reasons why 
the empirical situation might obtain do not ‘come from’ the empirical situation, but do 
come to bear on it. If certain deeper structures or prior events come to bear on 
events and experiences at certain times and in certain places; it is the researcher’s 
task to explain what, when, where and how. In the depth ontology of CR, the layers 
of reality are nested, so if the anomalous research situation to be explained 
manifests at the level of actual events or experiences, that anomalous situation as 
the research context quite naturally forms part of the explanation of what goes on in 
it. 
In this case, the research context is layered on CR ontological levels. On the level of 
real structures are differentiated pedagogical ways-of-knowing. These real structures 
either constrain or enable communication around visual design meaning in the 
79 
 
design studio, on the level of actual events. Because pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
are opaque to students and teachers in design studio communicative interactions, 
shared visual design meaning may or may not emerge at the empirical level. As a 
point of departure, relational mechanisms are considered to somehow involve 
differentiated design teacher ways-of-knowing as real structures that come to bear 
on design studio communication, bringing teachers’ attribution of particular, non-
arbitrary attribution of visual design meaning to students’ designs. The whole of this 
initial relational mechanism construal conditions the emergence of shared or 
unshared visual design meaning between teachers and students, as shown in Figure 
3.2 below.  
 
Figure 3.2 Initial Design Studio Construal of Relational Mechanism Emergence  
The term ‘abduction’ was coined by Peirce (cited by Kelle, 2005, unpaged). I follow 
here Kelle’s explanation of Peircean abduction: abductive inference starts with the 
research situation or context needing explanation. This situation is then 
conceptualised in terms of what might account for the anomalous circumstances of 
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the situation under research scrutiny. Abductive conceptualisation draws upon 
previously formed theories that must, however, fit the circumstances of the research 
context. The process of abductive inference does not invent new knowledge, but 
rather construes the situation under scrutiny in a new light. It is worth quoting Kelle 
(2005, unpaged) on abductive knowledge claims: 
Many of the theoretical insights and developments in sociology which led 
to new and convincing explanations of social phenomena may be 
reconstructed as arising from abductive inferences. This especially relates 
to so called ‘middle range theories’, as for instance Durkheim's idea that 
differences between suicide rates result from differing levels of ‘anomia’, 
or Weber’s explanation of the economic success of protestant merchants 
as a consequence of their religious orientations. The ‘labelling approach’ 
which attempted to understand ‘mental illness’ or deviance not as an 
inherent personal quality or attribute of individual actors but as a result of 
processes of social interaction may serve as another good example. 
To sum up, abductive inference is a theoretically informed mode of inference that 
can be shown to be relevant to the research context of enquiry. The abductive route 
entails a re-describing of the research phenomenon in new terms of structural and 
relational possibility (Breese, 2008). Understandings about the object of study are 
developed by being placed in new ‘contexts of ideas’ (Breese, 2008). The discussion 
of substantive theory that follows in Chapter Four is thus more than a summarising of 
what Luhmann offers this study and includes the argument for Luhmannian theory as 
a relevant if partial account of pedagogical ways-of-knowing. Abductive inference 
must heed the provisional validity and the fallibility of explanation that are enshrined 
in CR philosophy. But equally, CR asks for explanatory power that can be put to 
work, rather than discovery or interpretive ‘thick description’.20 
The goal of abductive inference in this study is to identify relational mechanisms that 
bring macro ways-of-knowing into the micro context of design pedagogy. The micro 
level is the level of visual design meaning emergence in pedagogical interactions in 
the design studio, and the macro level is the pedagogical ways-of-knowing that may 
apply and continue to apply across design pedagogical interactions, irrespective of 
time and place. 
                                            
20
 ‘Thick description’ is Geertz’ (1973) anthropological term for the interpretive validity of a descriptive  
research account.  
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I regarded pedagogical ways-of-knowing as macro structures or mechanisms that 
may lead to the emergence of particular student visual design object meanings in 
design studio pedagogical events. In the next chapter, I place pedagogical ways-of-
knowing in the new context of ideas offered by Luhmann’s theory of cognition in 
communication, as a theory of meaning emergence. 
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Chapter Four 
 Re-contextualising Design Studio Pedagogy  
The re-contextualising move made in this chapter is the application of substantive 
theory to the research context of design studio pedagogy. Theoretical re-
contextualisation of design studio pedagogy is the first step toward abductive 
inference through new but compatible ideas. The theory that is substantively applied 
is also one of emergence, as a first element of alignment with CR emergence 
ontology that drives abductive research explanation. This theoretical approach is 
Luhmann’s (2000, 2002, 2006) emergence theory of cognition in communication, 
also known (in a less accessible way) as his theory of ‘observation’, as I go on to 
explain in Section 4.1 
In Chapter Three I took an emergence view on how teachers think it possible to 
know the visual meaning of students’ visual design objects. I regarded these 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing21 as ontological conditions of possibility for teachers 
and students to share a view on the visual meaning relevance of students’ designs. 
If there is accord between a student’s and a teacher’s view of visual design meaning, 
then the relevance of design meaning can emerge as shared meaning. If there is no 
accord between teachers and students about design meaning relevance, then visual 
design meaning does not emerge. 
I have approached the possibility of visual design meaning emergence from the 
perspective of how teachers think design meaning may be known. In Chapter Two, I 
showed that design teachers undoubtedly affect the pedagogical sharing of visual 
design meaning, through their ways-of-knowing design meaning. 
Certainly pedagogical ways-of-knowing do not exhaust the possibilities for student 
knowing, and student ways-of-knowing the meaning of designed objects also 
condition the emergence of shared design meaning. However, as I have argued in 
                                            
21
 Here I remind my reader that I have defined pedagogical ways-of-knowing as the ways teachers 
think the students might know. 
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Chapter Two there is evidence of teachers’ strong influence on communication with 
students about visual design meaning, and therefore on the emergence of shared 
design meaning. In view of the multiplicity of assumptions that underpin teachers’ 
expectations of student knowing (see for instance Fleming, 1998; Oxman, 2003; 
Baynes & Roberts, 2005; Logan, 2007; Austerlitz et al., 2008; Smith, Hedley, & 
Molloy, 2009) my research focus was limited to the pedagogical role in student 
learning about design meaning. 
The emergence concerns here led to my positioning this study within the philosophy 
of Critical Realism (CR). To recapitulate, in CR a relational mechanism brings an 
abstract structure into relation with a concrete event or experience (Archer, 1995; 
Elder-Vass, 2007a; Bhaskar, 2008). I have then regarded pedagogical ways-of-
knowing as historically and socially structured, and brought into relation with design 
meaning in studio events. I have regarded pedagogical ways-of-knowing as 
relational mechanisms that condition the emergence of shared visual design 
meaning in the design studio. ‘Condition’ here means to enable, or to constrain 
shared design meaning. 
This emergence positioning of the study led to my adoption of an abductive strategy 
of inference, which uses a theoretical conjecture. Abductive inference works within 
the CR project of explaining emergence conditions of possibility by theoretically 
conjecturing these conditions (Wad, 2001; Kelle, 2005; Breese, 2008). 
CR can suggest only that relational mechanisms might operate in design pedagogy. 
It needs a more substantive theory of pedagogical ways-of-knowing as mechanisms 
to abductively infer their nature, and so provide an explanatory re-description of 
these mechanisms. In the abductive method, such a theory is used to re-
contextualise the research situation, with the proviso that substantive and empirical 
relevance of the theory to the research situation can be demonstrated (Roberts, 
2001; Dey, 2004; Kelle, 2005). 
The emergence positioning in Chapter Three regarded particular empirical factors in 
design pedagogy as contextualising the research phenomenon of visual design 
84 
 
meaning emergence. These contextualising factors were established in the core 
research questions of the study, to which I now give contextual emphasis: 
• In what different ways do teachers think the visual meaning of students’ 
designs can be known? In other words, what are the different pedagogical 
ways-of- knowing that operate in the design studio? 
• How does verbal communication affect pedagogical ways-of-knowing visual 
design object meaning?  
• Why might particular, non-arbitrary visual design object meanings be 
articulated by design teachers? 
It is in respect of these contextual factors that Luhmann’s theorisation22 is, I will 
argue, substantively relevant to this study. Luhmann sees knowing and meaning as 
embodied in communication processes (Luhmann, 1995, 2002, 2006). 
Communication about visual design meaning can only proceed on the basis of 
different ways-of-knowing. This was the starting perspective of Luhmann’s 
theorisation. 
4.1 Luhmann’s Theorisation and Design Pedagogy  
I begin with an overview of Luhmann’s theorisation, and then move to my 
Luhmannian re-contextualisation of design pedagogy in the design studio.  
Luhmann’s work is usually known as systems theory, but in his later work he 
developed the focus on systems theory in terms of the observation of distinctions 
that are organised within systems. This has culminated in what is regarded as 
Luhmann’s (1997) master work, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. The first of two 
                                            
22
 Kadirov and Varey (2008, p. 2) say that Luhmann is held in the same regard as Kant, Weber, 
Heidegger, Gadamer, Foucault, Parsons, and Habermas. Baecker (2008), Mingers, (2002) Elder-
Vass (2007), Farias and Ossandón (2009), and Lee and Brosciewski (2009) are among others who 
also regard Luhmann as a sociologist of great eminence. These authors attribute the lack of wider 
recognition of Luhmann to delay in English translation of his work, which has mostly been written in 
German.  
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volumes of this work has been translated into English under the title ‘The Theory of 
Society: Cultural Memory in the Present’, (Vol I, 2012).  
Luhmann (2002) terms persons who use ways-of-knowing ‘observers’. This is not 
observation in the ocular sense; it is observation as cognition. For Luhmann, 
cognition requires an indication or a ‘pointing to’ that at the same time leaves other 
things aside. This is the same as to say, if I point to something, I can only do so by 
leaving aside everything I do not point to. Only on the condition that there is this 
separation can anything be pointed to or indicated. So what is not indicated is 
necessary to what is indicated, and vice versa; an indication also entails a distinction 
(Schiltz, 2007, citing Spencer Brown). 
The term ‘observation’ for Luhmann refers not to the object that is indicated, but to 
the cognitive act of indicating, that always requires that other things be left aside. 
Indication by distinction is then very much about how something is observed, rather 
than what is observed. An observation is an act; it is ‘doing’ cognition, rather than 
what is cognised. In this sense, observation is an act of cognition and an event of 
cognition. The act of cognition becomes an event when it occurs within the 
communicative recursion of linked distinctions.   
Above all, indication by distinction happens in concrete communication events 
(Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). Though the distinction is usually implicit, it enables a 
concrete indication. An act of observation in a communication event is not limited to 
writing, speaking, or visual images or objects but extends to the communicative 
realms of body language, dance, and team sports tactics (Knudsen, 2010). Knudsen 
(2010, unpaged) also explains indication by distinction: 
It is not possible to indicate something without distinguishing. Observation 
is not bound to visual perceptions; the concept of observation covers any 
praxis of distinguishing indications, including actions. If you make an 
indication you also draw a distinction. Communication is for instance also 
distinguishing indications.  
My summation so far relates to cognitive indication by distinction in micro 
communication events. But on a macro level, over many communication events 
taking place over time, distinctions begin to categorise particular indications 
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(Luhmann, 1995; 2002). This means that a range of distinctions might accrue to 
knowing and communicating about gardening, or astrology, or contract law, for 
instance. Luhmann theorises such particular categorising, or observing by 
distinction, as social system processes of knowing and communication. It is 
ultimately the recursion of implicit distinctions made in concrete communication 
events that builds these abstract systems (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). Luhmann’s 
social systems are categories of cognitive observation (Grant, 2004, p. 219) that 
continually build through communication over time. 
Luhmann’s theory then holds that observers’ micro ways of indicating by distinction 
draw from macro systems of knowing and communication. These macro social 
systems are communicative networks that allow some and not other cognitive 
distinctions to be made in any communication event. They are first abstract systems 
that allow knowing on the fly in communication events, and are systems only in as 
far as they allow variational distinctions of meaning to be connected in 
communication events (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). So communicators are 
constantly drawing from these abstract macro systems to make micro indications by 
distinction, and they often do so without conscious awareness of the macro system 
conditioning the communication. 
These macro systems are historically formed abstract structures that co-ordinate the 
selection of cognitive distinctions in concrete communication events (Luhmann, 
1995). In this regard, macro system structures correspond with the CR idea of real, 
abstract social structures that are activated by agents in concrete events (Mingers, 
2002; Elder-Vass, 2007; Montiel, 2007; Brier, 2009; Fuchs & Hofkirchner, 2009; 
Wan, 2010). In both Luhmann’s (1995) systems theory and Bhaskar’s (2008) CR 
theory, systems of knowing and communication and real structures are in one way or 
another reproduced in concrete events. In Luhmann’s later theory, this reproduction 
of systems is called ‘observation’, and the systems are ‘observed’ systems. There is 
thus from the start, the intimation of relational processes or mechanisms in both CR 
structures and Luhmann’s social systems of knowing and communication. 
Returning to the above-mentioned cognitive distinctions that indicate, it is meaning 
that is indicated by a variational distinction, though a meaning, and the indication of 
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this meaning by distinction, are all tied together. None of these elements can stand 
alone. Luhmann does not support the idea of unitary meanings as encapsulated in 
any one term (Gibson, Gregory & Robinson, 2005, p. 8). Meaning in the Luhmannian 
scheme is about sense-making23 through related distinctions of meaning in 
communication. Social systems of knowing and communication organise sense-
making, as Martens (2006, p. 86) describes: 
Social systems consist of recursively related communications [and] 
communications process meanings. Meaning processing involves the use 
or incorporation of what he calls distinctions. The best way to understand 
communications and distinctions in Luhmann’s theory is, therefore, 
probably to consider them against the background of the notions of 
meaning and meaning processing. The word meaning is used in a specific 
way in Luhmann’s language. It refers to a general form of thinking and 
communication. The form of meaning is characteristic of each thought and 
every communication, as it has something as its focus and refers 
marginally to a horizon for further thought and communication. 
If, for instance, a communication and knowing system were structured around 
‘medical science’, the observers who indicate medical science might be medical 
doctors and nurses who make implicit distinctions that allow medical science to 
mean medical science, rather than folk remedies or other health care options. The 
system perhaps called medical science would not then be a repository of everything 
there is to know about medical science, but rather a developing network of various 
communicative (or associative) distinctions of medical science meanings, that are 
always founded upon the distinction of medical science from whatever, at the time, is 
not considered to be part of medical science (but may come to be). Medical science 
has a long history of scientific experiments as distinctive evidence that ‘indicates’ 
medical science. The network of communicative distinctions of medical science 
knowledge, like all such knowing and communication systems, can shift and change 
over time. At one time, it would have been unthinkable to include nutrition in medical 
treatment, but this is now standard. By the same token, it is now unthinkable to bore 
into the skull of an epilepsy sufferer, in the procedure known as ‘trepanning’. 
                                            
23
 Farias and Ossandón (2009) report that the English translation of Luhmann’s ‘Social Systems’ 
(1995) incorrectly associates Luhmann’s theory with meaning. Luhmann theorises sense and sense-
making, rather than meaning. 
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While there are macro knowledge structures that have developed over time, knowing 
is immediate and specific. Luhmann’s (1995, 2002) theory describes how micro, 
immediate knowing might be drawn from a macro knowling and communication 
system in a communication event. These macro systems are functionally 
differentiated (Luhmann, 1995, p. 53) because they organise and structure particular 
kinds of communicative sense-making or knowing. As such, communication and 
knowing systems are what Luhmann (1995) has called ‘social systems’. 
Diewald and Albert (2007, p. 4) describe Luhmann’s socially differentiated 
communication and knowing systems well: 
Luhmann’s entire theory is about the operation of social systems – 
nothing less, but also nothing more: it is about the question of how social 
systems manage that communication can continue, that it is constantly 
rejected and accepted, and that it leads to new communication; it is about 
symbolically generalized media of communication, such as power, money, 
or truth. 
Communication and knowing systems are thus social knowing systems, because 
they co-ordinate social meaning distinction selections that might otherwise be 
described as ‘ways-of-knowing’. Such social systems classify knowledge selectively 
by allowing certain and not other distinctions to be connected in communication 
(Bechman & Stehr 2002, pp. 71–72). Rassmussen (2005) echoes this point when he 
says “Learning consists therefore of being able to make a distinction through which it 
is possible to describe one thing and not another”. 
What this also means is that differentiated knowing and communication systems 
cannot but overlap24 each other; there are no hermetically sealed systems. There are 
also, unsurprisingly, subsystems of knowing and communication organisation within 
larger ones (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). For instance, historically, design has 
been regarded as a subsystem of the system ‘art’, and commerce may currently be 
considered a subsystem of the system ‘economics’. 
                                            
24
 I have used the word ‘overlap’ in a simplistic way here, to avoid complicating the point I want to 
make. In Luhmann’s (1995) social systems theory, system overlap is the structural coupling, or the 
interpenetration of systems. This is, however, only as a result of the autonomous development of the 
systems concerned, that have structured some of the same meanings, and therefore both systems 
can be called upon in certain instances (Luhmann, 1995). For instance, power structures may be 
common to both politics and government as separate systems of communication.  
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Luhmann’s theory is taxing, because it is chiefly about connections and relations. 
The reader of Luhmann is not afforded principles or theoretical points of reference. 
But it was for this very reason that Luhmann enabled my thinking about relational 
mechanisms in design pedagogy. It is, too, the way Luhmann links communication 
with cognition that offers insight into communication about the knowing of visual 
meaning in the design studio. This is chiefly because Luhmann regards cognition or 
knowing (rather than knowledge) as ways-of-knowing that are reproduced in 
communication. 
4.2 Luhmann’s Theory of knowing in Communication  
As I have described in Chapter Two, articulating visual design meaning in the design 
studio is necessary but fraught with difficulty. The possibilities for articulation are 
extremely wide, yet specialised to visual object meaning. 
The empirical or observable surface of visual design meaning emergence is 
communication about students’ designed objects. Non-verbally communicated 
meaning relies on prior knowledge; we can understand visual cues and visual 
objects only because of what we have already come to know about them, through 
life experience or more formal learning. Because of the emphasis on visual meaning, 
knowledge that pre-exists a pedagogical event in the design studio must be 
summoned in communication between teachers and students. 
Luhmann addresses the difficulties entailed in this empirical surface of meaning 
communication. Luhmann’s theory concerns how pre-formed knowledge might be 
brought to communication between two or more people whose thought processes 
cannot otherwise be shared (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). 
Luhmann’s theory of communication is quite different to the sender-receiver 
transmission model developed by Shannon and Weaver in 1949 (Brier, 2004). In 
essence the difference lies in the idea that what is said by one person to another is 
not unproblematically transmitted as an intact message that just needs to be ‘sent’ 
from a sender to a receiver. The receiver, to decode the intended message, will have 
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to draw upon an abstract ‘horizon’25 of distinction possibilities that lies outside of the 
immediate communication event (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). Here lies the cognitive 
element: this external reference is, in the Luhmannian view, essential to 
understanding in any communication event. 
According to Luhmann’s theory (1995, pp. 139–147; 2002, pp. 157–160), in a 
communication between two or more people, one person will venture a meaning 
intention, merely as a communicative gesture such as ‘welcoming’ or ‘appealing’ or 
‘inquiring’; this is called an ‘utterance’. The other person(s) will then need to select a 
distinction from a horizon of possible distinctions that best fits the first person’s 
utterance. This range of possible distinctions is called ‘information’. The selection of 
an information distinction is a cognitive process, it is implicit, and it is made in order 
to be able to respond to the first person’s meaning intention. The other person’s 
distinction requires discriminating among other possible information distinctions, so it 
is a selected associative distinction. The selection is a distinction in the sense that it 
distinguishes among variations on the ‘horizon’ of available information distinctions 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 140). The horizon of distinction possibilities is to some extent 
contextualised by the situation in which communication takes place, but the 
particular selection of a distinction may bring misunderstanding. Communication may 
easily fail at this point. 
Seidl and Becker (2006, p. 18) explain an associative distinction as a selection using 
the example of wearing a red tie. The red tie is an object ‘utterance’ like a designed 
object is an utterance, before it is imbued with meaning; it is just a signal that some 
or other meaning is intended. But if the wearing of a red tie is associated with a 
socialist conviction, this means that the distinction ‘socialist’ is selected from the 
many other distinctions that could possibly be associated with the wearing of a red 
tie (perhaps flamboyance, possibly bad taste, unorthodoxy, or assertiveness, for 
instance). Noteworthy here is that it is the relation between the red tie and the 
selected distinction that allows sense-making. The person doing the sense-making in 
response to the red tie utterance is the ‘other person’ mentioned above, or in 
Luhmann’s terms the ‘observer’; who uses the selected distinction ‘socialist’ to 
                                            
25
 Luhmann developed the idea of a horizon of possible meaning distinctions from Husserl’s 
phenomenological view of meaning-making (Rasmussen, 2005). 
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indicate the red tie. But there is something more subtle here; as Stichweh (2000, p. 
10) describes. Rather than simply a selection or distinction of meaning which is then 
imposed upon the utterance, it is the differential relation between an indicating 
utterance and a meaning distinction that allows sense-making or understanding. 
Luhmann’s (2002, p. 160) theorisation of the link between understanding or knowing 
or cognition and communication is as profound as it is uncompromising: 
It is a matter of different selections, whose selectivity and field of selection 
can be constituted only through communication. There is no information 
outside of communication; there is no utterance outside of 
communication; there is no understanding of outside of communication. 
Observation26 or indication by distinction is then tripartite (Figure 4.2, below). 
Observation as understanding consists of: 
• something that is indicated, (or an utterance), 
 
• an implicit distinction of what is indicated, selected from 
 
• distinction-selection possibilities (from information). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Tripartite indication by a selected implicit distinction  
In this tripartite observation both the second part, the implicit distinction, and the third 
part, distinction selections, enable the indication, the first part. An implicit distinction 
needs to be selected from selection possibilities before it can indicate something. 
This process is asymmetrical in that both possible distinction selections and an 
implicit distinction selected from these possible distinctions refer to the indication.  
                                            
26
 Luhmann used Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form to in conjunction with phenomenological ideas to 
formulate his observation theory.  
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But in the Luhmannian view, the process of indication by distinction is not a linear 
process. It is rather the simultaneous presentation of an implicit distinction and a set 
of possible distinctions that enable an indication. Therefore, I revise the linear 
diagram shown in Figure 4.1 in a triangular form, to show this simultaneity of implicit 
distinction and distinction selections. 
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The revision in Figure 4. 227 shows the indication of an utterance or communication 
move as dependent on both an implicit distinction and a set of possible distinctions. 
 
Figure 4.2 Simultaneous indication of an utterance by a selected implicit 
distinction. 
The proposition of simultaneous indication of an utterance by an implicit distinction 
and a selection from information distinction needs to be put into a design 
pedagogical context. In Figure 4.3 overleaf I use Haldane Martin’s famous ‘Zulu 
Mama Chair’© as a stand-in for a student design, as ‘utterance’. Martin’s chair uses 
a Zulu basket-weaving technique in place of the wire used to construct the original 
‘Diamond Chair’ by Harry Bertoia in the early 1950s (Bertoia Chair, n.d.). In the 
diagram the teacher implicit distinction selection plus the range of possible distinction 
selections make for the indication. 
 
                                            
27
 I developed the Figure 4.2 diagram from Kockelman’s (2007, p. 377) diagram of Peircean semiosis 
where there is a tripartite relation between an interpretant, an object and a sign. Brier (2009) has 
mapped Luhmannian theory onto Peirces’s semiosis, but not in the way that I do in Figure 4.2 and 
following figures based on this diagram 
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Figure 4.3 Understanding of a designed object as ‘utterance’ by means of an 
implicit information distinction ‘Zulu’ 
Haldane Martin’s™ Zulu Mama Chair© is used as the student’s designed object by 
kind permission of Haldane Martin. 
Were this chair to be a student design and not a marketed product, the teacher’s 
distinction selection ‘Zulu’ might initially be implicit in the understanding of the 
design. This implicit distinction relates the chair to a system or perhaps a sub-system 
of knowing and communication, like Zulu culture or Zulu basket weaving. What 
cannot be ignored though, is that the ‘Zulu’ distinction leaves aside other possible 
distinctions, like those of retro 1950s furniture, or 1950s chairs. 
The differential relation of an indication to an implicit distinction is the core idea here. 
Luhmann emphasises that the differential relation can only come from the selection 
of an associative distinction from other possible variations of associative distinctions, 
and that those associative distinctions that are left aside do hold significance. The 
distinctions left aside when something is selected also enable that selection. 
4.2.1 A Design Meaning Example 
As I have mentioned before, the open-ended nature of design briefs adds to the 
communication difficulties between teachers and students. Design briefs to which 
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students respond only loosely orientate communication about the visual meaning 
relevance of their designs. So in the design studio stage where students and 
teachers consult about design meaning potential, certain meanings might be 
mooted. Schön’s (1985; 1987) frame experimentation describes this experimental 
‘trying out’ or framing of meaning alternatives between the student and the teacher. 
This frame-experimentation corresponds to applying selected ‘information’ 
distinctions to the designed object as ‘utterance’. 
Here Luhmann’s indication by distinction is important. Though design teachers may 
be explicit in their indication of design meaning, they may use implicit framing 
distinctions. 
This relates to Seidl and Becker’s (2006, p. 19) note that though meaning may be 
understood in a communication, this does not mean that it is accepted. The cognitive 
implicit distinction used to indicate an object or utterance brings an understanding 
that may also be rejected. The point here is not whether the student accepts the 
indication and the distinction on which it relies, but rather, whether the student 
understands it. 
To show how Luhmann’s implicit distinction selections may or may not be 
understood and accepted in the design studio, I mount an imaginary example of a 
student design. In this example, the brief given to students is to design an engaging 
money box for a child. 
The student thinks about designing the child’s money box in the old fashioned 
children’s toy tradition of people looking like animals or animals looking like people. 
Figure 4.3 overleaf shows such a vintage child’s money box (the researcher’s own), 
where a pig is represented as a human game keeper. 
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Figure 4.4 A vintage child’s money box that depicts a pig as human game 
keeper  
In this imaginary design studio scenario, the teacher has responded positively to the 
student’s design development idea of animals as humans or humans as animals, 
and advises the student to try out various options. The student, doing some internet 
research, finds the pair of images below (Figure 4.4) on the website 
TotallyLooksLike.com.  
 
Figure 4.5 Winston Churchill’s resemblance to a bulldog  
Source: TotallyLooksLike.com (n.d.) 
So the student sketches a money box that amalgamates Churchill with a bulldog. 
The next time the teacher comes to the student’s workstation, he or she says, 
“Winston Churchill? Do you think that’s appropriate?” The student says, “I thought 
this would be amusing for a child and you can see the common features between the 
man and the dog.” 
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The implicit distinctions used by the teacher and the student here are at odds. The 
teacher is drawing on a ‘British imperialism’ distinction while the student is drawing 
on a ‘man as dog’ distinction. 
The further significance of these implicit distinctions lies in the question of a horizon 
of distinction possibilities that might be available to both students and teachers in 
respect of any student’s design. I raised this question of a horizon or a repertoire of 
meaning possibilities in Chapter Two, where Smith (2007) showed that Schön’s 
(1987) reciprocal framing of design meaning between teacher and student rests on 
the idea of a repertoire of meaning resources. Also in Chapter Two, I referred to 
design pedagogical commentary on the design studio as the site of a community of 
practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991), where students are held to become immersed in a 
professional practice knowledge repertoire. Luhmann, by contrast, construes 
‘repertoire’ as those distinctions that are selected from a shifting horizon of 
distinction possibilities in successive communication events (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). 
There are at least three ways in which the Luhmannian idea of distinction selections 
affects communication in the design studio. 
First, design teachers often expect students to explain the visual meaning of their 
designed objects. But how the students explain meaning may not tally with the ways 
in which teachers might think it ought to be articulated. Though tacit knowing might 
possibly be shared, if ways of communicating about this knowing between teachers 
and students are at odds, visual sense-making around the students’ designed 
objects will be jeopardised. 
Second, it is unlikely that design teachers always remember the framing revisions 
and reconceptualisations of meaning mooted with students during the development 
stages of these designs. Indeed, it has been a student complaint that design 
teachers do not remember meaning relevance discussions (Blair, Blythman & Orr, 
2007). But it is not reasonable to expect teachers to remember such discussions. 
Student numbers, and the unstructured and ambiguous nature of design knowing, 
and the diversity of visual meaning relevance trajectories preclude this.  
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Third, teachers and students must make visual meaning together, but do not have 
much in common. One must remember that communication interactions in design 
pedagogy are unlikely to be between people who are members of the same 
‘community of communicative interaction’ (Sayer, 1992). Teachers and students are 
usually from different age groups, so professional and life experience is unlikely to 
contribute to shared knowledge. The pedagogical context may also put limitations on 
communicative sharing of visual meaning, if it is assumed, as it is often is, that 
teachers know better about the visual meaning relevance of student designs than the 
students do (Oak, 2000; Blair, Blythman & Orr, 2007; Ng, 2011). 
Luhmann has expressed the view that communication, calling as it does upon 
implicit distinction selections from different distinction horizons, is an improbable 
proposition (Luhmann, 1990, p. 87). Put in a Luhmannian light, sharing the relevance 
of design meaning of students’ designed objects that have never been seen outside 
of the confines of the design studio is like pulling rabbits out of hats. Therefore, 
teachers’ implicit cognitive distinctions that frame meaning are all the more important 
to student learning about making design meaning. Gedenryd (1998, p. 199) says that 
the process of designing is a ‘representation hungry’ process which he defines as: 
Reasoning about absent, non-existent, or counterfactual states of affairs 
[where there is a need to be] selectively sensitive to parameters whose 
ambient physical manifestations are complex and unruly (for example, 
open-endedly disjunctive). 
Gedenryd’s mention here of the need for “selective sensitivity” within disjunctive and 
open-ended parameters is very significant. As Fleming (1998, p. 46) has shown,28 
‘language-laden talk refers a designed object to some object or objects ‘out there’, or 
available on a horizon of distinction possibilities. The selection of distinctions in 
design pedagogical communication events does come from ‘out there’ and does 
involve language that refers to objects ‘out there’, on a horizon of possible distinction 
selections. Unlike a repertoire of meanings, however, such a horizon is made up of 
systems, subsystems and overlapping systems of knowing and communication, all of 
which lead recursively onward. 
                                            
28
 I referred to Fleming‘s object-laden language’ in Chapter Two (Section 2.4).  
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4.2.2 Potential Design Meaning and the Recursivity of Communication  
For communication to have taken place, understanding must pave the way for 
continuing communication (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). There is significance in this 
continuation of meaning, since design teachers mostly expect that designed object 
meanings should be found relevant beyond the confines of the design studio, in 
social life contexts, at some future time. Dilnot (2006, p. 5) has in this regard, defined 
the whole enterprise of designing as one of potentiality. 
Gedenryd (1998, p. 156) believes that designers must create in their designs a future 
that does not yet exist. This future oriented thrust needs understanding of how an 
existing design might be changed in a way that might be found visually relevant in 
the future, in social life. 
Together with this future trajectory, visual design object meaning calls upon past 
design meanings, which are the design precedents or points of reference for future 
design meanings (Michl, 2002). When design meaning is discussed in the design 
studio, teachers may expect but not ask for this meaning span to be explained. This 
was noted in Chapter Two, where Dannels et al. (2008) put such teacher implicit 
expectations into stark perspective.29 To put the design meaning span of past to 
future meaning in a Luhmannian context, communications always contain both 
backwards and forwards references. As Stichweh (2000, p. 10) says: 
One reads [it] forwards when one looks at a sequence of communications, 
as communication as an ongoing process in time. On the other hand, one 
must read it backwards, too, as a communication only begins with the 
second participant who understands in the act of understanding projects 
the difference between information [an implicit design meaning distinction 
selection] and utterance [the student’s designed object] on the first 
participant. In this respect any communicative event is retrospective, it 
depends on the projection of difference on past events. 
Translated into the simpler language of indication, implicit distinction and distinction 
selections, the retro- and prospective nature of communication events is represented 
in Figure 4.6 overleaf. 
                                            
29
 I reported on Dannels et. al.’s teacher expectations in Section 2.4 of Chapter Two. 
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Figure 4.6 Retrospective indication by implicit distinction leading 
prospectively to further communication events  
In Luhmann’s communication theory, following distinction selections follow then 
extend the meaning of preceding distinction selections (Luhmann, 1995, p. 147; 
Seidl & Becker, 2006, p. 20). 
The retro- and prospective nature of communication means that a communication 
unit is formed if the unit recursively provides for further communication (Seidl & 
Becker, 2006). The understanding is that "A communication never comes as a single 
event/thing; rather it is situated in the background of preceding and subsequent 
communications" (Kadirov & Varey, 2008, p. 8). The reason for this is that a 
communication selection or distinction “attracts further communication: it recruits 
communications that direct themselves to aspects that selectivity has excluded” 
(Luhmann, 1995, p. 140). 
Luhmann’s communication theory then opens up the dubious question of repertoires 
of meaning in design pedagogy. Essentially, Luhmann shows how any design 
meaning can only be indicated by a distinction, and how that meaning distinction 
relies on connection to other retrospective and prospective distinctions.  
In view of the recursivity potential of a communication event, it is also important that 
communication is not constituted by language alone. Instead, for Luhmann, 
communication depends on networks of meaning (or more precisely, sense-making 
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networks), that may or may not be accessed by the use of language in a 
communication event. Davis (2011, p. 172), cites Luhmann, 1986 who explains: 
The synthesis of [communication] cannot be pre-programmed by 
language. It has to be recreated from situation to situation by referring to 
previous communications and to possibilities of future communications 
which are to be restricted by the actual event. 
In this light, the recursivity of design meaning depends more on knowing and 
communication systems than on language constructions or cultural constructions. 
Implicit associative distinctions draw on different cognitive and communicative 
systems, and understanding in communication may be precluded for this reason 
alone. Differences in the selection of distinctions then supersede differences in the 
use of language. Similarly, if there are cultural differences in the selection of 
distinctions, this merely means that a different horizon of possible distinction 
selections is entertained. Both language and culture then come down to the cognitive 
selection of distinctions, and it is the potential for distinction recursivity that makes or 
breaks communication. 
Taking a communication event to be one discussion about one student’s design, 
there is a restriction of future possibilities for design meaning to that particular event. 
But in the development stages of one student design, there are successive 
communication events that explore alternative future meanings. 
While for each communication event, the implicit distinctions selected by the teacher 
are surely seated within recursions of preceding and subsequent understandings, for 
different ‘design futures’30 there will naturally be implicit distinctions that are 
entrained within different recursions. In this scenario, both students and teachers 
have to communicate across different recursive distinction systems, representing 
alternative futures for the designed object. 
I have given here a Luhmannian micro-level account of design meaning emergence 
in a communication event. As Luhmann sees it, tacit or implicit distinctions enable or 
                                            
30 Evans and Sommerville (2007) have written about design futures as a field of study where 
designed products are considered in similar terms to business futures markets. 
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constrain explicit communication. The question of shared relevant meaning 
emergence is then in the Luhmannian observation view, one of communication and 
cognitive distinctions. 
4.3 Knowing and Communication Systems in Design Pedagogy 
When the distinctions I have described are recursively connected in communication 
events over time, they are, in exactly this way, organised as systems of cognition 
and communication (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). Broquet (2009, p. 2) usefully puts 
it that in communication events, cognitive distinctions “get loose” from the 
participants and become structured within systems of communicable knowing. This 
is the understanding of communication systems as cognitively functioning systems 
that Luhmann (1995, 2000, 2002, 2006) has theorised. As I mentioned in Section 
4.2, communication organises the selection of cognitive distinctions, with the result 
that there cannot be information or understanding without that communication limits 
the field of selectivity within which such a selection is possible (Luhmann, 2002, p. 
160.) Simply stated, this means that what we know, we know through 
communication, and the way in which we know it is by communicative selections that 
allow communication about a specific issue to carry on. It is Luhmann’s view that 
communication allows there to be specific issues in the first place.  
Implicit distinction-selections that are made by persons and groups in concrete 
communication events are recursively connected in an abstract social knowing and 
communication system, as shown in Figure 4.6 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.7 Concrete person and group communication events and an abstract 
social knowing and communication system  
Source: Adapted from Naruse and Iba (2003, p. 5) 
It might seem that abstract systems of knowing and communication are a most 
prescriptive idea to bring to the meaning of students’ designs. But if one accepts that 
meaning is a matter of associations, there is immediately a need to limit, select, or 
choose what can and cannot be associated. In speaking or writing, meaning can 
progress in the speaking event or the reading event; but when we are faced with a 
visual object, pre-formed associations limit sense-making. To understand a vase, a 
car or a garment requires particular prior associations, so understanding visual 
objects is not a matter of plucking meaning out of the ether. 
On the count of pre-empting or prescribing sense-making then, it is more the case 
that Luhmann’s systems make it possible for associated knowledge to be accessed 
and shared in a communication medium (Brier, 2006). 
If design teachers’ ways-of-knowing are seated in differentiated knowing and 
communication systems and subsystems, so are the implicit associative distinctions 
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they make in the design studio. The connection of design teachers’ implicit 
associative distinctions to knowing and communication systems may then be 
construed as ‘pedagogical ways-of-knowing’. 
4.3.1 Pedagogical Ways-of-Knowing and Knowing and Communication 
Systems 
Earlier I presented Luhmann’s view that any cognitive act in communication involves 
what he calls an observation (see also Luhmann, 2002; Seidl 2007; Baecker, 2008a; 
Aguado, 2009; Farias & Ossandón, 2009; Lee & Brosciewski, 2009; Knudsen, 2010). 
Much like the previously explained implicit meaning distinction-selections that are 
projected onto an object or ‘utterance’, observation is indication by distinction, and 
the object/utterance is replaced by the term ‘indication’. In Luhmann’s observation 
theory it is a system of communicatively organised cognitive distinctions that is 
indicated by an implicit distinction. 
Such a system, as I have described in the previous section, comprises of recursive 
distinctions. The distinction used to indicate an utterance is already part of a 
previous communication, and the previous communication is linked to another 
previous communication. When specific kinds of system-organised implicit 
distinctions are drawn upon, then the observer of such a system31 indicates that 
system by reproducing cognitive system distinctions in communication events. 
If these linkages become specialised to communication and knowing systems and 
subsystems, and if, as Luhmann has it, communication organises all communicable 
knowing, then design teachers may well draw upon distinctions that indicate knowing 
and communication systems, overlapping systems or subsystems. According to 
Luhmann (2000, 2002, 2006) then, design teachers may be observers who 
reproduce system cognitive distinctions in design studio communication; and these 
                                            
31
 Because a human system observer uses system distinctions, Luhmann (2002, 2006) regards the 
abstract system as the observer, and keeps human observers in the concrete environment of an 
abstract system. Luhmann has for this reason been criticised for reifying systems (Grant, 2004). Yet 
Luhmann emphasises that systems cannot speak or hear, and need human communicators (Seidl & 
Bekker, 2006). This may be a question of perspective; Luhmann seems more interested in the 
emergence of abstract systems and less so in the concrete events that allow them to emerge.  
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reproduced system cognitive distinctions might constitute design teacher or 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
Just as persons involved in communication events select a distinction from 
distinction possibilities in order to indicate a meaning, so system observers in their 
communication also leave aside the unselected distinction possibilities of a system of 
knowing and communication. Observation by distinction is a system-level 
observation that indicates (or reproduces) the system (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002, 
2006). 
A teacher system-observer’s way-of-knowing would then in the same way also 
indicate a particular system of knowing and communication, by implicit distinction 
from distinction possibilities. This rather opaque idea is best explained by Bechman 
and Stehr (2002, p. 69): 
That an observer may label this as this (and not as that) is due to a 
distinction in which both moments, separated from each other, can only 
be understood in relation to each other; the distinctive units only 
possessing their own identity in the difference to the other. To be able to 
characterise something as something, one has to have already 
distinguished it from its distinctive other: what deserves to be called true, 
for example, is measured by the difference from appearance; and to 
speak of the past makes sense only with reference to a present that can 
be distinguished (constitutively) from it. Even if it is not explicitly raised as 
an issue, this other side of something termed as this or that is always 
present in every determination of speech or gesture we make. It is a 
permanent horizon. 
My further supposition here is that in a design studio event, a teacher-observer 
implicitly draws upon a system of knowing and communication selected from 
amongst other systems, and a distinction selected from that system. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4.8 overleaf. 
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Figure 4.8 Teacher-observer of a cognitive system distinction that indicates 
design object meaning 
A teacher-observer would then use an implicit distinction to reproduce distinctions 
organised within a cognitive system of communication. This is shown in Figure 4.8 
below. 
 
Figure 4.9 A teacher-observer’s implicit reproduction of a cognitive system 
distinction in a communication event. 
There is, however, more to be considered about why a design teacher might have 
cognitive allegiance to any particular system knowing and communication over 
another. This leads to system structures as structures of expectation. 
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 4.3.2 Pedagogical Observation and Expectations  
Communication and knowing systems structure expectations (Luhmann, 1995; 
Mingers, 2002; Vos, 2002; Gonzalez-Diaz 2004; Hartzog, 2006). As Tang (2008, p. 
13) points out, Luhmann regards expectation as social expectations of the form 
meaning might take, rather than the personal expectations of an individual. This sits 
well with pedagogical ways-of-knowing as expectations. 
Observer expectations arise when an observer is ‘structurally coupled’ to a system of 
knowing and communication. Structural coupling means that an observer’s own 
structured knowing is held in common with knowing structured within a 
communication and knowing system (Luhmann, 2002; 2006). For example, a doctor 
is structurally coupled to the system of knowing and communication called 
‘medicine’; a university is structurally coupled to the system of knowing and 
communication called ‘higher education’, and Americans are structurally coupled to 
the system of knowing and communication called ‘the United States of America’. 
The very significant link here to teacher-observers is that pedagogical ways-of-
knowing represent teachers’ expectations of how students might know visual design 
meaning. Further, it is in communication that such structured expectations are 
reproduced, and are likely to be reproduced in the design studio. This suggests that 
design teachers entertain distinction expectations that influence what they observe 
about a student’s designed object. This proposition is illustrated in Figure 4.10 
overleaf, where I use the same designed object stand-in featured in the previous 
figures illustrating design pedagogical sense-making, Haldane Martin’s Zulu Mama 
Chair©. In Figure 4.10 the teacher system observer’s expectation (as an implicit 
distinction) plus the distinctions that are not selected combine to indicate what is 
observed about the designed object. 
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Figure 4.10 Teacher system- observer’s expectation of design meaning  
Haldane Martin’s™ Zulu Mama Chair© is used as the student’s designed object by 
kind permission of Haldane Martin. 
4.4. Systems as Relational Mechanisms in Design Pedagogy 
So far I have explored the ways in which teachers expect students to know, as 
structured by systems of cognitive and communicative expectation. Reproduced 
cognitive system distinctions have been shown as pedagogical expectations, or 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing. The notion of these cognitive system distinctions as 
selections from possible or potential cognitive distinctions also resonates with the 
idea of design meaning as potential future meaning (Gedenryd, 1998; Dilnot, 2006). 
Because reproduced cognitive system distinctions act to separate or leave aside 
possible cognitive distinctions in communication, I have argued that they function as 
relational mechanisms in the CR sense. These cognitive distinctions allow a relation 
to a system of knowing and communication , and also the relation of such a cognitive 
distinction to other possible cognitive distinction selections. Systems as relational 
mechanisms of communication and knowing depend upon human observers, 
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because system cognitive distinctions are communicatively reproduced by human 
observers. 
4.4.1 Systems as Way-of-Knowing Mechanisms  
Systems of knowing and communication structure observer expectations over 
multiple communication events, over time. Because these systems are self-
referential,32 only cognitive distinction selections that can be related to the existing 
system structure are selected. As in the case of a micro communication event, these 
distinctions are selected from a horizon of distinction possibilities, or ‘environment’. 
According to Heylighen (1997, unpaged): 
[t]he simplest form or structure there is, is a distinction. A distinction 
divides a class of phenomena from the complement or background of that 
class (all phenomena that do not fit into that class). A distinction structures 
experience into two parts: one is the indication of phenomena to be put 
together in a class; another is the phenomena to be discriminated from 
that class. 
Heylighen refers here to the concept of a knowing and communication system 
environment as consisting of those phenomena that are discriminated from the 
system. Yet the environment is system-relative and a system ‘presupposes’ its 
environment (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). Schumacher (2002, unpaged) puts this well: 
“Each system [thus] determines what counts as its relevant environment, i.e. which 
differences make a difference versus those aspects that remain indifferent”. As an 
example, design education is a knowing and communication system and the 
environment of design education is design professions, design manufacture and 
technology, designed products and artefacts, and so on. So if the observers of a 
system like design education notice changes in the design education environment 
that relate to design education, for instance if collaborative design becomes 
important in that environment, then collaborative design as a cognitive distinction of 
design practice will be related to what design education means. Collaborative design 
then becomes communicatively and cognitively incorporated in the system ‘design 
education’. 
                                            
32
 The language of social systems theory describes an abstract system as referring selected 
distinctions to itself. This is of course impossible; only human observers can select distinctions, using 
a system of knowing and communication frame of reference.  
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Knowing and communication system structures do not exist other than when human 
observers indicate them by distinction (Luhmann, 2002). These system structures 
are just the way in which distinctions are organised on a macro level, so system 
structures are not pre-given in a determinative sense. Rather, a macro system 
structure limits the micro “combinatory possibilities” (Luhmann, 1995, p. 283) of 
distinctions in communication. In this sense the system structure is whatever, at any 
particular historical moment is condensed as the macro system structure of knowing, 
like ‘design education’, or ‘maritime law’’ or ‘autobiography’, for instance. 
What is important though, is that a macro knowing and communication system both 
limits and allows micro relational cognitive distinctions to be made. This is the basis 
of my argument that a macro knowing and communication system is a relational 
mechanism. Such a system is also a relational mechanism of emergence because it 
is an historically formed macro structure, and historically formed cognitive 
distinctions organised within such a macro structure are reproduced in 
communication events, like those that occur in the pedagogical ambit of design 
studio events. Figure 4.11 overleaf illustrates the relation between implicit teacher 
way-of-knowing distinctions, macro historical design communication and knowing 
systems structures, and the empirical, micro level where implicit teacher cognitive 
distinctions may be experienced in design studio communication.  
111 
 
 
Figure 4.11 Implicit way-of knowing distinctions as a relation between macro, 
abstract historical structures and micro, concrete communications.  
A knowing and communication system structure continues to emerge over time 
because new distinctions selected from the environment or horizon of distinction 
selections will be related to previously system-structured distinctions. What is not 
selected continues to be constitutive of what is selected, in the sense of ‘this and not 
that’, which is the same as to say, this indication, by virtue of that distinction. 
The historical formation of knowing and communication system structures stretches 
over different time spans. For instance, in a gender-related systems or subsystems 
ideals of female beauty took five hundred years to include androgyny. In a much 
narrower space of time, systems or subsystems of sexuality came to include the idea 
of sex as recreation. In a narrower still passage of time, media systems or sub-
systems such as television found the idea of dog training viable. One more example, 
this time of a social institution as a system or subsystem may show the structural 
depth of the cognitive dynamics of knowing and communication systems. There is a 
system of knowing and communication called the ‘South African government’ which 
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has operated as a republic since 1961. Since the 1994 scrapping of the apartheid 
ideology of the South African government, those who counted as political villains 
now count as political heroes. This is a structural meaning change in a system that is 
still organised around exactly the same core knowing and communication function, 
that of governance. Luhmann’s (2006, p. 56) cognitive and communicative system 
distinctions then refer to “structures that have been around for some time and to the 
historical state of society in this very moment with its specific issues”. 
Significantly, Luhmann is quoted as saying that he “thinks primarily in historic terms” 
(Farias & Ossandón, 2009, unpaged, citing Vanderstraeten’s 2007 paper quoting 
Luhmann in German). Luhmann’s comment refers to the reproduction of historically 
formed knowing and communication system distinctions. 
4.5 Design Pedagogical Ways-of-Knowing: The Abductive 
Conjecture 
In my view, the design pedagogical context is one where Luhmann’s theorisation is 
both of emphatic importance and extremely helpful in finding a way of accounting for 
how it is that teachers and students might arrive at shared visual design meaning. 
Luhmann’s theorisation suggests that the pre-formed knowledge that teachers bring 
to knowing the visual meaning of students’ designs may be communicatively 
structured on a macro system level. Differentiated macro systems of knowing and 
communication might then condition communication about design meaning. The 
opening conjecture is, then, that in design studio events, teachers may use implicit 
distinctions that are structured by differentiated knowing and communication 
systems. These may be systems that structure the articulation of this and not that 
visual design meaning. 
Using Luhmann, I have argued that design teachers reproduce historically formed 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing when they comment on the visual meaning of 
students’ designs. The ways in which teachers expect students to know may involve 
implicit cognitive distinctions within historical systems of knowing and 
communication. Theoretically, these historically developed and recursive systems 
continually organise cognitive distinctions as communicable knowledge. When 
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teachers implicitly relate specific cognitive system distinctions to students’ designs 
then, some and not other visual design object meanings may be favoured by the 
teachers. Therefore pedagogical ways-of-knowing so constituted may be regarded 
as relational mechanisms that enable and constrain the emergence of shared design 
meaning. 
This abductive conjecture is a re-contextualisation of the research context as 
established by research questions. At the beginning of this chapter, I showed how 
the research context of design pedagogy is delineated: 
In what different ways do teachers think the visual meaning of students’ designs can 
be known? In other words, what are the different pedagogical ways-of- knowing that 
operate in the design studio? 
How does verbal communication affect pedagogical ways-of-knowing visual design 
object meaning?  
Why might particular, non-arbitrary design object meanings emerge through 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing?  
Within these linked contextual issues, Luhmann’s theorisation might most 
significantly explain the capacity for communication in the design studio to address 
potential future meaning in the social world. To quote Gedenryd again, design studio 
communication concerns “reasoning about absent, non-existent, or counterfactual 
states of affairs” (Gedenryd, 1998, p. 199). The notion of distinctions made as 
selections from possible or potential distinctions also resonates with the idea of 
design meaning as potential future meaning (Dilnot, 2006; Gedenryd, 1998). 
Largely the abductive conjecture is a conjecture about relational mechanisms in 
design pedagogical ways-of-knowing. The relational mechanism conjecture is 
supported by the notion of the structural coupling of teacher-observers to systems of 
knowing and communication. System distinctions represent recursive and historically 
structured expectations, and teacher systems-observers may be structurally coupled 
to some (not all) system-structured expectations. 
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Such a historically recursive system of knowing and communication might then 
operate to relate certain distinctions and not others, as a relational mechanism of 
design meaning emergence. Figure 4.12 below shows these relational mechanism 
components of the abductive conjecture: 
 
Figure 4.12 Relational mechanism components of the abductive conjecture 
Significantly, it is not the meanings of individual designed objects per se that are 
considered to be organised and structured by communication systems. Rather, the 
communicative concept-dependency of designed objects depends on ways-of-
knowing or ways of observing. Diewald and Albert (2007, p. 3) say of this: “meaning 
is only meaning as communicatively constituted meaning – it does not emanate as a 
given, but always requires observation”. 
Ways-of-knowing as conditioning relational mechanisms cannot, however, 
comprehensively explain the sharing or not of visual design meaning. How teachers 
think students know design meaning is not the only factor impinging on design 
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meaning emergence and this thesis in no way makes such a claim. But pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing loom large in the situation of dissent between teachers and 
students. Pedagogical ways-of-knowing may therefore be abductively considered to 
be relational mechanisms that serve to condition the possible emergence of shared 
design meaning. As I have argued in Chapter Two, pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
are a highly significant factor in this dissent, because, as Austerlitz et al. (2008, p. 9) 
say, they are both tacit and equivocal. 
The question that arises then is: what evidence might there be of all of these 
promising connections between design pedagogy and design meaning in the design 
studio? The issue of this evidence, and of the conjectured mechanism that has been 
derived from Luhmann’s theorisation, necessitates the observation of design 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing design meaning, or second-order observation. 
4.6 Second-Order Observation and the Abductive Conjecture 
To take a few steps back: in Luhmann’s view, a knowing and communication system 
may be indicated by an implicit distinction in a concrete communication interactions 
between people. The system (1) is reproduced by an implicit cognitive distinction (2), 
which is also selection from what is not indicated and not organised within the 
system (3) (Rasmussen, 2005, p. 215). A second-order observation can explicitly 
observe these three components: the nature of the system of knowing and 
communication system that is indicated, the specific cognitive distinction that 
indicates this system, and what cognitive distinctions could have been selected, but 
were put aside.  
For instance, I might speak about being a design educator. The person I am 
speaking to makes a first-order implicit cognitive distinction of what a design 
educator is. This cognitive distinction is enabled by differentiating between design 
educators and other kinds of educator; these other kinds of educator are put aside. 
But how does this person cognitively distinguish between design educators and 
other kinds of educator, in order to understand my statement? The distinction the 
other person may select from amongst other cognitive distinctions might rest on a 
conception of design education as part of ‘art and design’ education, as a general 
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system of knowledge and communication. Therefore the other person may decide 
that being a design educator is the same as being an art and design educator, as 
against other kinds of educator. 
Alternatively, the other person with whom I engage in communication may just as 
well select a distinction of design education that rests on the difference between 
design education and art education. Now the very different cognitive distinction is 
between design education and art education, science education, technology 
education and so on.  
These distinctions of what is prioritised and what is side-lined are the essence of 
second-order observations. Direct observation or report of these different first-order 
observations at a second-order remove will couch first-order observations within 
different systems of knowing and communication: art and design, for one, or design 
only for another.  
To add to and underscore this explanation of second-order observation: A second-
order observer may directly observe or report about (as a newsreader reports) how 
the first-order observer observes. The second-order observer is able to ‘see’ the first-
order observer’s implicit distinction and the system reproduced by this distinction, 
because of what the first-order observer chooses to leave aside. What is left aside is 
other possible distinction selections, which also indicate the reproduced system. For 
another example, if I note that someone has taken a calculated risk, I see risk as 
indicated and ‘calculated’ risk as the selected distinction that indicates risk; other 
possible distinctions of risk as a gamble, risk as peril or risk as opportunity are left 
aside. Risk is though still indicated as a system of knowing and communication.33 
For a second-order observation to be made, there must be a motivation of common 
interest, or a ‘structural coupling’ between the second-order observer and the system 
of knowing and communication he or she observes . This structural coupling extends 
too to the first-order observer who reproduces a distinction from this particular 
knowing and communication system. As Luhmann (2000, p. 56) puts this matter:  
                                            
33
 I have extrapolated this example from Luhmann’s example of taking risks in traffic (Luhmann,1993, 
p. 219). 
117 
 
… there must be structural couplings between first- and second-order 
observations, which guarantee that something is observed at all in the 
mode of second-order observation. 
To put this in terms of research evidence of design pedagogical ways-of-knowing, 
there is a requirement that data about the interests of design teacher first-order 
observers and those who might observe them at a second-order level are linked to 
the same macro systems of knowing and communcation, or ‘structurally coupled’ to 
these macro systems. 
I have proposed that the kind of relational distinction explicitly observed by second -
order observers is the same kind of implicit relational distinction made by design 
teachers on a first-order level in design studio communication with students. I have 
abductively theorised that this is the relational mechanism of design pedagogical 
‘ways-of-knowing’. 
The following chapter explains more about the use of second-order observation as 
evidence of the abductive conjecture presented in this chapter. In this following 
chapter chapter I also set out the abductive methodology of drawing inferences from 
this second-order evidence. 
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Chapter Five 
 Methodology and Abductive Research Method 
This chapter approaches the idea of methodology as concerning the philosophic and 
theoretical framework of a study, with all of the knowledge values and beliefs these 
entail (van Manen, 1998). My understanding is also that one should aim for 
alignment of methods with methodological principles (Leshem & Trafford, 2007). 
Thinking of methodology at the meta-level of research design alignment, I noted 
Katz’s (2002, p. 257) comment that “All research methodologies imply a substantive 
view of social life”. How the methodology of this study could yield a valid or 
substantive explanation that would be methodologically ‘in and of’ the research 
focus, was a major research design consideration.  
These guidelines influenced my research focus on design pedagogical ways-of-
knowing. My aims for an abductive research explanation were to: 
• investigate pedagogical ways-of-knowing visual design meaning in design 
studio interactions with students, in order to  
 
• write an explanatory account of how these ways-of-knowing manifest in 
design pedagogy that is accessible and useful for design teachers. 
The previous chapter mounted a conjecture about pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
visual design meaning. This conjecture considered that design teachers bring implicit 
distinctions to bear on the visual meaning of students’ designed objects in the design 
studio. These implicit distinctions might indicate a system of knowing and 
communication by cognitive distinction from possible cognitive distinction selections. 
In this way, indication by distinction constitutes a relation mechanism that accounts 
for pedagogical ways-of-knowing. According to Luhmann’s theory of cognitive 
communication systems (1995, 2000, 2002), these implicit distinctions might be 
historically recursive and so might structure communicable knowing about visual 
meaning in design. Communicable knowing systems limit the combinatory 
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possibilities of indication by distinction (Luhmann, 1995, p. 283). As a result, implicit 
distinctions will allow this rather than that visual design meaning to emerge. 
Indication by selective distinctions might then function as a relational mechanism of 
design meaning emergence. Teachers are then implicit observers and reproducers 
of particular historically formed communication and knowing system distinctions. 
Teacher selection of these distinctions from other possible distinctions then accounts 
for ‘pedagogical ways-of-knowing’. 
In examining this abductive conjecture, I sought to confirm that knowing and 
communication systems do in fact have a relational effect on knowing the meaning of 
student designs in the design studio. Pending such an appraisal, identifying and 
explaining the effect of historically persistent design knowing and communication 
systems in design pedagogy was the ultimate goal. 
Luhmann’s second-order observation afforded an opportunity to find evidence of this 
abductive conjecture. Essentially, in this study design educators’ second-order 
observations of cognitive distinctions that indicate design meaning constituted this 
evidence. 
5.1 Second-Order Observation as Evidence  
In Chapter Four I showed how, in Luhmannian theory, an observer’s selected 
distinction is an implicit indication of meaning in a communication event (Luhmann, 
2000, 2002). But when such observations are themselves observed, implicit 
distinctions can be discerned. The discernment of others’ cognitive observations is 
theorised by Luhmann as second-order observation. 
Second-order observation is a cybernetic concept where the second-order observer 
is attuned to first order observations that feeds back to or indicates his or her  his or 
own store of communicable knowing (Luhmann, 2000, p. 54-56). Second-order 
observations are of how first-order cognitions occur, specifically in terms of what 
distinctions a first-order observer uses to indicate the second-order observer’s own 
systems of knowing. This makes second-order observation a different proposition to 
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what is generally seen in research as a second-order researcher rendition of first-
order research participant accounts. As Luhmann (2000, p. 62) says “Second-order 
observation observes only how others observe”[Author;s emphasis]. Second-order 
observation may directly observe cognitions made in communication events, which 
may take highly varied forms – they may be acts of visual, written, or spoken 
communications (Knudsen, 2010). These are, in Luhmannian terms, all cognitive 
distinctions that distinguish indications (Knudsen, 2010). 
Then second-order observation may be indirect observations from unspecified 
sources, such as ‘this country is going down the drain’ or ‘no child should be left 
behind’. In the former example, a second-order observation might concern a first-
order observation about economic downturn, and in the latter example, a first-order 
observation about access to education. Luhmann says that second-order 
observation is of cognition and only of cognition, but then Luhmann sees cognition in 
every communication. For Luhmann, as I have said, communication may take many 
forms. But it is only communication when there is recursivity; when understanding 
retains a previous implicit distinction and impels the making of another distinction. 
The communication examples of ‘the country going down the drain’ and of ‘no child 
should be left behind’ are examples that demand both distinctively retrospective and 
distinctively prospective understanding, and both demand structures of associative 
understanding. 
Second-order observation as evidence is typical of an ethnographer who observes 
social groups, themselves indicating and distinguishing meaning in their social 
practices (Lee & Brosziewski, 2007, p. 258).  
Of the first-order observer, Luhmann (2002, p. 165) says that there is no observer 
before there is an observation and Seidl (2004, p. 22) also says there is no observer 
before there is a meaning distinction. It is in the choice of a distinction that the 
observer “betrays his presence” (Luhmann, 2000, p. 54). Any observation occurring 
in a communication event most importantly “refers to the observer, not the 
observed”, and: 
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We do not see an object as it is; we see the object as it emerges through 
the specific distinction used in the act of observation … Everything we 
know is a product of observation and refers to the observation, not to the 
observed. 
A second-order perspective observes how a distinction is made, more than what 
distinction is made. But this is feasible only if the second-order observer is 
‘structurally coupled’ (Luhmann, 2000, p. 56) or cognitively attuned to the first-order 
observer’s system of knowing and communication. The second-order observer is 
therefore sensitive to selective distinctions which put aside other possible distinction 
selections. 
What can be confusing is that it is the act of observation, rather than the human 
observer who performs the act, that is observed at second order. This fits with 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch’s (1991) description of enacted cognition, where what 
is said or done (though not necessarily directly observed) is the act that creates 
distinctions. As Arnellos, Spyrou and Darzentas (2003, p. 5, citing Beer, 2000) also 
say, observers and observation are in an enactive sense embodied in system of 
knowing and communication networks. Historically formed system networks structure 
observations. As Seidl clarifies, “the knowledge structure [network] of the system is 
what determines what distinction will be drawn in an observation” (Seidl 2007, p. 18). 
Here is the reason why second-order observations are significant to the CR project 
of abductive explanation. From the second-order or knowing onlooker perspective, 
knowers’ or observers’ cognitions or observations are seen in a structured light. 
What the second-order observer then observes is a structured cognitive event, made 
in a communicative medium. The first-order observer is then embodied by the 
system and system distinction within which his or her act is intelligible. 
This first-order observer or knower in the case of this study is the hypothetical design 
studio teacher. 
A second-order perspective is also only obtainable retrospectively (Luhmann, 1995, 
2002, 2006), just as newspapers report on events that have already happened. The 
time lag between the event and the second-order view of the event can be 
momentary, as in the case of live television broadcasts. For another example, if I re-
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construe something that has just been said by placing it in a broader context, I make 
a second-order observation. Second-order observations can also occur centuries 
later, as in the case of an historical view of the French Revolution.  
Self-observation can also be second-order observation. This can be seen in the idea 
of reflective observation (Kolb, 1984) when one construes learning experiences 
retrospectively in a mediated way: one is able to see the experience as distinct from 
other experiences. This is a self-second-order observation, or our own later 
observation of our earlier observation, which cannot, in hindsight, but be seen in the 
light of other potential distinctions for indication. 
A second-order observer discerns the distinction made by a first-order observer as a 
selected distinction that leaves aside alternative distinctions (Luhmann, 2002, pp. 
114–115; Schwer, 2006; Seidl, 2007, p. 18). In other words, as I have explained 
about Luhmann’s theory of cognition in first-order communication events, an 
observer-participant responds to the ‘utterance’ of another person by selecting a 
distinction that can be applied to the utterance. The distinction that is chosen from a 
set of possibilities constitutes an understanding of the utterance. In the same way, 
the second-order perspective is of the first-order observer’s selection of a distinction 
from other possible selections. Merely to say ‘the doctor prescribed an extended 
period of rest’ is to put this cognitive event of prescription within an implicit set of 
choices, and ‘a period of rest’ gains its particular import precisely because it is one 
cognitive distinction among others. This is the sense in which a second-order 
observer observes how, or in what way a distinction is made by a first-order 
observer. Through a second-order observation, a first-order observers’ observation 
then acquires contextual depth (Baecker, 2008a) as a cognitive event. This is the 
value of second-order observations that are motivated by the same interests as 
those of the first-order observer, in this case ways-of-knowing in design.  
Ways-of-knowing observed at second-order require there to be an embodied first-
order observer who makes the cognitive distinction observed  by the second-order 
observer. Someone must do the knowing that is so observed; knowing requires 
knowers. There is another good reason to regard second-order observations of 
design knowing as evidence of first-order ways-of-knowing in design: simply to 
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explain, describe or relate how a design knowing distinction comes to be a particular 
distinction among others requires considerable commitment. 
In Figure 5.1 below, I show a second-order view of an embodied, first-order teacher-
observer’s implicit distinction. In this diagram’, the reproduced distinction is that of an 
‘iconic’ design conceptual distinction. As I showed in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.2), both the distinction that is selected, and the distinctions that are not selected, 
combine to inform a second-order observation. These unselected distinctions might, 
in the case of the exemplar system ‘design conceptualisation’, comprise of ‘iconic, 
contemporary, or cult distinctions, amongst others.  
 
Figure 5.1 A second-order observation of how a teacher-observer observes a 
designed object . 
Luhmann’s indication by distinction (2000, 2002, 2006) as depicted in Figure 5.1 may 
be made clearer by pointing out similarities with a phenomenographic approach to 
distinctions as variations.34 The distinctions ‘iconic’; ‘contemporary’, and innovative 
depicted in Figure 5.1 are related variations of design meaning conceptualisation. 
Discerning one distinction variation depends on the availability of other distinctions 
                                            
34
 I am grateful to Professor Linda Drew for pointing out this similarity. 
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variations, so that there is a necessary relationship between distinctions as cognitive 
discernments selected from among a variety of possibilities for cognitive discernment 
(Marton and Trigwell, 2000). 
5.1.1 The Abductive Conjecture and Second-order Data 
The abductive explanation attempted here is that pedagogical ways-of-knowing are 
relational mechanisms in the CR sense. The relational mechanism elements, as I 
have posited them in Luhmannian terms, are: 
• the indication of knowing and communication systems 
• by means of selected cognitive distinctions  
• that leave aside other potential communicable cognitive distinctions. 
Clearly these elements involve a concrete observer who selects distinctions in order 
to indicate. As Christis (2001) has pointed out, Luhmann entertains a duality 
between abstract systems of knowing and communication and the concrete persons 
or observers who constantly call upon these abstract systems. This duality is, for 
Christis, an ontological separation in the manner of Bhaskar’s CR separation of the 
level of empirical experience from abstract social structures (Christis, 2001, pp. 340–
344; see also Brier, 2009, p. 29; Hickman, 2011).35 Christis’s term for this ontological 
duality is ‘grammatical realism’, meaning that how things come to be is in some way 
ordered. In Luhmann’s as well as Bhaskar’s view, structures or systems are 
reproduced in events; this is the grammatical principle they share. 
I have then treated Luhmann’s (2002, p. 179) theorisation of relations between 
persons and systems of knowing and communication as a substantive of CR 
relational mechanisms. Luhmann (2002, p. 179) is especially clear on this relational 
causality: 
                                            
35
 A number of commentators have also connected aspects of CR and Luhmannian theory, for 
instance, Mingers, (2002); Bryant, (2006); Elder-Vass, (2007); Montiel, (2007); Skliarevksy, (2007); 
Fuchs, (2009); and Wan, (2010). 
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Meaning comes into play only on the level of observation … with the 
ability to negate (as distinguished from the ability to affirm); with the ability 
for logical modalization, for a simultaneous presentation of other 
possibilities and, building on this, for modalities such as necessity, 
impossibility, and contingency; with temporal orientations that can 
describe, with the help of the distinction between future and past, what 
happens in the operative present and what differentiates the system from 
its contemporary environment; and last but not least, with concepts of 
causality. 
An important aspect of this rather dense quote from Luhmann above is that a 
second-order observation observes not just a distinction but a distinction as a 
selected distinction, a selection that is most importantly made by means of “the 
simultaneous presentation of other possibilities” (Luhmann, 2002, p. 179). These 
other possibilities can arise from the past or refer to an anticipated future. While a 
second-order observation is in and of itself retrospective, what is observed can 
therefore be a forward-looking though antecedent first-order observation.  
Examining the abductive conjecture about relational mechanisms then required that 
abstract communication and knowing systems could in the Luhmannian sense be 
found to have an antecedent structuring effect on the actual events of design 
pedagogy. This would mean that design teachers reproduce historically formed 
knowing and communication system distinctions. These distinctions, as Keller (1999, 
pp. 78–79) says, might be part of knowing and communication systems as “networks 
of recursively produced and reproduced communications”.  
Abstract knowing and communication systems could then be considered to be real 
structures that have effect on events in the CR sense. Similarly, actual design 
pedagogical events are actual events in the CR sense, where events are held to be 
real and to take place whether they are observed or not. Therefore the antecedent 
structuring effect of abstract knowing and communication systems could, in the CR 
sense, be considered to be a relational mechanisms, specifically relating cognitive 
distinctions to indications in communication events such as those of the design 
studio. This was conjectured to be the mechanism of pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
that might enable or constrain the shared emergence of the visual meaning of 
students’ designed objects. 
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5.2 Abductive Research Data 
Silverman has asked searching questions about the status of the specific field or 
context in which a research study takes place: how is the field described/delineated, 
“since it is neither a here-and-now situation, nor a situation in which mankind as a 
whole is characterised through the fundamental properties of every one of its 
activities?” (Silverman, 2000, p. 197). In this section I provide research setting 
answers to Silverman’s questions. 
5.2.1 Macro and Micro Considerations 
I have attempted to show that design pedagogy involves micro and macro ways-of-
knowing. An analysis of research evidence must, however, consider how it is that 
macro and micro evidence will be discerned, and how these might be connected. To 
open up the micro-macro question methodologically, I draw on two views of this 
question. 
First, Fuchs (1988, p. 124) mounts arguments against ‘microsociology’. In Fuchs’s 
view what might be considered ‘individual’, and what might be considered 
‘interaction’ is no more concrete or less abstract than “the concept of ‘state’ or the 
Watson-Crick model of DNA” so micro level data is not necessarily empirical data. 
This is very much the position taken by Bhaskar. Direct experiences and events are 
not what they seem, and do not easily give up their secrets (Bhaskar, 2008). 
In Chapter Three I gave the example of football hooliganism in this respect (Carter & 
New, 2004, p. 6, citing Marsh, Rosser & Harre). Attending a football match and 
witnessing hooliganism will not enlighten one about why it is happening. Similarly, 
observing a design studio critique will not explain how it is that teachers attribute 
visual meaning to students’ designed objects. These micro events are affected by 
macro structures, and the mechanisms responsible for this need a research 
explanation. Sawyer (2004, p. 266) points out the relational mechanism importance 
of the micro- macro question: 
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Many sociological theorists use the philosophical notion of emergence to 
argue that collective phenomena are collaboratively created by individuals 
yet are not reducible to individual action (Sawyer 2001). In the social 
sciences, emergence refers to processes and mechanisms of the micro to 
macro transition …  
With reference to Sawyer’s mention of “mechanisms of the macro to micro 
transition”, second-order observation is observation of micro way-of-knowing 
distinctions that are framed within macro indications of knowing structures/systems 
of communication. This framing is, however, only detectable in a second-order 
observation of a system-structured cognitive event. 
In both the CR and Luhmannian theoretical accounts then, there are relational 
mechanisms that bring macro structures into relation with micro events and 
experiences. In Figure 5.2 below I align CR macro structures with Luhmannian 
macro structures. Bhaskar’s concept of structure refers both to an entity and to a 
structuring or relational mechanism. For example, we may think of ‘Law’ as a social 
institution or entity. At the same time, law is a process and a mechanism. Also in 
Figure 5.2 below I give parity to relational mechanisms and Luhmann’s system 
relations between communicative and cognitive indications and distinctions. Then 
Bhaskar’s level of concrete events and experiences is on par with Luhmann’s 
concrete communication events and the experience of implicit distinctions that 
Luhmann theorises. 
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Figure 5. 2 Alignment of Bhaskar’s Critical Realist ontology with Luhmann’s 
knowing and communication system structures.  
If second-order observation data addresses the research context of design 
pedagogy, then examining the abductive conjecture I have mounted could be viable. 
But as Lee and Brosziewski (2007) say, second-order observations that can confirm 
or contradict others are needed, so that a reasonably large corpus of second-order 
data becomes necessary. This has significance if the reproduction of system 
cognitive distinctions is to be established. 
5.2.2 Data and the Research Context  
A substantive analysis is, for Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen and Karlsson (2002) 
one where substantial relations are effectual; they have palpable effect. The 
phenomenon under analysis is taken to be unobviously but substantively or 
effectually structured in particular ways. The contextualising conditions of a 
phenomenon are not merely whatever might be empirically observable around that 
phenomenon, so context is to be carefully considered. 
The contextual conditions of design pedagogy were identified as teachers’ 
differentiated ways-of-knowing visual design meaning, the activation of these ways-
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of-knowing in design studio communication events, and the particularising effect of 
these ways-of-knowing on the emergence of design meaning. 
Though there is a great deal of scholarship that refers to these contextual conditions 
of design pedagogy, they remain opaque and unpredictable. Therefore I have re-
contextualised these contextual conditions using Luhmann’s theorisation, as an 
abductive conjecture. This conjecture is nonetheless still about the contextual 
conditions of design pedagogy that are under scrutiny. So the research 
methodology, in examining the conjecture, must make room for contextual conditions 
to surface. 
As I showed at the beginning of this chapter, there are three main areas of research 
context focus: 
• different pedagogical ways-of-knowing; 
• verbal communication about visual design object meaning, and 
• particular, non-arbitrary visual design object meanings.  
In respect of the first contextual aspect, I needed data from second-order observers 
who are structurally coupled to design teachers by virtue of their own involvement 
with design pedagogy. Only such second-order observers might be able to 
discriminate among different pedagogical ways-of-knowing.  
Concerning the second contextual aspect, I needed data that could show teacher- 
observers’ ways-of-knowing visual meaning in a communicative medium.  
Regarding the third contextual aspect, I needed data that could show how teachers’ 
structured distinctions result in the articulation of particular student design object 
meanings.  
Underpinning these contextual aspects is the idea of pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
as the ways in which teachers might expect students to know. All the same, though, I 
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have launched a relational mechanisms conjecture about these pedagogical 
expectations that depends at least upon communicative recursivity.  
These data evidence requirements motivated my choice of data sources. 
5.3 Data Sources  
As I describe in more detail over the following two sections, two sources of evidence 
provided data about the contextual foci mentioned in the previous section. Both 
sources involved communication between discussion participants, and both data 
sources involved second-order observations about knowing visual design meaning. 
The second data source consisted of discussions among design studio teachers, 
and served as a check and balance for analytical inference from the first, which 
consisted of posts to an online academic design forum.  
There was, however, nothing straightforward about choosing these data sources. 
Instead, I came upon the first of these – an academic forum about design education 
– and realised that in some way this forum suggested my own research problem.  
The second source of research evidence was obtained at a point of more clarity in 
respect of my research approach, but certainly not at a point where I understood the 
role this source would come to play in the data analysis.  
The description of these two data sources that follows thus needs to be seen in light 
of these research process exigencies. Some aspects of the kind of data each source 
provided only became clear in the longer term. 
5.3.1 Online Design Education Discussion Forum 
The first research data source was an online academic design discussion forum. 
This forum has a large, free-subscription membership of design educators, design 
academics and design professionals who participate in design education 
(approximately 2,290 subscribers). Like all forums and blogs, communication is in 
the form of posts that recursively take up issues raised in previous posts, and these 
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posts provoke further posts. In terms of Luhmann’s (2002) theory of recursive 
communication, cognitive distinctions recursively made in this communication forum 
then had the potential to evidence systemic or relational mechanisms.  
The online forum is somewhat misleadingly titled PhD-Design, since discussion is 
not limited to PhD research in design and in fact PhD research is not often 
mentioned. The forum is public in the sense that anyone can subscribe and any 
quoted data can thus be traced back to its original context. The forum is hosted by 
JISCMAIL (www.jiscmail.ac.uk), who advise forum participants that their 
contributions may be quoted, and that any persons doing so should cite the 
contributor. I have complied with this in my analysis of online forum data, as 
explained in the next chapter. 
As I followed contributions to this forum, I became more and more convinced that 
particular threads36 contained valuable data about pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
about design meaning. Threads like ‘design as research’, ‘design creativity’ and 
‘pragmatic aesthetics’ concern37 ways-of-knowing about design because they speak 
of the knowledge or thinking that is necessary for producing design meaning.38 There 
is vigorous contention within each thread, with subscribers joining thread debates 
whenever they find threads or posts within threads relevant to their own point of 
view. 
Online discussion forum posts were exceptionally valuable because they comprised 
of unsolicited participation. I found that discussion threads relating to ways-of-
knowing design meaning contained numerous (up to eighty) message posts. These 
threads also featured the posts of widely published design academics of international 
standing. Forum data provided then provided opportunistic sampling (Patton, 1990).  
                                            
36 A thread is a series of messages that directly or indirectly relate to one another and are posted in 
response to each other. 
 
37 I speak of this list service in the present tense because it is an archived resource of posts from 
1998 to date which can be accessed by subscribers at any time.  
 
38 The listserv posts predominantly speak of design in general, but reference to specific design 
specialisations are made. 
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Significantly, design academic data in this forum setting was distributed second-
order data, on the basis of both the geographical spread of higher education 
institutions, and the forum participants being situated across design specialisations.  
Distributed data has macro significance for this study, since it evidences ways-of-
knowing that are not situationally confined. When forum posts from distributed 
design educators take the same view, the likelihood is that such a view is organised 
within a communication system of knowing. As Hutchins (2000, p. 1) points out, 
distributed cognitions tend to represent a co-ordination of internal thinking with 
external, material thought objects. There is also, for Hutchins, a temporally 
distributed aspect39 where earlier cognitions affect later ones. This aspect of 
distributed cognition seems to highlight the reproduction of way-of-knowing 
distinctions and indications. There is identifiable cognitive organisation of social and 
material meaning that transcends individual knowing (Rogers, 1997, pp. 1-2). 
The online forum also provided a unique opportunity for design educators to express 
views in an environment where institutional or design programme policy does not 
hold sway. I then regarded the forum contributors to be structurally coupled to the 
research context of visual design meaning, though not necessarily to design studio 
pedagogy.  
I examined discussion threads that arose in discussions only during the period June 
2008 and June 2009, so that the quantity of research data would be manageable. 
5.3.2 Design Educator Group Discussions 
To begin with I requested permission to approach design programme teachers from 
faculty/institution management at each of the three universities. With this permission 
I then contacted the design programme teachers informally to introduce myself and 
my research interest. I purposely contacted more potential participants than would 
be necessary for a group discussion of five to seven participants per institution 
                                            
39 Hutchins (2000, p. 1) identifies the origins of distributed cognition theory in Vygotsky’s ‘Mind in 
Society’ (1975) and Minsky’s ‘Society of Mind’ (1985), also pointing out the “nearly perfect mirror 
symmetry of these titles”. 
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(Patton, 1990). This was because I feared that teachers who agreed to participate 
might find themselves otherwise committed on the day of the recorded group 
discussion. Overall, my approaches were very positively received and generated 
much conversation. 
These design teacher group discussions drew participants from different design 
programmes located in three South African universities. These institutions offer 
design programmes like Graphic Design, Jewellery Design, Fashion, Interior Design, 
and Industrial Design. Group discussions comprised of studio teaching staff from 
different design programmes so that discussion data was spread across design 
pedagogy programmes and also spread over the three institutions. Participants were 
then not close colleagues. 
Purposive (Patton, 1990) recruitment of participants for group discussions was then 
based first on their experience of or involvement in design studio teaching. A further 
recruitment criterion was the self-identified interest of participants in a discussion 
about knowing design meaning. 
The design teacher group discussion participants were then interested and involved 
second-order observers of design studio pedagogy. This was on account of their 
own self-reflective second-order observations, or on account of their intimate 
knowledge of the ways-of-knowing of other design studio teachers.  
In contrast to requirements for using and citing online forum posts, I guaranteed 
these the anonymity of participants in the three group discussions by using fictional 
names. Design teachers were provided with an informed consent document that 
introduced me as a university student researcher and set out the aims and 
motivation of my study. Consent to participate in the research guaranteed anonymity 
to participating institutions and teachers. After the research discussions, I provided 
respective institutional discussion transcripts to the participating teachers. The 
purpose of this was to allow teachers to re-consider or correct their views as 
expressed in their group discussion transcript. No corrections were returned. 
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The three design educator group discussions consisted of five to seven participants 
each. I participated in each discussion. Group discussions lasted approximately one 
hour and were audio recorded and later transcribed. 
Using second-order online forum data in conjunction with second-order group 
discussion data has special significance for examining my abductive conjecture of 
pedagogical ways-of- knowing or cognitions in the design studio. Cognitions do 
require human minds. That these human minds are the minds of designers (in the 
forum data) and design studio teachers (in the group discussions) is beyond doubt, 
because second-order observer data does concern explicitly concern design 
knowing. The second-order observations of design academics (in the online forum 
data) and design teachers (in the group discussions) then refer to embodied 
designers in design studios or design studio teachers, and cannot do otherwise. The 
roles of these two data sources in moving from the broad level of design studio 
knowing to the more specific level of design studio pedagogical knowing are 
diagrammatically represented in Figure 5.3 overleaf. 
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Figure 5.3 Data sources for second-order abductive analysis of relational 
mechanisms. 
The abductive analysis afforded by these two data sources depended on the alliance 
I have forged in previous chapters between the CR philosophy and Luhmann’s 
theorisation. 
5.4 Research Analytical Perspective  
My worldview is of an external reality that is extant but never fully knowable. This is 
the critical realist ontology behind my research approach. As Pratt (2007, p. 32) 
states the case of CR research: 
[The CR] epistemology is transcendental dualist – the inquirer is both part 
of the reality and partakes of its qualities but attempts at the same time to 
transcend the limitations of human knowledge and approximate the truth. 
I take ‘transcendental’ to mean those immaterial processes and entities that make 
things possible, or that are ‘behind’ what is experienced as reality. Dualism is 
inherent in this idea; because for something to occur, something else must make this 
possible. There is, in other words, always a relation of some kind; there is no purified 
‘this’ or ‘that’ as Latour (1993) has shown about the natural and the social. 
A relation is regarded as real purely in the sense that it has effect. This need not be 
an inscrutable proposition if one merely considers that ‘inflation’, an abstract 
concept, might be regarded as the condition of possibility that leads to the concrete 
event of paying more for bread. 
Taking a transcendental dualist position means, as Pratt says, being in two places: 
the place where things happen, and the place that accepts that these things do not 
just happen without being triggered in some way. The second place is an uneasy 
one, because the trigger can never be fully known. Nevertheless a CR researcher 
makes the attempt to give a provisional and partial explanation of such an 
explanatory trigger or triggers. There are more adequate and less adequate 
provisional explanations (Sayer, 1992), but I leave this question to my discussion of 
research validity and reliability issues in Chapter Eight.  
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Returning to Pratt’s mention of partaking of a reality but at the same time attempting 
to ‘transcend’ it, my research position is comprised of two roles. One role is that of a 
design educator who is concerned about the issue of knowing visual design meaning 
in design pedagogy. My other role is that of a researcher who seeks to explain the 
knowing of design meaning as a historically emergent phenomenon. 
The links between Luhmann’s theorisation and CR philosophy mentioned earlier 
allowed me to oscillate between these two roles. 
5.4.1 Ethical Considerations of the Analysis 
I faced a dilemma about quoting or not quoting from the online forum data. On one 
hand, I wanted to provide an audit trail of research analysis for my reader. But the 
purpose of quoting was to examine my research conjecture, and that conjecture was 
not the context in which online forum participants made posts. Selective quoting from 
posts to this forum then involved a research ethical risk of quoting online forum 
participants out of context. I weighed this risk in the following way: quoted 
distinctions were not always expressed in thread posts in such a way as to overtly 
represent distinctions of ways-of-knowing in design. However, I think that the authors 
of these posts would agree that the posts I selected as data concern knowing in 
design. The distinctions made by online forum contributors were also not necessarily 
distinctions supported by that contributor. But this did not disqualify such a distinction 
as one that might indicate a system or subsystem of knowing and communication; a 
contested distinction is still a distinction.  
5.5 Abductive Data Analysis  
A broad summation of abductive analysis is that it starts from a view of empirical 
circumstances, seeks a theoretical fit with empirical circumstances, then uses this 
theoretical fit to conjecture why the empirical situation obtains.   
Wad (2001, p. 13) advises that a substantive, contextual methodology is needed to 
explain relational or generative mechanisms. For Jepessen (2005, p. 5), this is to ask 
‘how and why’ a particular phenomenon came into being, got its specific character 
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and so on. The emphasis is on the explanation of the constitution of empirical 
phenomenon. 
The explanation sought by critical realists is abductive in nature, as Mingers (2002, 
p. 300) says: 
We take some unexplained phenomenon and propose hypothetical 
mechanisms that, if they existed, would generate or cause that which is to 
be explained. So, we move from experiences in the empirical domain to 
possible structures in the real domain. 
To further clarify, Breese (2008, p. 18) describes abductive analysis as: 
Interpreting and redescribing the different components from hypothetical 
conceptual frameworks and theories about structures and relations. The 
object of study is further developed when placed in new ‘contexts of 
ideas’. 
Wad (2001, p. 6) cites Pawson’s criticism of Bhaskar’s realism that we cannot 
validate knowledge of a system (presumably, open or closed) if the knowledge of the 
system is independent of the system. But this is exactly the methodological point to 
be taken if one chooses to use CR: one will have to rise to the challenge of 
provisional yet adequate explanation. A perhaps encouraging comment on this from 
Pawson (1989, p. 50) is that Hesse shows how “elements in the chain fit in with a 
pre-established network of existing relations”. He regards the explanation of 
empirical relationships as always involving generative or relational mechanisms: 
Firstly, any empirical relationship requiring explanation would be 
interpreted as the consequence of a generative mechanism. Secondly, 
since it is assumed that all generative mechanisms are localized in their 
action it is necessary to specify the social context where the mechanism is 
expected to operate. This would involve close definition of the social 
characteristics of the group of (sic) location to be studied, rather than 
simply assuming that the mechanisms (and thus laws) act uniformly 
across population samples. Thirdly, since it is assumed that the action of 
a mechanism can be obscureds by other mechanisms, some method of 
controlling the effects of these further constraints on the relationship under 
inspection is required. 
Over the two data sources, there was an important question as to the recursivity of 
explicitly distinctive ways-of-knowing design visual meaning. Baecker (2008a, p. 6) 
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quotes von Foerster with respect to how researchers might handle the complexity of 
systems theory – which is not to try to understand or reduce this complexity, but to 
keep it in view, and instead to look for recursion. Lee and Brosziewski (2007, p.260) 
point out that: 
To observe and understand a communicative event, one must be familiar 
with the communication that preceded it, with the relevant themes and the 
possible meanings participants have already publicly constructed and 
conditioned themselves to remember. 
Familiarity with these preceding and following events was most fortunately provided 
by the recursivity of online forum thread posts. However, such recursivity needed 
further establishment in the design educator group discussions. 
5.5.1 Abductive Inference of Relational Mechanisms  
The overall abductive strategy serves the CR aim of providing an explanation of 
mechanisms or conditions of possibility. As I have said in Chapter Three, CR regards 
the context in which a mechanism is activated to be a necessary part of the 
explanation. CR also requires that one use substantive theories in the pursuit of such 
explanation. The re-contextualisation move of the abductive conjecture seeks to 
allow the research context to become part of the explanation of mechanism affecting 
it. 
The view I took was that second-order observations in research data could reveal 
design teacher ways-of-knowing, as well as their location within differentiated 
knowing and communication systems. An abductive inference that these 
differentiated knowing and communication systems might be  relational mechanisms 
was then feasible. But the macro, historical nature of such systems, and their micro 
effect in the concrete context of design studio pedagogy would require further data 
evidence.  
If methodology is the link between the study aims and their achievement (Feast 
2010, citing Crotty), then that link centres in the study upon emergence. Beginning 
with the emergence philosophy of CR, I have worked from the idea that there are 
structure, event and experience levels of emergence. What ‘happens’ is in CR a 
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matter of what has made it possible for such a thing to happen. Then I have moved 
to a theorisation of emergence that has purchase on the research context that needs 
explanation – knowing the visual meaning of students’ designs in design pedagogy. 
Luhmann’s theory has been applied to the overall emergence idea of ‘whatever 
happens, something else makes this possible’ in the specific instance of the 
emergence of shared visual design meaning in the design studio. The aim of the 
methodology laid out in this chapter is to explain relational mechanisms that 
condition the emergence shared visual design object meaning in the design studio. 
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Chapter Six 
The Abductive Conjecture in the Online Forum 
Data Analysis  
In this chapter I examine the first of the two sets of data mentioned in Chapter Five. 
This is the online design educator discussion forum;40 the design educator group 
discussions I held with design educators at three different South African universities 
are discussed in Chapter Seven. For ease of reference, I will refer to ‘online forum’ in 
respect of the data from the online design educator forum, and to ‘group discussion’ 
in respect of the data from the designer educator group discussions. 
Over both data sources, I regarded research participants as second-order observers. 
In Luhmannian theory, as I stated in Chapter Five, a second-order observer is a 
‘knowing onlooker’ who observes cognitive indications made by distinctions 
(Luhmann, 2000, 2002). Such cognitive indications by distinctions embody the 
knower who knows in the distinctive way so indicated. What counted as substantive 
data in both data sources was this cognitive relation of distinctions to indications of 
design knowing. That is, I identified different ways-of-knowing in the data and noted 
the various distinctions called upon to indicate these ways-of-knowing. By these 
means, I set out to show pedagogical ways-of-knowing that might operate implicitly 
as cognitive relational mechanisms in design teachers’ attribution of visual design 
meaning to students’ designed objects, in the design studio.. 
Data evincing knowing indications by distinction held the potential to confirm, deny or 
alter my abductive conjecture about relational mechanisms in design pedagogy. To 
re-iterate the abductive conjecture that I proposed in Chapter Four: 
Design teachers reproduce historically formed pedagogical ways-of-
knowing when they comment on the visual meaning of students’ designs. 
The ways in which teachers expect students to know may involve implicit 
cognitive distinctions within historical systems of knowing and 
communication. Theoretically, these historically developed and recursive 
                                            
40
 This forum is entitled PhD-DESIGN but the forum is not confined to doctoral research in design. 
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systems continually organise cognitive distinctions as communicable 
knowledge. When teachers implicitly relate specific cognitive system 
distinctions to students’ designs then, some and not other visual design 
object meanings may be favoured by the teachers. Therefore pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing so constituted may be regarded as relational 
mechanisms that enable and constrain the emergence of shared design 
meaning. 
By virtue of the common interests or structural coupling of design academics with 
design teachers, design ways-of-knowing might refer to a broad spectrum of 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing. Therefore I examined the online forum data first, for 
evidence of design knowing that might possibly constitute pedagogical ways-of-
knowing as relational mechanisms. 
6.1 Tracing Ways-of-Knowing in the Online Forum Data 
The online forum data consisted of forum threads and individual, dated posts by 
design academics within these threads. 
Particular threads caught my attention because they dealt with design knowing 
themes. To start with, and in order to not anticipate systemic ways-of-knowing in 
design studio communication as relational mechanisms, I identified threads in which 
different knowing themes appeared. These knowing themes mostly surfaced and 
resurfaced across threads over weeks and months, showing design academics’ 
preoccupation with these themes. For instance, three threads titled ‘Creativity–
Design–Innovation’ (May 2008), ‘Methodologies, performative placemaking and 
distributed creativity’ (January 2009), and ‘Creativity and Nature vs Nurture’ 
(February 2009)41 all concerned distinctions of creativity, and specified distinctions of 
what sort of knowing creativity might be. 
To illustrate how I drew upon the online forum data, I show in Figure 6.1 overleaf a 
thread I selected, ‘Design as Discourse’, that appeared in July, 2008 and attracted 
some fifty posts. This thread is only one selected from amongst the other threads 
appearing in July 2008. I regarded the knowing theme ‘design as discourse’ as a 
possible system of knowing and communication, especially as design as discourse 
                                            
41
 These online forum threads and all that follow in this chapter are available at the PHD-DESIGN 
page of the JISCMail listserv (https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/cgi-bin/webadmin?A0=phd-design). 
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as a knowing theme re-surfaced as ‘Symbolic Design cues’; ‘Actor-Network theory - 
discourse on object level’; ‘Toward an actor network theory of design’; and ‘Seeking 
refs on how artefacts mediate power’. 
 
Figure 6.1 Choice of a thread from the PhD-Design Archives. 
The following figure 6.2 shows sequential ‘design as discourse’ posts made by 
different forum contributors, during the month of July, 2008. I examined these posts 
for indications of the theme ‘design as discourse’ by variational distinctions.  
 
Chosen thread  
‘design as discourse’ as a 
knowing theme 
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Figure 6.2 Sequential posts within the forum thread ‘design as discourse’ 
Next, Figure 6.3 shows an explicit distinction or variation of the ‘design as discourse’ 
theme (the highlighted phrase “things like race, class, culture power, etc.”) made by 
a forum contributor. This is way-of-knowing about design as discourse embodies the 
first-order knower who takes such a view – either as a second-order reflective self-
observation of the forum contributor’s own knowing, or another or other first-order 
knowers who think of ‘design as discourse’ in terms of “race, class, culture, power 
etc”. the Here, as in other posts, it is most significant that the post refers to the 
previous forum post distinction or variational understanding of design as discourse, a 
distinction made by another forum contributor. Over forum threads that encompass 
knowing themes, it was evident that new distinctions referred to foregoing 
distinctions. This shows the recursivity of Luhmann’s communication events, where a 
prior distinction is indicated in order to make a new one, as communication proceeds 
(Luhmann, 2002).  
Subject:  Re: design as discourse 
From:  Juris Milestone  
Reply-To:  Juris Milestone  
Date:  Mon, 7 Jul 2008 13:40:37 -0400
Content-Type:
 
text/plain 
Parts/Attachments:  
 
text/plain (35 lines) 
  
 
I agree - excellent question. 
 
I'm not sure if there is irony meant in Eduardo's post, but wouldn't it 
be abstract distillation to attempt to define design as not discourse -
albeit a potentially useful abstraction for certain purposes (I would 
genuinely like to know what they are), but still, a  
kind of artificial isolation, as if to say that design operates in a 
total material and social vacuum? 
 
For my interests, accepting design as discourse is a first step. And 
staying with Foucault, the pertinent questions have to do with effects  
and results of that discourse - who benefits? how? in what way? and how 
does this articulate with things like race, class, culture, power,  
etc.? 
 
Juris Milestone 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Thread post showing an explicit distinction that indicates ‘design as 
discourse’ as a knowing theme. 
 
Explicit  
distinction  
of ‘design 
as 
discourse’ 
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What is also evident in this post and the reference made in this post to the previous 
post is that distinctions as related variations all indicated the knowing theme or 
potential system of knowing and communication design as discourse.  
After a careful examination of these distinctions and indications in forum threads 
appearing from June 2008 to June 2009, I identified nine way-of-knowing themes 
that evidenced design knowing and communication system characteristics. These 
nine knowing themes are listed below. The workings of my analysis of these themes 
are given in following sections.  
Design Creativity. Creating a designed object is a cognitive act, but there was 
contention in this knowing theme about what kind of cognition creativity involves. For 
instance, as I described in Chapter Two, creativity is construed as sometimes 
personal knowing and sometimes as social knowing. 
Design Definitions. Definitions in the threads concerning this knowing theme 
viewed designing as a cognitive act, but an act that might be defined by different 
goals. 
Design versus Art. Forum discussion over the threads concerning s knowing theme 
took up the ubiquitous question of how design might be different to art, in terms of 
what kinds of knowing are involved in each. 
Design as Discourse. Threads about this knowing theme concerned how it might 
be that designed objects can be understood as discursive – for instance, how they 
might represent or subvert historical traditions of style like what might be considered 
‘baroque’ or what might be considered ‘kitsch’, or as Buchanan (1996) has 
mentioned, how designed objects might challenge or advance social norms. 
Design Research. Posts within the threads referring to this knowing theme dealt 
with ‘finding out’ or forms of mental processing in order to know what issues might 
impact on the appeal of a particular design.  
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Design Thinking. This knowing theme concerned ways of thinking through 
designing as a process toward producing a viable visual object.  
Design Methods. knowing through formalised strategies for thinking through and 
dealing with visual design problems was the theme of these threads.  
Group Collaboration. This knowing theme saw group-think and group-work as 
having advantages over individual efforts. 
Design Aesthetics. How it is that the visual aesthetic appeal of a design might be 
known was the theme of this thread.  
Cognitive distinctions in respect of these knowing themes were ubiquitous across the 
threads in which they appeared. These design knowing themes recurred over the 
history of the online forum archives. This longevity was not surprising because these 
themes appear often in historical, theoretical and educational design scholarship. 
Overall, these themes involved contention between online forum contributors about 
‘designerly ways-of-knowing’ (Cross, 2007a). Figure 6. 4 illustrates the second-order 
indication of knowing themes by explicit distinctions.  
 
Figure 6.4 Second-order observation or indication of knowing themes by 
means of explicit distinctions. 
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In the analytical examination that follows, I attempt to show how online forum posts 
within knowing-themed threads exhibited the relational duality that both Bhaskar 
(2008) and Luhmann (2002) espouse: the relation between an abstract system or 
structure, and an actual cognitive event. Explicit distinctions were asymmetrically 
related to knowing themes in that they patently indicated these themes. This relation 
between a way-of-knowing distinction and a knowing theme was my guideline for 
selecting posts as data. 
The research concern with visual design meaning was sometimes satisfied by 
explicit reference to designed objects, and at other times there was implied reference 
to designed objects. 
As I have said, in the data a great many distinctions indicated each of the data 
knowing themes. My purpose was, however, to identify the scope of way-of-knowing 
distinctions that might indicate knowing themes. I selected posts on this basis, and in 
the following section I illustrate my analysis with what I judged to be sufficient quotes 
from the data to illustrate the scope of variation amongst knowing theme distinctions. 
My further purpose was to show differentiation among pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
This needed a staged analysis over both data sets. In the online forum data, it was 
possible to identify selective distinctions that indicated what might be knowing and 
communication systems and subsystems. But only when I could find some evidence 
of enduring historical structures could these putative systems and subsystems be 
considered to be relational mechanisms, in the CR sense. In the following analysis I 
footnote the thread titles I drew upon in respect of each knowing theme, because 
these thread titles sometimes made obscure reference to thread contents.  
Posts made by the online forum design academic contributors are referenced by 
name and day, month and year date. I have taken this citation route because of the 
ethical considerations regarding design academic posts, mentioned in Chapter Five. 
As I have said in this regard, I tread a fine line between recognition of academic 
distinctions of design ways-of-knowing, and the use of these quoted distinctions for 
my own research purposes. The citation format I have used is intended to allow my 
reader easy access to the online forum posts from which I quote portions of the 
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design academic contributor’s observations, should they wish to follow up on these. I 
now move to a discussion of each of the identified nine ways-of-knowing with brief 
examples from the data of the distinctions being called upon in each. 
For the first knowing theme, Design Creativity, I show the workings of my analysis 
method (Henning, van Rensburg & Smit, 2004) in a bit more detail. This same 
analysis method was called upon for the identification of all nine of the knowing 
themes. In the interests of space and the logistics of demonstrating the process 
within the confines of a thesis, I therefore use this first knowing theme to give an 
analytical exemplar of the online forum data (which is the second-order view of a 
design academic) of micro, distinctive ways-of-knowing as seated in macro systems 
or structures of knowing and communication. 
6.1.1 Design Creativity42  
Borjesson (23 May, 2008)43 asserts that design innovation as a creative way of 
knowing does not mean innovation as novelty: 
Design and innovation is so intimately linked that young designers seem 
to seriously think that by creating something new they are innovative. 
Innovation has no value of its own if it does not mean development [my 
italics]. 
For Borjesson, creative innovation requires a development of what has gone before. 
I then regarded ‘development’ as a distinction or specification of how creativity might 
be viewed as be as a cognitive act.  
For Scott, design creativity drives “new ways of looking at existing problems”, 
involves “seeing new opportunities” and may also “[exploit] emerging technologies 
and changes” (Scott, 27 May, 2008). In this understanding, ways in which design 
could be creative then required the designer: 
                                            
42
 As I have already mentioned, the threads in respect of this particular theme include: ‘Creativity–
Design–Innovation’; ‘Methodologies, performative placemaking and distributed creativity’; and 
‘Creativity and Nature vs Nurture’. 
 
43
 This is thus the first of the references to the forum data. In this case the reference is to an online 
comment made by a design academic named Borjesson and the comment was made on 23 May 
2008. 
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to look at existing problems in new ways,  
to see new opportunities, and  
to exploit technological change. 
Morelli (23 May, 2008 and citing Verganti) said that creative innovation “produces 
substantial changes in the universe of language/meanings, and consequently 
generates technological changes of minimal or radical dimension”. Ways in which 
design could be creative required the designer:  
to produce substantial change, and 
to generate technological change. 
For Bill (27 May, 2008) a distinction of creativity “that resides in the person” is 
countered by the distinction of creativity as “organised externally”. From this kind of 
perspective creativity “is mainly an issue of who the audience is when someone is 
talking about design” (Sobh, 28 May, 2008). Ways in which design could be creative 
then required the designer:  
to draw on personal understandings,  
to address social understandings, and 
to design for an audience. 
Albinsson (22 May, 2008) feels that creative “innovation is associated with the 
challenge or alteration …”. Creativity is differently conceived by Jurier (2 February, 
2009) “as somehow where economic value is hung, even if, in fact, this is mythical” – 
and not about “a series of pure 'innovations' that punctuate an otherwise stable 
tradition”. Ways in which design could be creative then required the designer:  
to challenge or alter, and 
to generate economic value. 
A blander view of creativity was that creativity is just “a form or subset of general 
intelligence” (Curedale, 16 February, 2009). A way in which design could be creative 
required the designer to think intelligently. 
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Design creativity as a way-of-knowing thus called upon a number of cognitive 
distinctions in the data, a few of which have been briefly illustrated here with data 
excerpts, as requiring a designer:  
to innovate through development 
to look at existing problems in new ways,  
to see new opportunities,  
to exploit technological change to produce substantial change, 
to generate technological change, 
to draw on personal understandings, 
to address social understandings, 
to design for an audience, 
to challenge or alter, 
to generate economic value, and 
to think intelligently. 
The explicit distinctions of design creativity above are discernable in data only 
because they are second-order observations. Distinctions seen at a second-order 
level construe the distinction as representing a first-order observer’s act of cognition, 
like ‘drawing on personal understandings; or ‘seeing new opportunities’ or 
‘challenging’. The distinctions here are shown in both a cognitive and communicative 
light. 
The distinctions identified above suggested how different design teachers might think 
design students could creatively know design object meaning. At this stage the 
conjectured role of distinctions that indicate ways-of-knowing was clearly borne out 
in the data. Due to the likely structural coupling between design academics and 
design studio teaching, I further surmised that these distinctions could occur 
implicitly to design studio teachers. While many of those posting to the forum are 
indeed design studio teachers, this cannot be taken as a given. Confirming that 
design teachers do indeed make such distinctions could, however, therefore only be 
done when the group discussions among design teachers who have direct 
experience of the design studio were examined, as is discussed in the next chapter.  
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6.1.2 Design Definition44  
The design definition thread posts made cognitive distinctions of ways-of-knowing 
what it is that defines design.  
Friedman (25 June, 2008) distinguished design as “a process of planning to create 
something new (or to reshape something that exists) to meet a need, to solve a 
problem or to transform a less desirable situation to a preferred situation”. Design 
was thus defined by the ability of the designer:  
to create something new, 
to reshape something that exists,  
to meet a need,  
to solve a problem, and 
to transform a less desirable situation into a preferred situation.  
Salustri (19 June, 2008) asked whether design was concerned only with material 
culture: “Are you excluding the possibility of [the] immaterial?” A way in which design 
was defined then required the designer:  
to address both material and immaterial culture. 
Bürdek’s (15 June, 2008) opinion was “that design functions to improve the relations 
between products and users, and this is mainly a question of function and meaning”. 
This way in which design was defined then required the designer: 
to improve relations between products and users. 
Friedman (25 June, 2008), explained that the term design is “rooted in older Latin 
words, the most important being designare, a word that means ‘to mark out’”. To 
mark out or delineate is the nature of the act of design for Friedman. A way in which 
design was defined then required the designer:  
                                            
44
 This theme emerged in the threads: ‘Definition of design;,Working across multiple design sectors’ 
(was previously ‘A simple definition of Design'; ‘A Short Definition of Design’; ‘The non-opposite 
definition’; and ‘The Design Domain’). 
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to mark out [or specify]. 
Milestone (15 June, 2008) offered a definition of design “as a mobilising metaphor”. 
Design for Milestone might also essentially “coalesce elements of many different 
positive notions or ideas, or discourses, into a technology of organisation and 
change”. Ways in which design was defined then required the designer:  
to coalesce elements of different notions or ideas and  
to mobilise design through metaphor. 
Simon’s (26 June, 2008) sense of design is that it is essentially connected to 
“embodiment”. A way in which design was defined then required the designer:  
to embody [meaning]. 
Chambers (12 June, 2008) favoured an encapsulated definition of design as 
“seeking differentiation through insight. A way in which design was defined then 
required the designer:  
to differentiate [design meaning] through insight. 
Both a specific and a generic definition came from Cahalan (13 June, 2008), as 
follows. The specific definition: “Design is the research, analysis and creation of 
innovative products and services which shape the human experience.” Ways in 
which design was defined then required the designer:  
to create innovative products and services, and 
to shape human experience. 
The generic definition was: “Design bridges the gap between the present and the 
future as a catalyst for improvement of the human condition.” Ways in which design 
was defined then required the designer:  
to bridge the gap between the present and the future, and 
to improve the human condition. 
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Overall, some of the cognitive distinctions identified in the data as defining design 
then required the designer:  
to create something new, 
to reshape something that exists, 
to meet a need, 
to solve a problem, 
to transform a less desirable situation into a preferred situation,  
to address both material and immaterial culture,  
to improve relations between products and users, 
to mark out or specify, 
to coalesce elements of different notions or ideas,  
to mobilise design through metaphor, 
to embody, 
to differentiate through insight, 
to create innovative products and services, 
to shape human experience, 
to bridge the gap between the present and the future, and 
to improve the human condition. 
Ways-of-knowing show asymmetrical indication by calling on selected distinctions. In 
this case of the design definition ways-of-knowing, design is an abstract systemic 
structure that is indicated by distinctive acts of cognition like ‘improving the human 
condition’ or ‘mobilising design through metaphor’. This asymmetrical relation of 
cognitive acts of distinction to ‘Design’ is one of ontological duality, where concrete 
acts (of cognitive distinction) are put in relation to abstract structures.  
6.1.3 Design versus Art45  
The design versus art thread posts seemed to refer to cognitive distinctions of art 
versus design. The entwined histories of art and design were discussed in Chapter 
Two. Similarities and differences between art and design have long been debated 
                                            
45
 This was a single thread, which was titled as such. 
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(by, for instance, Palmer & Dodson, 1996 ; Barnard, 1998; Buchanan, 1996; Archer, 
Baynes & Roberts, 2005a).  
A commonality between art and design saw both as endowed with “high cultural 
capital” (Bill, 4 June, 2008). Knowing design meaning was then construed as:  
high cultural capital.  
Milestone (June, 4 2008) suggested some fairly politicised distinctions of design as a 
“total social fact, along the lines of Mauss' gift,46 or a technology of governmentality 
along the lines of Foucault, or related to class and taste along the lines of Bourdieu's 
field of position takings”. Milestone also thought “Design in mass media and 
consumer culture is a powerful force that is shaped outside the purviews of 
professional designers”. Distinctions of the ways in which design meaning could be 
known that are called upon here were: 
as class and taste, 
as social politics, and 
as a media force.  
Huppatz (2 June, 2008) thought the contemporary consumer design field was 
becoming narrower but at the same time becoming more closely associated with art. 
Milestone (4 June, 2008) made a “star system: of famous designers” (like the star 
system of famous artists) link between art and design. Ways in which design 
meaning could be known were: 
as art-related, and 
as referring to famous designers. 
Bill (5 June, 2008) wondered whether engineering designers “need to express and 
realise their creative 'inner qualities' in the same way as the 'art and design' 
designers do?” A way in which design meaning could be known was then: 
                                            
46
 Mauss’ gift refers to the anthropologist Mauss’ research on social conventions around gift giving 
and receiving. 
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as reflecting the designer’s 'inner qualities'. 
Milestone (6 June, 2008) thought that “the aesthetic variety [of design] (architecture, 
product design, fashion)” mainly contributed to media representation being 
“embedded in a symbolic economy of cool or new or tech” where “new subjectivities 
are created … so as to align populations with the needs and desires of political 
economic order à la 'design’”. This distinction viewed design meaning as located in a 
symbolic economy that produces popular design subjectivities. A way in which 
design meaning could be known was then: 
as embedded in a symbolic economy, and 
as producing subjectivities. 
Overall, design as cognitively related to art could then address design meaning: 
as high cultural capital,  
as class and taste, 
as social politics, 
as a media force, 
as art-related, 
as referring to famous designers, 
as reflecting the designer’s 'inner qualities', 
as embedded in a symbolic economy, and 
as producing subjectivities. 
Distinctions comparing design to art showed how cognitive acts in design must, as 
Gedenryd (1998) has asserted, place a designed object in a future scenario of public 
life. As in the case of the previously two identified ways-of-knowing, design creativity 
and design as defined, each cognitive distinction of design as different to or the 
same as art entailed a trajectory of design meaning toward social life. This is 
evidence of the value-laden and socially divisive reach of these cognitive 
distinctions. The relation of distinctions to future meanings is, in the Luhmannian 
scheme, one where selected distinctions ‘attract’ further distinctions that selectivity 
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has put aside (Luhmann, 1995, p. 40). By calling on ‘this’ distinction, rather than 
‘that’ distinction, there is the possibility of some future meanings and not others.  
On these grounds, the conjecture of ways-of-knowing as relational mechanisms 
could be further pursued. 
6.1.4 Design as Discourse47  
The design as discourse posts seemed to make cognitive distinctions of ways in 
which design discourse embodies design knowing.  
Young (8 July, 2008) said that “once we’ve decided that something [a design] is 
‘important’ … we cast back to see where it began, what the important events were, 
and who the important people were, in its history”. This is a representational way of 
knowing through design precedent. Along these lines, Russell (29 June, 2009) 
mentions “the concept of artefacts as Affect Machines”. Ways in which design 
meaning could be known were: 
as reference to important historical designs, and  
as producing affective response. 
A more contemporary vision focused on interpretive reference to social memory and 
material culture (Berk, 21 April, 2009). A way in which design meaning could be 
known was: 
as social memory and material culture. 
The idea of design as discourse for Friedman (22 April, 2009) could be seen as 
object-text interpretation: “One can use text interpretation and Wilhelm Dilthey's 
approach to the human sciences to understand all things human and human-made, 
including objects”. A way in which design meaning could be known was: 
                                            
47
 This knowing theme was identified in the following threads:’ Design as discourse’; ‘Symbolic Design 
cues’; ‘Actor-Network theory - discourse on object level’; ‘Toward an actor network theory of design’; 
and ‘Seeking refs on how artefacts mediate power’. 
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as object ‘text’. 
Alternatively, ideological discursive forms could be seen as a cognitive vehicle for a 
designed object, as Hepworth (24 April, 2009) mentioned: “an object's ability to 
channel or tap into a dominant discourse is part of why masses of people fall in love 
with it”. A way in which design meaning could be known was: 
as channelling or tapping into a dominant discourse. 
The socially structured view of design as discourse was given by Krippendorff (7 
July, 2008). Krippendorff’s distinction of design as discourse firmly states that 
“design discourse … is a way of coordinating with others the realisation of artefacts 
or intervening into existing reality. Discourses produce objects”. A way in which 
design meaning could be known was: 
as producing discourse. 
For Stolterman (29 June, 2009) design as discourse concerned “the role and power 
of artefacts in the field of the philosophy of technology”. A way in which design 
meaning could be known was: 
as concerned with power relations. 
A different branch of distinctions that indicated design as discourse conveyed design 
as discourse in the semantic terms of affordances, symbols, and symbolic cues 
(Tonkinwise, 14 August, 2008) and semiotic relations (Hunsinger, 21 April, 2009). 
For Faust (23 April, 2009) the “[discursive] system of thought is visible within the 
[design] objects”. Ways in which design meaning could be known were: 
as affordances, 
as symbols, 
as symbolic cues,  
as semiotic relations, and 
as visible systems of thought. 
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Krippendorff (21 April, 2009) developed the idea of design as discourse somewhat 
differently as “stakeholder networks within which artefacts come to fruition”. For him, 
a way in which design meaning could be known was: 
as stakeholder interests. 
Galle’s (15 August, 2008) design as discourse distinction was of “Design as 
Communication … [or] how the designer may communicate with the user of the 
design product, through that product itself”. A way in which design meaning could be 
known was: 
as visual communication. 
Overall, the examples of cited distinctions suggest that design as discourse could 
then address design meaning: 
as reference to important historical designs, 
as producing affective response, 
as social memory and material culture, 
as object ‘text’, 
as channelling or tapping into a dominant discourse, 
as producing discourse,  
as concerned with power relations, 
as affordances, 
as symbols, 
as symbolic cues,  
as semiotic relations,  
as visible systems of thought, 
as stakeholder interests, and  
as visual communication. 
These explicit cognitive distinctions of design as a discursive knowing system 
showed the relational properties of indication by calling on selected distinctions. That 
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selected distinctions were chosen from a range of possible distinctions is made clear 
by the alternative distinction possibilities within which each post is couched.  
Another noteworthy feature of the above cognitive distinctions of design as discourse 
is the temporal references made by these distinctions. Distinctions of visual 
representation could just as well refer to Derrida’s visual ‘texts’ (1997), Gibson’s 
affordances (1977) or designed objects as material culture (Attfield, 2000; Ebbesen 
and Vihma, 2006). There was also again a sense of how these visual meaning 
distinctions might, for design teachers, carry implicit expectations of future meaning 
in the social world beyond design pedagogy. 
The conjecture of (possibly pedagogical) ways-of-knowing as historically developed 
relational mechanisms was supported by forum participants’ selection of temporally 
inflected distinctions.  
6.1.5 Design Research48  
This online forum way-of-knowing concerned the debate about whether design 
praxis can be regarded as research output. My interest, however, focused upon 
ways of researching in order to design.  
Simon (4 July, 2008) pointed to a “haptic” or touch-based way-of-knowing through 
sculpting that had students “thinking with their hands” and then with their minds. A 
way of researching for design was then: 
by conceptualising from sense data. 
At one end of a range of indications of design as a research or inquiry form of 
knowing lay in Love’s (24 September, 2008) assertion that “ALL design methods are 
information gathering methods”. A way of researching for design was then: 
                                            
48
 The threads in which this way of knowing was evident were: ‘Personal inquiry for Design Research’; 
‘Design as research; Evidence and Case-based Alternatives’; ‘Evidence-Based Design Axioms’; 
‘Visual material in the development of knowledge – and beyond’; ‘But where is understanding’; 
‘Cultural probes and axioms’; ‘Information as an entity rather than an activity’; ‘Is design always user-
centred?’; ‘Looking for referred definitions of consumers Latent Needs’; ‘Design practice as design 
research?’ 
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by gathering information. 
Qualifying Love’s assertion, Corte Real (24 September, 2008) characterised 
“imagination [as an] information processing method”. A way of researching for design 
was then: 
by mentally processing information. 
“Rigorous observation” of design user interactions constituted design research for 
van der Merwe (23 September, 2008), who later added that such observation should 
address systems of user needs, and should be conducted “according to accepted 
research guidelines and principles”. A way of researching for design was then: 
by formal research procedures. 
Sneha (23 September, 2008) also stressed “the necessity of user inclusion” in the 
design research process, which process ought to be “'communicated, analysed, 
tested or criticised”. Ways of researching for design were then: 
by including users, 
by analysing, 
by testing, and 
by criticising. 
Nelson (18 September, 2008) championed “diverse forms of inquiry” leading to 
integrated or “composite understandings”. A way of researching for design was then: 
by diversified inquiry. 
Designs themselves needed to be “analysed, reflected upon, tested, criticised … and 
to produce theory during the making process” for Butt (23 September, 2008). Butt 
also emphasised “the invention and generation of ideas” and “original investigation 
undertaken in order to gain knowledge and understanding” as design research. 
Ways of researching for design were then: 
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by theorising designed objects,  
by reflecting on designed objects, 
by theorising design process, 
by inventing ideas, and 
by generating ideas. 
Mackinnon (21 June, 2008) described design in terms of a rational production of “a 
solution that meets a perceived or actual need” but at the same time “a highly 
creative and innovative effort that produces something new or reframes or combines 
elements in a new and unexpected way”. Ways of researching for design were then: 
by reframing elements in a new and unexpected ways, and 
by combining elements in a new and unexpected ways. 
Butt (19 September, 2008) quoted Swanson’s epistemic summation of design as a 
“syncretic and integrative discipline". A way of researching for design was then: 
by synthesising and integrating. 
Reader (19 September, 2008) turned attention to “the need for visual scholarship 
across higher education, as a response to the ubiquity of new media”. A way of 
researching for design was then: 
by visual scholarship. 
“Routine discoveries” during routine investigation “would always lead to the 
unexpected” for Sless (20 September, 2008), who added that investigation for design 
is located at the fluctuating “interface between designers and the public they serve”. 
Ways of researching for design were then: 
by discovery, and 
by researching relations between designers and the public. 
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On a cautionary note, Krippendorff (22 September, 2008) advised that though 
“empirical data” might help to make design decisions, such data would remain 
hypothetical, because the future of a design can only be conjectured. One way of 
researching for design was then: 
by empirical data which can only conjecture the future hypothetical data about the 
future of a design.  
“Cultural probes” (formal procedures for cultural inquiry) might be “about inspiration 
rather than information” in Barnes’s view (24 September, 2008). A way of 
researching for design was then: 
by using cultural probes for inspiration. 
Visual probing of the most promising design options “and then comparing them with 
client, production and user requirements” was van der Waarde’s (24 September, 
2008 ) design research option of choice. A way of researching for design was then: 
by visual probing of the design options. 
Matthews (24 September, 2008) favoured “a more designerly, open-ended, 
ambiguous, pluralistic way of inspiring design concepts”. A way of researching for 
design was then: 
by open-ended, ambiguous, pluralistic inspiration.  
Rosenbaum (29 October, 2008) mentioned “cognitive walkthroughs with think-aloud 
protocols to look at various aspects of user experience”. A way of researching for 
design was then: 
by cognitive walkthroughs to investigate user experience.  
Design research involves “[T]he kind of knowledge that can be conceptualised as 
fluid, dynamic, changeable and applicable in particular sites” for Clerke (7 October, 
2008). A way of researching for design was then: 
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by fluid, dynamic and changeable contextual inquiry. 
Burnette (29 October, 2008) felt that design “needs and desires arise in the 
circumstances of a situation and the potentials through which they might be satisfied 
is usually where the experience of the practitioner weighs in”. Burnette noted though 
that practitioner experience is “often under-informed and in need of relevant 
knowledge”. A way of researching for design was then: 
by drawing on informed personal experience. 
“Evidence-based design” has been the modus operandi for most design fields, 
according to Love (30 October, 2008). A way of researching for design was then: 
by drawing on evidence. 
Overall, various distinctions indicated how design research could cognitively address 
design meaning:  
by conceptualising from sense data, 
by gathering information, 
by mentally processing information, 
by formal research procedures, 
by including users, 
by analysing,  
by testing, 
by criticising, 
by diversified inquiry, 
by theorising designed objects, 
by reflecting on designed objects, 
by theorising design process, 
by inventing ideas, 
by generating ideas, 
by reframing elements in a new and unexpected ways, 
by combining elements in a new and unexpected ways, 
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by synthesising and integrating, 
by visual scholarship, 
by discovery, 
by researching relations between designers and the public,  
by empirical but hypothetical data about the future of a design, 
by using cultural probes for inspiration,  
by visual probing of the design options, 
by open-ended, ambiguous, pluralistic inspiration,  
by cognitive walkthroughs to investigate user experience,  
by fluid dynamic and changeable contextual inquiry, 
by drawing on informed personal experience,and 
by drawing on evidence. 
The multiple distinctions called upon to form the design research ways-of-knowing 
variously reflected historical developments in the history of epistemology (Kuhn, 
1970). For instance, experimental testing, personal reflection on experience and 
visual scholarship are historically successive approaches to design research as 
forms of research inquiry. This evidence supported the conjecture of pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing as historically formed relational mechanisms. 
6.1.6 Design Thinking49  
The post in which design thinking emerged as a way of knowing seemed to make 
cognitive distinctions of ways in which design definitions imply design knowing.  
Friedman (28 November, 2008) suggested that design thinking might follow 
Einstein’s thinking process of “steps and missteps” exemplifying Einstein’s 
“willingness to think creatively AND willingness to apply intellectual rigour to the 
problems he chose and the solutions he attempted”. A way of thinking about design 
was then: 
                                            
49
 The threads in which this way of knowing emerged were: ‘Designers Think Through Einstein’; 
‘Cultures, Societies, and the Individuals within Them’; ‘Intuition in design’; ‘Bridging Art and Science’; 
‘Self Questioning in Design’;’ Using DNA Structure as an Analogy for Design’; ‘Bridging Art and 
Science Intuition in Design’. 
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by steps and missteps, and 
by means of intellectual rigour. 
Haugen (21 November, 2008) linked “conceptual and abstract thinking” to graphic 
design. Then she observed that while ingenious design makes sense in hindsight, it 
relies on the “imaginative and intuitive” capacities. Ways of thinking about design 
were then: 
through conceptual and abstract thinking, and  
through imaginative and intuitive capacities. 
Design thinking was, for Arvola (30 March, 2009), “about employing tacit knowledge” 
or how “experts leap to solutions and decisions, seemingly without analysis 
conclusions". Arvola also connected intuition to design. Ways of researching for 
design were then: 
through tacit knowledge, and 
through intuition. 
The discussion about design thinking turned to the curious idea of using DNA 
structure as an analogy for design. Love (4 December, 2008) remarked that 
Alexander (1977) had made it possible to “[connect] generic information about the 
world to good quality solutions”. A way of thinking about design was then: 
by connecting information about the world to design solutions. 
A single post to a single thread ‘Self-questioning in Design’ was made by Wölfel (16 
December, 2008) who drew attention to self-questioning as an “unconscious 
practice,” not based on a carefully chosen set of questions. A way of thinking about 
for design was then: 
by self-questioning that is not based on a carefully chosen set of questions. 
Rust (13 December, 2008) reported that “constructing and evaluating a set of 
operational principles” had been done through his students’ design sketching 
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activities “showing thinking in action as well as an audit trail that connected the 
original [design] concept with the refined final version”. A way of thinking about 
design was then: 
by constructing and evaluating a set of operational principles. 
Swanson (30 March, 2009) thought that decision making was influenced by culture, 
and that intuition is backed by hard work. A way of thinking about design was then: 
through intuition in design decision making, influenced by culture. 
Curedale (30 March, 2009) pointed out that learned skills could be subconscious in 
thinking, while Norman (30 March, 2009) held that expertise draws upon a reserve of 
subconsciously known patterns. But Norman, echoing Swanson’s post, objected to 
the term intuition, as meaning “automatic, without conscious awareness” whereas 
automatic design thinking is the result of many hours of practice. A way of thinking 
about design was then: 
through subconsciously known patterns. 
Past experience “was a form of design research” for Blackler (31 March, 2009). A 
way of thinking about design was then: 
through past experience.  
Overall, the illustrative distinctions indicate that design thinking could then cognitively 
address design meaning:  
by steps and missteps, 
by means of intellectual rigour, 
through conceptual and abstract thinking, 
through imagination,  
through tacit knowledge, 
by intuition, 
by connecting information about the world to solutions, 
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by self-questioning, 
by constructing and evaluating a set of operational principles, 
through intuition in design decision-making, influenced by culture, 
though intuition backed by hard work, 
through subconsciously known patterns, and 
through past experience. 
As in the case of distinctions of design research as a possible knowing and 
communication system, design thinking distinctions reproduced disparate cognitive 
acts: imaginative and intuitive capacities are for instance very much of the ‘art’ way 
of knowing tradition, versus the experimental rigour of the ‘science’ tradition (Feast, 
2010). Nevertheless these distinctions were all framed within design thinking. As 
such, these temporally located distinctions were grounds for the conjectured 
reproduction of such distinctions in design pedagogy.  
6.1.7 Design Methods50  
The thread posts through which design methods was identified as a way-of-knowing 
seemed to make cognitive distinctions of the ways in which design methods involve 
design knowing.  
Online forum posts in respect of design methods concerned the very particular 
phenomenon of ‘pattern languages’, which were developed by Alexander (1977). 
Pattern languages are a distillation of design problem types, their characteristics, 
and successful solutions to these problems. Pattern languages involve typologies as 
well as ‘grammar’ as the ordering procedure or syntax that should be followed in 
order to solve the design problem (Todd, Kemp & Phillips, 2004). 
Thorpe (8 December, 2008) refers to pattern languages as “creating a viable 
typology” that informs design. A design methods way-of-knowing was then: 
                                            
50
 This way of knowing emerged in the following online forum threads: ‘Pattern Language’ (using DNA 
etc.); and: ‘What undergirds Christopher Alexander’. 
. 
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by using a viable typology. 
Then Burnette (8 December, 2008) mentions “syllogistic logic (IF this situation exists 
THEN do this)”. However, for Burnette a pattern language “does set forth both 
supporting evidence and the reasoning behind a proposed response”. A design 
methods way-of-knowing was then: 
by using syllogistic logic. 
Love (5 December, 2008) countered these ideas: “How does one know that a pattern 
isn't just something that someone thought was a good idea because of some moral, 
fanciful or idealistically conditioned beliefs about how the world works?”. Love (9 
December, 2008) adds that rules for designing constitute “a taxonomy, typology or 
categorical schema [and] NOT a language”. A design methods way-of-knowing was 
then: 
by using taxonomies, typologies or categorical schemas. 
Russell (10 December, 2008) thought the nature of pattern language might be 
comparable to “theoretical provocations … [as] fixed ideas which can however still 
open up a space for new ideas”. Patterns as templates for design might, for Russell, 
“distract [us] from the obvious … away from the known details – towards possible 
combinations and variations that exist in the spaces between … as an advance on 
the fixity of the given”. A design methods way-of-knowing was then: 
by using pattern templates.  
Overall, design methods could then cognitively address design meaning:  
by using a viable typology, 
by using syllogistic logic,  
by using taxonomies, typologies or categorical schemas, and 
by using pattern templates.  
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Distinctions of design methods as a knowing structure harked to the design methods 
movement that arose in the 1960s (Casakin, 2008). In 2008, at the time when these 
distinctions were posted, these method-based ways-of-knowing were still being 
debated. Their cognitively relational significance might then still lead to the 
emergence of this rather than that (shared or unshared) design meaning in design 
pedagogy. This effect on the emergence of design meaning was consistent with the 
abductive conjecture of relational mechanisms. 
6.1.8 Group Collaboration51 
The design collaboration thread posts seemed to make cognitive distinctions of the 
ways in which knowing could be a group process.  
Coker (19 November, 2008) avers that “Collaborative skills are independent of 
design skills … [ and require] a complete rethink of the working philosophy of design 
without losing the commitment to aesthetic and functional excellence”. A way in 
which design could be collaborative required designers: 
to rethink design without neglecting aesthetics and functionality.  
Tonkinwise (18 November, 2008) saw collaborative designing as motivating students 
to “monitor and learn about their teamwork capacities”. A way in which design could 
be collaborative required designers: 
to monitor design process. 
Overall, cognitive distinctions of design collaboration required designers: 
to rethink design without neglecting aesthetics and functionality, and  
to monitor design process. 
                                            
51
 This online forum theme was evidenced in a short but important forum thread called ‘Group 
Assessment’. This thread dealt minimally with the assessment of group design work in design 
education, concerning far more distinctions of design intention as a collaborative effort. 
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Though this way-of-knowing was only briefly entertained during the online forum 
research data window of June 2008 to June 2009, ideas about collaboration in 
design have since received much attention (du Preez, 2010). Cognitive collaboration 
stands against the historical idea of the designer or artist as a lone genius (Feast, 
2010), yet still refers to design intention. 
6.1.9 Design Aesthetics52  
The design aesthetic thread posts seemed to make cognitive distinctions of the ways 
in which design aesthetics constitutes design knowing. 
Albinsson (26 January, 2009) thought of pragmatic design aesthetics as 
communicating values in which “stakeholder design errands” are run. A way in which 
aesthetic design meaning could be known was then: 
as concerning client stakeholders. 
Dunbar (23 January, 2009) asked how pragmatist aesthetics might help to 
conceptually reach beyond “product styling” in interaction or communication design.  
A way in which aesthetic design meaning could be known was then:  
as going beyond ‘product styling’. 
Russell (23 January, 2009) cited Norman’s work in connection with “transactional 
approaches” to pragmatist aesthetics. A way in which aesthetic design meaning 
could be known was then:  
as transactional. 
                                            
52
 This way of knowing comprised the following threads: ‘Pragmatist aesthetics in communication 
design’; ‘Measurement of aesthetics’; ‘Emotional Theory Re: Online judgement of aesthetics’. 
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Friedman (23 January, 2009) made reference to the “symbolic interactionist tradition” 
as a pragmatist context for “aesthetics and interaction”. A way in which aesthetic 
design meaning could be known was then:  
as symbolic interaction. 
Love (28 January, 2009) differentiated between “subjective feeling-based design 
[and] rational functionalist design”. A way in which aesthetic design meaning could 
be known was then:  
as subjective feeling-based design. 
Dunbar (27 January, 2009) thought that theories of aesthetic experience offered 
“more than just the sum of identifiable, classifiable qualities possessed by artefacts”. 
Dunbar cited McCarthy and Wright’s view that design “is as much about what people 
bring to experiences as what the designer leaves there”. A way in which aesthetic 
design meaning could be known was then:  
as what people bring to the experience of design.  
Love (27 January, 2009) brought the discussion about pragmatist aesthetics back to 
the design user's internal subjective world, but then stated that he could “only create 
designs for things in the objective external world”. A way in which aesthetic design 
meaning could be known was then:  
as concerning the objective external world. 
Albinsson (26 January, 2009) put a purposive slant on design communication: “I view 
communication as teleological, it serves the purpose of someone”. A way in which 
aesthetic design meaning could be known was then:  
as serving someone’s purpose. 
Overall, design aesthetics could then address design meaning: 
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as concerning client stakeholders,  
as going beyond ‘product styling’, 
as a transaction, 
as symbolic interaction, 
as subjective feeling-based design, 
as what people bring to the experience of design,  
as concerning the objective external world, and 
as serving someone’s purpose. 
The reproduction of temporal cognitive distinctions about design aesthetics is 
evidenced here by Blumer’s (1969) seminal social research into ‘symbolic 
interaction’. Similarly ‘subjective feelings’ could be associated with Kelly’s construct 
theory, (for instance, Salmon, 1995) or the general constructivist leaning of design 
knowing (Cross, 1982). ‘Product styling’ conceivably refers to Bürdek’s product 
semantics theory of the 1970s (Bürdek, 2005).  
These cognitive distinctions of design aesthetics have an emergent significance as 
they leave the hands of the designer and become product or artefacts in the public 
domain. This calls to mind Fleming’s reference to the potential value-laden, 
historical, “out-there” meaning of students’ designs, as “future artefacts” (1998, pp. 
49–50).  
Luhmann’s (1995) view that seems to apply here is that meaning is always 
communicatively constituted. Design aesthetic meaning is indicated here by a 
number of different, but always selective cognitive distinctions that are selected from 
possible distinctions of design aesthetics.  
This, for Luhmann (1995), is how communicative distinctions refer backward to 
previous distinctions, and forward toward future distinctions that can, in terms of an 
emergent knowing and communication system, still be made in the future.
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.6.2 Online Forum Knowing Themes as Knowing Structures  
The foregoing analysis examined nine knowing themes that might be potential 
communication and knowing systems in the Luhmannian sense, and, 
correspondingly, nine potential enduring, abstract and macro structures that might 
historically structure relational mechanisms. 
A marked characteristic of the knowing themes of the foregoing analysis is that they 
evidence asymmetrical indication of a knowing theme by variational distinctions or 
ways-of-knowing. There were also commonalities among knowing themes:  
To illustrate this, the knowing themes 
• Design Research, 
• Design Thinking, and 
• Design Methods  
seemed to bespeak finding out, (through Design Research) ways of thinking about 
designing (Design Thinking) or following prescribed strategies for solving design 
problems (Design Methods). Within these knowing themes, way-of-knowing 
distinctions like conceptualising from sense data, using imagination and intuition, and 
using syllogistic logic seemed to refer to forms of Design Inquiry. Then the knowing 
themes  
• design versus art, 
• design as discourse, and 
• design Aesthetics 
seemed to concern picturing, visualizing (Mirzoeff, 2002, p. 6) or referring to known 
qualities or ideas. Within these knowing themes, ways-of-knowing concerned for 
example, design as social politics, as semiotic relations, and as symbolic interaction. 
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I inferred that these way-of-knowing distinctions belong to a broader kind of knowing, 
that of Design Representation. The knowing themes 
• design Creativity,  
• design Definition, and  
• group collaboration 
seemed to refer to creativity as an act marked by particular intentions (Design 
Creativity) to design definitions as definitions of the purpose of cognitive design 
activities (Design Definitions) and to group-think as an intentional approach to design 
(Group Collaboration). For instance,53 to challenge or alter, to improve relations 
between products and users, and to monitor design process were intentional way-of-
knowing distinctions. 
I inferred that the varied way of knowing distinctions within these knowing themes 
referred to Design Intent.  
6.3 The Temporal Nature of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent forms of knowing had 
noticeable temporal features. For instance, designing by using “a viable typology” 
(Thorpe, 8 December, 2008) derives from the design methods movement that was 
influential from the 1960s to the 1970s (Casakin, 2008). “To improve the human 
condition” (Cahalan, 13 June, 2008), was the intent of the idealistic Bauhaus design 
movement in in the 1950s (Boradkar, 2009). Indeed, one may infer temporal 
reference in the online forum data that goes back to Enlightenment rationalism. 
Similarly, references to objects as intrinsically representing particular attributes dates 
back to medieval craftsmanship (Feast, 2010). 
                                            
53
 These instances constitute my reading of the online forum data.  
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To examine Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent forms of 
knowing in a CR light, I turned to the realist historian Daniel Little. Little has written 
about enduring ontological ‘kinds’ of historical phenomena, in contrast to ‘types’, 
which are temporally context-specific. Little’s criterion for enduring kinds is that they 
have “deep explanatory properties” (2000, p. 12) that allow inference from one 
element within them to the next (2000, p, 14). This criterion is particularly relevant to 
Luhmann’s distinction-structured systems of communicable knowing. Types, for 
Little, are by contrast heterogenous and changing groupings. 
Little’s (2000, p. 12) explanation of a historically enduring ‘kind’ follows: 
What is a kind? We may refer to a ‘kind’ as a group of things that share 
fundamental properties – structural, essential, causal. When ‘things’ fall 
into groups that share deep, explanatorily relevant properties, we refer to 
the groups as ‘kinds’. For example, ‘metal’ constitutes a kind; ‘plastic’ 
does not. ‘Gold’ is a kind; ‘mud’ is not. 
Historical structures like ‘feudalism’, ‘state’, ‘free market’, or ‘bureaucracy’, do not 
have the ontological gravity that allows inference to new cases (Little, 2000, p. 13). 
As Little (2000, p. 23) puts the realist case for ‘kinds’ of relatively enduring 
structures: 
A social order existed in Northern France in the 12th century that can be 
classified as ‘feudal’. The social order existed; feudalism does not. 
Peacock (2000, p. 2) elucidates Little’s position by simply stating that enduring 
structures or systems are “distinct from the knowledge science produces about 
them”. 
Commonalities among ‘types’ of knowing theme were commonalities of inquiry, 
representation and intent. From an historically structured knowing and 
communication point of view, Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design 
Intent as irreducible kinds. They cannot be reduced to any type or way of knowing 
within them. They are historically formed and enduring knowing structures that will 
continue to be indicated by cognitive distinctions over time. As I explained in Chapter 
Three, real structures that have a structuring or relational mechanism effect are 
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deemed intransitive, or relatively enduring in the CR view, by contrast with more 
transitive social structures (Lawson, 2004, p 2). 
I further inferred that Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent are 
historical knowing structures that structure relations – they are relational 
mechanisms. In this way, and according to the CR conception of relational 
mechanisms, concrete micro events are into relation with macro abstract structures 
(Bhaskar, 2008; Archer 1995; Bunge, 2006, Elder- Vass, 2007a).  
The relation between subsumed knowing themes and irreducible knowing structures 
is illustrated in Figure 6.5 below. 
 
Figure 6.5 Forum data knowing themes as historical knowing structures. 
To examine these historically ‘deep explanatory properties’ (Little, 2000, p 12) of 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent, I look the status of each 
as historical kinds, in turn.  
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6.3 Historical Perspective on Design Inquiry 
Design Inquiry is a cognitive act of inquiry that informs design meaning. 
To begin with, Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry is pertinent to Design Inquiry as a 
relational mechanism, since Dewey combined cognitive inquiry with action, as the 
practice of design always does (Gedenryd, 1998, pp. 79–80). Dewey repudiated the 
rationalist tradition of pure intellectual rigour, a tradition which had persisted from the 
time of the Greek philosophers (Schön, 1992). What came to be known as technical 
rationality was famously espoused as design problem solving in Simon’s ‘Sciences 
of the Artificial’ (Simon, 1969/1996). 
Schön’s (1983, 1987) reflection in and on action countered the rationalistic approach. 
Schön (1992) has referred to the rational versus reflective dichotomy as a historically 
entrenched matter of rigour versus relevance. The high academic ground of rigour 
may fail to establish the relevance of an inquiry, whereas a socially relevant inquiry 
may not achieve the same rigour. Very much earlier, Dewey (1938) had emphasised 
that ideas might guide inquiry in a continued and heuristic way, that neither 
anticipates nor limits the possible results. As Dewey (1938, p. 140) said, “There is 
continuity in inquiry. The conclusions reached in one inquiry become means, 
material and procedural, of carrying on further inquiries.” 
The historical opposition of technical rationalism to reflective practice has also 
received significant attention in design scholarship (for instance, Dorst 1997; 
Carvalho, Dong & Maton, 2009; Gedenryd, 1998; Jonas, 2006). 
6.4 Historical Perspective on Design Representation 
Design Representation is the cognitive act of representing design meaning by means 
of a particular avenue of visual meaning representation. 
A quintessential view of the historical development of design representation is 
provided by Mirzoeff (2002, p. 7): 
As one mode of representing reality loses ground, another takes its place 
without the first disappearing. The formal logic of the ancien régime 
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(1650–1820) first gave way to the dialectical logic of the photograph in the 
modern period (1820–1975). 
One example of the ongoing replacement of representational modes was mentioned 
in Chapter Two. Barnard (1998) showed how objects have been regarded in the 
early beaux arts (fine arts) tradition as inherently meaningful. A later, post-Industrial 
Revolution view sees objects as subject to the meaning attributions of social groups 
(Feast, 2010). 
Faigley (1999) traces how people have become progressively more materially 
literate since elite, private ownership of art and design objects or images became a 
thing of the past. Modern means of reproduction have brought increased access to 
these artefacts, so that they have now become part of global mainstream culture. 
Such objects have entered into the image language of culture, where they are 
relatively and contextually meaningful, and no longer hold uncontested power in 
themselves. Faigley explains how this has happened: photography, then film and 
later computer-generated images have made the world increasingly visible, and in 
doing so, have also made the understanding of the material world appropriable and 
transformable. For the general public, the field of possible associations with visual 
images and objects has widened exponentially since the late 1980s, when 
advertising moved from aspirational forms of persuasion to re-circulating cultural and 
media images, lifting images from one context and placing them in another. 
6.5 Historical Perspective on Design Intent 
Design intent is the cognition involved in the actual making of a designed object. As 
Krippendorff (2006, p. 42) has put this, an artefact from the latin ‘factum’ is 
‘something done’. ‘Doing’ designing is the intentional production of designed 
artefacts and requires ways-of-knowing that are enacted in the process of design. 
Enactive cognitions involve both ‘way-finding’ and ‘path-making’ (Sawada & Caley, 
2003, p. 50). In a design practice context, Prentice (2000, p. 523) says of intentional 
design knowing: 
Practical knowledge is acquired through experiential learning; a direct 
involvement with expressive media, through which ideas and feelings are 
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realised in visual form. The imaginative outcomes of this creative process 
in a sense embody the knowledge required for their production. 
Prentice’s evocative remarks here bring the sense that motivation is the link between 
intent and creativity in design, and that such creative intent can be ‘read-off’ a 
student’s designed object. 
However, there are two historically opposing ideas about design intent that derive 
from design’s origins in art. One idea, from the Romantic period, is of the individual 
artist or designer whose feats of creative inspiration constituted intentional cognition 
(Barnard, 1998, p. 49). Another, and very different post-Industrial Revolution idea, is 
that of socially intentioned creative design that looks to cultural expression or the 
challenging of social mores (Barnard, 1998). 
6.6 The Abductive Conjecture and Historically Relational 
Mechanisms 
So far, forum data evidence has been called upon to verify the abductive conjecture 
of historically relational mechanisms of design meaning emergence. The activation 
of these mechanisms could be seen in the selective, asymmetrical indication of 
design ways-of-knowing that puts aside other possible design ways-of-knowing. This 
mechanism involves a design observer who is embodied in the second-order 
perspective of explicit way-of-knowing distinctions. Most significantly, second-order 
observations of design ways-of-knowing in the forum data were observational 
choices that superseded other choices. Prioritised choices of a design way-of-
knowing distinction were made by design academics as second-order observers who 
are interested in observations about design knowing. 
According to my analysis of the data, the observational distinctions or choices 
selected in the forum data indicate Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent as systems of visual meaning cognition and communication. Relational 
mechanisms involving these abstract systems, however, require concrete acts of 
cognitive observation – without human observers, there would be no relation and no 
mechanism. 
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At this stage, design ways-of-knowing as relational mechanisms could be claimed on 
the basis of the online forum data. But that these were design pedagogical ways-of-
knowing could not be assumed. Therefore, I construed the online forum data as 
representing historically relational mechanisms of design meaning emergence, not 
necessarily located in the design studio. 
In the next chapter, the three identified historically relational mechanisms (Design 
Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent) are examined in data transcripts 
from the design teacher group discussions. The purpose of this was to investigate 
these relational mechanisms as design studio pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Abductive Conjecture and Group 
Discussion Data 
In this chapter, I move to the second set of data, the design teacher group 
discussions. These discussions took place at three different South African 
universities in 2009. Using the transcripts from these discussions, I appraise my 
abductive conjecture that pedagogical ways-of-knowing are historically relational 
mechanisms. 
When the relational mechanisms of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent were identified in the forum data, I moved to establishing these 
relational mechanisms in the design teacher group discussions. The very general 
and ubiquitous relational mechanisms of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent were evidenced in the group discussions, and so the activation of 
these relational mechanisms was established. Because of group discussion 
participants’ involvement with design studio pedagogy, it was then possible to locate 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent relational mechanisms in 
the research context of design studio pedagogy. 
I found, as I have reported in Chapter Six, many temporal and some historically 
situated references in the design ways-of-knowing in the online forum data. The 
group discussion data also offered particular  historical references, as I show in my 
examination of this data, over the following chapter sections. 
7.1 The Group Discussions 
I regarded the design teacher group discussion participants as interested and 
involved second-order observers of ‘what is known’ in the design studio. As I 
explained in Chapter Six, a second-order observation may be indirect (in the case of 
an actual event which is not witnessed). Alternatively a second-order observation 
may constitute a second-order self-reflection on the observer’s own observation of 
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events. The latter case of second-order self-reflection was strongly featured in the 
group discussions about design studio teaching. Most participants were or had at 
some stage been design studio teachers, and it was clear from the data that group 
discussion participants had intimate knowledge of design studio communicative 
interactions about the meaning of students’ designed objects.  
The group discussions generated lively dissent among participants, who came from 
different design programmes, so were not close colleagues. Over the three group 
discussions, there was a palpable sense of interested engagement. I have preserved 
the anonymity of participants in the three group discussions by using fictional names, 
and refer to the discussions as follows: 
• Group Discussion A (2 June 2009), 
• Group Discussion B (4 June 2009), and 
• Group Discussion C (8 July 2009). 
I draw on all three group discussions to examine in this data the relational 
mechanisms of: 
• Design Inquiry, 
• Design Representation, and 
• Design Intent. 
My selection of a some brief excerpts from the group discussion data is intended to 
show both variation and temporal recursivity of distinctions in respect of each 
relational mechanism.  
Since the group discussion data comes from a very different kind of source to the 
online forum data, I have provided verbatim excerpts from the discussion transcripts. 
These excerpts are indented, and I have signalled what I identify to be explicit 
distinctions of design knowing mechanisms by means of bold text. 
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7.1.1 The Historical Perspective on the Group Discussion Data 
As was the case with the online forum data (discussed in Chapter Six) there were 
many references in the design educator group discussions to ways-of-knowing that 
have emerged in the past. There were temporal distinctions that indicated that in the 
design ways-of-knowing or relational mechanisms identified in Chapter Six, it was 
possible to connect temporal distinctions to Design Inquiry, Design Representation 
and Design Intent ways-of-knowing because these are historical relational 
mechanism ‘kinds’ that link connected but varied distinctions.  
In the group discussion data I sought further evidence of these relational 
mechanisms as being historically structured and recursive over time. From the 
Critical Realism (CR) point of view, the abductive conjecture involves a relation 
between abstract structures and empirical events and experiences (Bhaskar, 2008). 
From the Luhmannian point of view, if these conjectured structures were structures 
of communicable knowing, they must entail communicative recursion of historically 
formed distinctions (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002).  
My process of analysis was to look for indication of Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation, and Design Intent by explicit distinctions. I sought the same 
relational duality that guided the analysis of the online forum data: the relation 
between an abstract system or structure of knowing and communication, and an 
actual cognitive event (Luhmann 1995, 2000, 2002; Bhaskar, 2008). This relation 
entailed, on one hand,  explicit second-order way-of-knowing distinctions that 
embody design studio teachers as knowers. On the other hand, such distinctions 
also indicated the historical knowing structures of Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation, and Design Intent. The embodied teacher ways-of-knowing that 
might evidence the indication of these historical knowing structures are shown In 
Figure 7.1 overleaf. 
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Figure 7.1 Embodied teacher way-of-knowing distinctions that indicate 
historical knowing structures. 
Showing the historical antecedence of distinctions in the group discussions was 
necessary in order to examine my abductive conjecture that the reproduction of 
historically formed distinctions in design studio pedagogy represents pedagogical 
mechanisms or ways-of-knowing. My approach to the matter of temporality and 
historicity in the group data was not chronological. I followed Luhmann’s (1995, p. 
79) systemic conception of history:  
[H]istory is constituted in the specific meaning dimension of time. By 
history we do not simply mean the factual sequence of events, according 
to which what is present is understood as the effect of past causes or as 
the cause of future effects. What is specific to the history of meaning is 
that it enables optional access to the meaning of past or future events, 
and thus leaps within the sequence. History originates in the release from 
sequence.  
This insight from Luhmann is endorsed by Tang’s (2008) comment on the historicity 
of any given phenomenon. A historical perspective is a perspective in which a later 
event is related to an earlier event. The outcome of this is that the earlier event is 
imputed to be the cause or condition for the later one. So as Tang (2008) says, 
earlier events gain their particular significance after they have occurred, but not, in 
my understanding of Tang, as a linear or sequential progression. This is described 
as ‘historical recursivity’ by Rheinberger (2010, p. 40, citing Canguilhem). 
184 
 
Rheinberger explains how discarded historical attitudes and practices discredit those 
that came before them. 
In the analysis that follows I draw briefly on design theory concerning this non-
sequential temporal significance of distinctions of design knowing in the data. In this 
way, I provide grounds for regarding as historically antecedent the distinctions that 
indicate Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent. Historical 
antecedence is deeply ingrained in CR philosophy because of the effect of 
historically formed abstract structures and events on empirical experience (Bhaskar, 
2008), which I described in Chapter Three.  
Therefore, in each of the next three sections examining, respectively, Design Inquiry, 
Design Representation and Design Intent in the group discussion data, I briefly refer 
back to the broad historical location of these relational mechanisms in Chapter Six. 
7.2 Design Inquiry in the Group Discussions 
Design inquiry refers to the ways in which teachers think students might inform their 
designs. In this regard, Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry pits pragmatism against the 
earlier emphasis on the technical rationality of a problem-solving epistemology. The 
separation of rationalist objective analysis from pragmatic, active forms of inquiry 
means that there are many distinctions of Design Inquiry. These distinctions, I had 
conjectured, may function as relational mechanisms or pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
design meaning that enable or constrain the sharing of design meaning between 
teachers and students. 
In the first excerpt from the group discussions, the indication of Design Inquiry is by 
discussion as a related distinction:  
Ella: I mean the whole Socratic – it's more a discussion, it's more an 
exchange of ideas. (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
The ancient lineage of discussion as Socratic or critical dialogue (Maxwell, 2009) is 
invoked here as relational mechanism and a pedagogical way-of-knowing. 
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In the following excerpts, design teachers appear to reproduce a rationalist problem 
solving distinction of Design Inquiry:  
Tony: You must rationalise your work, you must always say “Why I did 
this and why I want this here". Yes, then you rationalise your 
processes, and that is what we’ll allow you to understand – whether you 
actually arrived at something that is reasonable or you actually missed out 
some steps, because you have to rationalise why you moved from this 
step to the next step and the next step, before arriving at this and judging 
that this is the right thing. (Group Discussion B, 4 June, 2009) 
Marion: So within a project there will be certain problems that they must 
solve … We give some outline; maybe give some reading, and the 
students start by collecting information, some research … (Group 
Discussion A, 2 June, 2009)  
This rational, problem solving indication of Design Inquiry represents a relational 
distinction by which design meaning can be known. Such a distinction has been 
widely attributed to Simon’s ‘Sciences of the Artificial’ (1969/1996). Simon developed 
an approach to rational problem solving based on logic and reason, which was later 
largely abandoned because it did not take aesthetics into account (Ehn, 2007). 
In the next group discussion excerpt, cultural analysis is drawn on as a distinction for 
Design Inquiry: 
Anne: [making a suggestion for project research] Couldn’t you have … 
then … to do a bit of cultural analysis to say, you know … (Group 
Discussion B, 4 June, 2009) 
Cultural analysis is a development in the history of design as a discipline 
(Whitehouse, 2009, p. 55). This development dates from the establishment of 
Cultural Studies as a meta-discipline in the 1970s (Whitehouse, ibid). Beginning with 
the landmark work of Raymond Williams (1963), cultural theorists have drawn upon 
semiotic and discourse analytical methods to investigate the circulation of cultural 
ideas. 
In the following group discussion excerpts, gathering information contrasts with 
visually collecting information, or collecting information in the mind, as distinctions 
that indicate Design Inquiry as a knowing structure: 
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Marion: It is always in the context of a project. (Okay) So the project is 
there, and obviously each one goes off and they gather information … 
(Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
Nancy: It's not part of their everyday living and breathing to visually 
collect information … (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009)  
Ella: There's a jewellery student that's collecting in their mind. You 
know, he's doing excellent work but he doesn’t have any visuals to show 
… (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
In these group discussion excerpts, it is noticeably the individual designer’s cognitive 
processes that are prioritised. In this regard, Casakin (2008, p. 46) notes that the 
cognitive processes or ways-of-knowing of individual designers became important as 
a reaction against the prescriptive design methods movement of the 1960s. 
Design Inquiry was also related to participative exploration of human experiences 
and activities: 
Ella: Ja, it's basically a space where people can explore and where you 
include yourself, I think, as another participant … (Group Discussion 
A, 2 June, 2009)  
Burns et al. (2006, p. 10) trace participative Design Inquiry back to changes in 
employer–employee relations after the 1950s. The inclusion of workers in employer 
decision-making led to a participative design process where designers consulted 
with their design audience about their needs. In turn, this way of conducting Design 
Inquiry appears to have become a pedagogical way-of-knowing. 
After World War II, Design Inquiry involved an increasing focus on customers and 
market segments (Burns et al., 2006). Target market analysis was a distinctive form 
of Design Inquiry in the excerpt below: 
Brent: We talked about target market analysis, and then we go through 
this academic process of trying to figure out what might they do. (Group 
Discussion B, 4 June, 2009) 
Design Inquiry as a mechanism was thus found by teacher-observers to involve 
distinctive pedagogical ways-of-knowing:  
by discussion, 
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by rational problem solving, 
by cultural analysis,  
by gathering information, 
by mentally processing information, 
by exploration, 
by participation, 
by contextual (community) investigation, and  
by target market analysis. 
The excerpts from group discussion data in this section represent just a sampling of 
the temporal distinctions that design teachers observed. Though these relational 
distinctions were not chronologically sequential, they could still be considered to be 
recursively related to Design Inquiry because of the repeated indication of Design 
Inquiry by the selection of varied yet related distinctions.  
7.3. Design Representation in the Group Discussions 
Design Representation refers to ways of visually conveying design meaning. Visual 
representation of design meaning has historically devolved upon the dialectical poles 
of intrinsic object meaning, and socially structured human attributions of meaning 
(Barnard, 1998).  
Trend in the first excerpt below can be understood to be a distinction of Design 
Representation: 
Tony: Okay, these are the 2008 trends, this is what they're doing, very 
organic shapes, very this, very that and Na, na, na – something very 
futuristic and all that, and some students are saying “Do we have to 
follow those trends?” (Group Discussion B, 4 June, 2009). 
As a transient but collective form of taste, trend in this excerpt is a distinction of 
Design Representation. Romans (2005), in his history of art and design education, 
traces the reign of aesthetic trends in taste back to the 1830s and 1840s. During this 
period “escalating relationships between fashion, taste, and consumerism as a triplet 
existed in tandem with moral and behavioural imperatives” (Romans, 2005, p. 42).  
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In the following excerpt, reference to contemporary design exemplifies the same 
representational understanding of trend as public taste that Romans (2005) 
described: 
Karen: They have to understand what contemporary jewellery is and 
where it fits in. (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009)  
In the two group discussion excerpts below, visual communication and symbolic 
communication distinctions indicate Design Representation: 
Nancy: it explains your awareness of visual communication out there 
and collecting material that you can use … (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 
2009) 
Marion: I think Buchanan also says that communication is specifically 
referring to design, graphic design, as symbolic communication as well, 
which is another layer … (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
According to the design theorist Richard Buchanan, visual communication of design 
meaning is embedded in social practices (Buchanan, 1996). This socially expressive 
representation of designed objects has led to an anthropological view of design 
meaning as symbolic consumption54 since the 1980s (Margolin, 2009, p. 39).  
Context was a distinction that applies to Design Representation in the excerpts 
below: 
Nancy: They have to contextualise within the broader contemporary 
jewellery discipline. (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
Ella: So it's in that bigger context that it's important, instead of sitting on 
your own designing something (Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
The dispute between rational and pragmatic representation of design meaning is 
highlighted by emphasis on the context in which designed object meaning may be 
represented (Cardoso, 2004). Cardoso characterises this dispute as a break with the 
art history-derived connoisseurship of formal55 design meaning in the 1960s and 
1970s, and a move to contextual meaning.  
                                            
54
 ‘Consumption’ is a term used in material culture studies that refers to the meaningful incorporation 
of material objects in everyday activities and practices (Miller, 1987). 
55
 ‘Formal’ means pertaining to the physical form of a designed object. 
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There were various group discussion excerpts that showed the relational distinction 
of questioning traditional designs, as indicating the representation of design 
meaning:  
Karen: Contemporary jewellery questions traditional jewellery. (Group 
Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
The questioning of establishment values through design became an imperative in the 
social criticism surge of the 1950s (Jacks, 2002). Designed objects could represent 
opposition to social norms of “the corporation and the suburb” (Jacks, 2002, p. 44). 
Similarly, the following three excerpts refer to the influence of critical theory as a 
distinction of Design Representation: 
Marion: I think critical theory, in a sense it is to expose what is not 
immediately visible, it's to expose domination, it's to expose these things. 
(Group Discussion A, 2 June, 2009) 
Mary Anne: … encouraging the students to see the application of critical 
concepts into design, so it brings … and vice versa, bringing design into 
the way that you work through critical ideas. (Group Discussion C, 8 July, 
2009) 
The critical theory influence on Design Representation addresses social oppression 
versus emancipation in the critical design movement (Bowen, 2008, p. 441). The 
critical theory epistemology originates in the 1920s Frankfurt School of social 
theorists who sought to expose the exercise of implicit dominance in social practices 
(Bowen, 2009).  
The next excerpt refers to the representation distinction of Baudrillard’s simulacra:  
Mary Anne: … which becomes a wonderful simulacral incitement of the 
idea. (Group Discussion C, 8 July, 2009) 
Baudrillard’s (1983) argument was that through advertising and other media 
influences, objects lose their original meaning. They become simulacra of 
themselves, mere informative instruments that transfer the image of themselves onto 
the individuals who consume them, becoming completely identified with the manner 
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in which they are consumed. This results in a process of meaning classifications and 
social differentiations that overrides attention to the objects themselves.  
A postmodern distinction of Design Representation is made in the excerpt below:  
Mary-Anne: I asked her to create a photographic metaphor doing it 
through analogue and digital. I mean it’s flawed and it’s full of [inaudible] 
but it can be used at this level as a kind of allegorical talking about the 
fixity of truth and solid ideas, totalitarian; as opposed to the sort of floating 
world of the postmodern … (Group Discussion C, 8 July, 2009) 
The design- representational distinction of postmodernism applies to design meaning 
as “creative stocktaking, with archival interest in the past” (MacDonald, 2006a, p. 56, 
citing Adair). MacDonald rejects the superficial view of postmodernism as a “post-it, 
cut and paste” antidote to modernist dogma.  
Design Representation as a pedagogical way-of-knowing relational mechanism was 
thus observed by design teachers: 
as trend, 
as contemporary,  
as visual communication, 
as symbolic, 
as a vehicle of emotions, 
as context-bound, 
as critique (or questioning),  
as critical theory, 
as simulacra, and 
as postmodern. 
When Design Representation is indicated by any of these distinctions, a pedagogical 
way-of-knowing is activated. The asymmetrical relation of any of these distinctions to 
Design Representation is the mechanism of this pedagogical way-of-knowing. The 
operation of this relational mechanism requires a design teacher to implicitly call on 
such a distinction in a design studio communicative interaction. 
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7.4 Design Intent in the Group Discussions   
The basis for understanding Design Intent as a relational mechanism brings together 
two elements: one is the cognitive intention or motivation that accompanies any act 
of designing; the other is the artefact that is made or created through this act. 
Historically, however, creative Design Intention has been divided between personal 
self-expression and cultural expression (Kim, 2006, p. 16).  
This intentional distinction between personal design meaning expression and social 
or cultural design meaning expression was evidenced across the group discussions, 
such as in the following excerpt: 
Vanessa: … see design firstly as a personal victory, before it can be a 
social victory. (Group Discussion B, 4 June, 2009) 
Belief in design meaning as a personal rather than a social accomplishment has 
been championed since the mid 20th century (Kim, 2006, p. 16).  
A reflective distinction of Design Intent was also evident in the data, whereby the 
student is required to take responsibility for looking back. In the case of the next 
excerpt, the analogy of a reflective journey is drawn upon. This way of knowing links 
with Schön’s (1983, 1987) reflective practice in design: 
Nancy: It's difficult to get them to get into a journey and to kind of get 
them to understand their own responsibility … (Group Discussion A, 2 
June, 2009)  
A distinctive relation between Design Intent and situated knowing was also evident: 
Brent: The interesting thing here, talking about the situatedness and the 
importance of bodily being in the place where your communication design 
is going to be … looking at the habits of people who are passing through 
that space – “How are they behaving?” and they're taking notes, and 
they're developing their concept and their copywriting and their design as 
a result of being in that space. So I think that's … you asked earlier what I 
meant by situatedness. 
Rebecca: Mm hm. Okay, so it's situated cognition? (Group Discussion 
B, 4 June, 2009).  
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Situated cognition is a form of Design Intent by virtue of the simultaneity of knowing 
and socially situated doing. The theory of situated cognition comes from research in 
educational psychology in the late 20th century (Brown, Collins & Duguid, 1989). The 
educational psychology view of situated cognition was one of ‘cognitive 
apprenticeship’ to the situated demands of a particular knowledge field.  
In contrast to the distinction of situated knowing, there was also a universal design 
meaning distinction to Design Intent. This relied on the view that universal design 
meaning may still be represented in a designed object: 
Olivia: I struggle with is this whole idea of having this one universal truth 
about what is aesthetically pleasing or what is right or wrong. (Group 
Discussion C, 8 July, 2009) 
In the Romantic era individual Design Intent drew upon individual inspiration and 
imaginative faculties to create universal meaning (Romans, 2005). After the 
industrial revolution, Design Intent was directed toward more generalised social and 
contextual meaning (Barnard, 1998).  
In the next group discussion excerpt, a relation between ego and Design Intent is 
evidenced: 
Jean: There's another searching for values and meaning where the whole 
trend, if you like, for lack of a better word, is against ego (Ja), where ego 
doesn’t feature (Group Discussion B, 4 June, 2009). 
Quite possibly, the rejection of egotistical Design Intent connects with what Thomas 
and Southwell (2003) have identified as ‘the cult of celebrity’ in design, where 
designer ‘big names’ become exalted through popular media, exhibitions and design 
as lifestyle. Thomas and Southwell feel that this state of affairs is more about the 
designer than the consumer of design. For Thomas and Southwell the recent focus 
on human-centred design has shifted the focus from the designer to the consumer of 
design.  
Design Intent was also distinguished as worldview, as illustrated by this excerpt:  
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Tony: They're also thinking about the way that they want to communicate 
to the world because they're also informed by a particular worldview … 
(Group Discussion B, 4 June, 2009) 
A Design Intention worldview is regarded as indispensable to students’ design 
processes by Hardman (2009). Hardman’s argument is that long-established ideas 
about design as a problem solving activity do not account for all that is needed in the 
design process, because such ideas fail to sufficiently take the social context of 
worldview into account.  
Collaboration as a form of Design Intent was championed in the group discussion 
data, as illustrated in the following two excerpts: 
Vanessa: I think we've lost that basic understanding of “Who am I, who 
are you” (mm mm), groups or having kids work in groups, it's really 
strange watching the dynamic. You know, “what can connect us, what can 
we change, what can we make better, what can we fix?" – those basic 
human interaction skills are actually severely lacking. (Group Discussion 
B, 4 June, 2009) 
Peter: They are co-facilitators in a process, in a group context, so we 
were talking earlier about how our web designers in the group are in fact 
the leaders of that particular aspect of the group … (Group Discussion C, 
8 July, 2009) 
The ideal of collaborative design has had to overcome a lengthy history of 
individualistic expression in design. Hileman (1998, p. 1) estimates that the 
individualist emphasis on design cognition was prominent from the Renaissance to 
the 1950s. However Feast (2010) has cited research that confirms strong support for 
collaboration in design since the late 1980s, also noted by Benett and Dunphy 
(2004).  
In the next excerpt, Design Intent is distinguished as an attitude of respect for social 
difference that rejects conformity. The group discussion participant characterises this 
as supporting social ‘rupture’: 
Mary-Anne: When I say grow the difference is – I mean – like grow the 
rupture in yourself, in a way that you respond to the students, so it like 
internalises the difference (Ja) of other people, and internalise that these 
things are difficult. (Group Discussion C, 8 July, 2009) 
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The group discussion participant here refers to epistemological rupture as a 
philosophical term originated by Bachelard (1884–1962) and later elaborated by 
Foucault, Althusser and Derrida (Bontems, 2010). Rupture is an intentional 
opposition to social norms.  
An expectation that Design Intent can be distinguished as a humanistic attitude is 
expressed in the group discussion excerpt below: 
Vanessa: So we go right back and we talk about humanism and we build 
it up, and we actually don’t talk about design, and we don’t talk about art, 
we don’t talk about anything like that from the beginning, just talk about 
these ideas of the space of cultural being, “What is it to be?" (Group 
Discussion (Group Discussion B, 4 June, 2009) 
Design Intent as a humanistic concern emerged in industrial design in the 1950s 
(Burns et al., 2006, p. 10). A human-centred design process has become recognised 
as a particular design approach (Thomas & Southwell, 2003, citing Pain et al., 1993).  
The distinctions called upon in the data to indicate Design Intent suggest a 
historically recursive pedagogical way-of-knowing. Drawing together the illustrated 
distinctions, Design Intent can be seen to mean: 
to know personally,  
to reflect, 
to know by doing (situated cognition), 
a worldview,  
to collaborate, and 
a humanistic attitude. 
The asymmetrical relation of any of these cognitive distinctions to Design Intent 
constitutes a pedagogical way-of-knowing. As such, I argue that Design Intent is a 
pedagogical way-of-knowing which in turn acts as a cognitive relational mechanism.  
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7.5 Pedagogical Ways-of-Knowing and the Abductive Conjecture  
In the foregoing examination of my abductive conjecture, I have shown three ways-
of-knowing that were found in the data to operate as relational mechanisms in design 
pedagogy: Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent. 
Design Inquiry Design Representation and Design Intent are knowing structures or 
systems that co-ordinate the implicit selection of cognitive distinctions in 
communication in the design studio. Consciously or unconsciously, design educators 
draw from multiple distinctions in their activation of such systems. These systems as 
structures are organised by communication; communication is the mechanism that 
organises abstract meaning distinctions such that this and not that distinction is 
selectable in any concrete communicative exchange.  
In the case of Design Inquiry, ways-of-knowing involve a cognitive act in which visual 
design object meaning can be known to the design teacher by means of a form of 
inquiry. In the case of Design Representation, ways-of-knowing involve a cognitive 
act in which visual design object meaning can be known to the design teacher as a 
representation. In the case of Design Intent, ways-of-knowing involve a cognitive act 
in which visual design object meaning can be known to the design teacher as an 
indication of design intent to create personal or social meaning. 
At the same time, communication systems of knowing are historically formed and 
particular historical distinctions within them may be reproduced by design teachers in 
any design studio event. The reason why a design teacher may implicitly reproduce 
particular, historical selections is because that design teacher is ‘structurally 
coupled’56 by his or her own store of communicable knowledge to some and not 
other communication distinctions within the pedagogical mechanisms or ways-of-
knowing. For example, a teacher’s own knowing about Design Inquiry might espouse 
personal inquiry by exploration or by reflection on own experience, and not 
knowledge of the circulation of cultural ideas. Both of these distinctions of Design 
Inquiry are historically located: personal knowing is constructive knowing, and 
                                            
56
 ‘Structural coupling’ refers to the coupling of a person’s own knowledge to a knowledge domain. A 
simple example of this is the structural coupling of a doctor’s knowledge to the knowledge domain of 
medicine, as described in Section 4.3.2. 
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constructivist epistemology is historically located in the early 20th century work of 
Piaget and Dewey, and later Vygotsky and Bruner (Oxford, 1997). Similarly, a 
cultural understanding of inquiry has come with the cultural studies approach of the 
1970s (Whitehouse, 2009). The expectations of design teachers about how their 
students may know the meaning of design are then anterior to any design studio 
event. For visual meaning to be known, this must be the case: visual object meaning 
relies on prior knowledge. 
However, in this study, design meaning is considered to emerge in the design studio 
only if it is shared between students and teachers. Pedagogical ways-of-knowing are 
then relational mechanisms that enable or constrain the emergence of shared 
meaning.  
The abductive inference here is that pedagogical way-of-knowing mechanisms will 
impact on any single event of communication about design object meaning in the 
design studio. Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent are 
mechanisms that allow knowing about design meaning to be communicated, but not 
necessarily shared.  
The micro view of the three pedagogical ways-of-knowing mechanisms is as follows: 
the student’s designed object is an ‘utterance’ or signal of communicative intent 
(Luhmann, 1995, 2002). The design teacher responds to this signal by drawing on 
an implicit distinction. If the implicit distinction is one that the student can 
‘understand’ (Luhmann, 1995, 2002), communication about design meaning can 
continue. This is the case even if the student does not accept the understanding, as I 
explained in Chapter Four. Communication does not require agreement about what 
is understood in order to continue (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002), but it does require 
shared understanding. However, if the student does not recognise the way-of-
knowing mechanism at play, or the distinction being drawn upon in its activation, 
then shared understanding is not possible.  
If communication continues, then in the Luhmannian view of knowing systems, 
further distinctions will be recursively made (Luhmann, 1995, 2000, 2002). This 
allows the possibility of reaching a shared understanding of design meaning, but by 
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no means is there any guarantee that this will happen. To put this micro explanation 
in a macro perspective, design teachers draw on the pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent in order to select 
meaning distinctions. The meaning distinctions that design teachers may select then 
draw upon these historically recursive systems of knowing and communication.  
The broad abductive inference here is that that pedagogical ways-of-knowing are 
relational mechanisms that entail historically recursive way-of-knowing distinctions. 
The dynamics of this inference as it derives from the online forum data and the group 
discussion data are shown in Figure 7.2 below: 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Abductive analysis across online forum and group discussion data  
In the following chapter, I examine the validity and reliability issues that have so far 
been implicit in my abductive conjectural and inferential moves. Leading on from this, 
my focus in the following and final chapter is the research explanation proper, and 
the implementation of this explanation in design studio pedagogy. 
. 
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Chapter Eight  
Validity and Reliability Issues  
From the outset, this study has focused on the general problem of pedagogical 
ways- of-knowing in any design studio context. It is then incumbent upon me to show 
why the abductive inferences I have made might be generalizable to design studios 
and pedagogical ways-of-knowing at large.  
Therefore, in this chapter, I explore the traditional research concerns of validity and 
reliability and what they may mean for this qualitative study as it is positioned within 
the CR ontology and as it uses an abductive methodology. 
In the case of critical realist (CR) research, the researcher role admits to the 
constraints of human knowing and admits that what might be known does not cover 
what there is to know. Pawson and Tilley (1997, p xvi ) locate the CR position in 
relation to those of positivism and constructivism:  
We have one camp aspiring to precise before and after measurement of a 
program subject in closely controlled conditions (the experimental 
evaluators) and another camp seeking empathetic understanding of 
program participants by sharing in their own natural settings (the 
constructivist evaluators) We spurn these as choices because what is 
under test in realist evaluation are theories of how programs work. 
This is somewhat different to constructivist or interpretivist subjectivity. Fine (quoted 
by Christis, 2001, p. 337) observes that “discussions between realists and 
constructivists tend to be desk-thumping and foot-stamping in nature”. The trouble 
seems to be that what ‘really’ exists tends to be put against knowing what things in 
themselves are. These two claims about reality, what ‘really’ exists, and ‘knowing 
what things in themselves are’ do not contradict each other because it is quite 
possible to allow that things really exist without knowing what things in themselves 
really are. In consequence, the CR project champions theorising and abstraction in 
order to explain 
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CR research pursues the explanation of how programs work (in this case, the 
program of design studio pedagogy) in the face of a provisional and fallible research 
stance. Some principles of the explanatory power a study might achieve have been 
ventured: Different explanations may have more or less explanatory power( Peacock 
2000, citing Lawson, p 5). These degrees of explanatory power cannot however 
count as criteria, since there is no way to decide them; there is only who decides 
them ( Peacock, 2000, p.5). That should then be those design educators who deal 
with the problems of meaning-making in studio interactions.  
In Chapter Five I identified my abductive research explanation aim of providing to 
design teachers an accessible and useful account of design pedagogical ways-of-
knowing. Now I suggest in what terms design educators might judge the validity and 
reliability of this study. These terms are:  
• The relevance of abductive research inferences to the material design 
pedagogical research context.  
• The rigour of the abductive methodology. 
• The generalizability of abductive inferences of pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
as relational mechanisms in design studio pedagogy.  
8.1. Abductive Inferences in the Design Pedagogical Context  
Abductive inferences needed constant attention to the meaning emergence nature 
the research focus. The core emergence issue in the context of design pedagogy 
embraces these emergence conditions:  
• prior knowledge is needed for the visual meaning of a student’s designed 
artefact to emerge, yet  
• ways of knowing that allow design meaning to emerge are ambiguous and 
divergent, and  
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• shared visual design may therefore emerge or not emerge. 
Explanation in the CR view centres on emergence. But it is one thing to explain in 
research, and another thing to regard an explanation for empirical circumstances as 
necessarily concerned with emergence. This is the case of CR research. For Morse, 
Barret, Mayan, Olson, and Spiers, 2002) ontological and epistemological 
commitments determine validity judgements. In the case of this research, ontological 
and epistemological commitments are staked upon the CR view of emergence.  
Niiniluoto’s example of Beethoven’s Eroica symphony may illustrate the CR view of 
emergence in the context of empirical circumstances: 
Niiniluoto (1999, p. 24) shows how Beethoven’s Eroica symphony exists in the 
physical world where it is performed, and in a mental world when we hear it played. 
But the Eroica symphony exists beyond these spaces and times, and does not 
depend on such concrete manifestations for its existence. The Eroica symphony has 
achieved a lasting existence beyond anyone’s experience of it, now or in the past. 
The Eroica symphony is a relatively enduring structure, irreducible to any of its parts, 
and a structure that can structure the emergent experience of the hearing of this 
symphony, in events where this symphony is played and experienced and in events 
where this symphony is heard and experienced, whether or not the symphony is 
performed, as it were, ‘live’.  
I venture that the empirical emergence of shared design meaning in the context of 
the design studio is similarly conditioned by Design Inquiry, Design Representation 
and Design Intent as enduring structures of knowing and communication in design 
studio pedagogy.  
An abductive inference of emergence also brings the validity requirement that it uses 
the context in which the explanation is to have material effect as part of that 
inference (Maxwell, 2004, p. 6). It may seem self-evident that an explanation 
attempting to explain a situation should include that situation. But inferences about a 
empirical situation must answer to the research contextualisation of this empirical 
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situation. The research questions developed in Chapter Three have set out these 
contextual parameters: 
• In what different ways do teachers think the visual meaning of students’ 
designs can be known? In other words, what are the different pedagogical 
ways-of- knowing that operate in the design studio? 
• How does verbal communication affect pedagogical ways-of-knowing visual 
design object meaning?  
• Why might particular, non-arbitrary design object meanings emerge through 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing?  
As I have said in Chapter Five, research data sources needed to allow contextual 
conditions of design studio pedagogy to surface on some level – the different ways- 
of-knowing of design teachers, communication between design teachers and 
students about students’ designs, and teachers’ non-arbitrary, particular attributions 
of design object meaning. These contextual conditions did surface in the group 
discussion excerpts in Chapter Seven, as participants described their favoured 
epistemological positions, how they might communicate about visual meaning with 
students, and the kinds of visual meanings they expected to be understood. The 
relational mechanisms of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent 
need though to be more firmly located in the research context of design studio 
pedagogy. I view the contextual relevance of these explanatory relational 
mechanisms as follows: 
Design Inquiry cannot be a standard procedure but must venture many different 
ways in which teachers expect students to ‘find out’. In turn, this will influence the 
way in which teachers think it is possible for the students to know design meaning, 
and will further influence the way in which design teachers communicate with design 
students. When referring to Design Inquiry, it makes a clear difference if the guiding 
or implicit distinction used is ‘rational analysis’ as in Dannels Gaffney and Martin’s 
(2008) study57 rather than ‘cultural information’ per Strickfaden, Heylighen, Rodgers 
                                            
57
 I described this study in Chapter Two, Section 2.4. 
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and Neuckermans (2005, p. 1). These distinctions will respectively favour non-
arbitrary and particular design meanings. 
Next, Design Representation involves object-laden language that requires shared 
tacit knowledge of material objects to be applied to the student’s designed object at 
hand (Fleming, 1998). Then there is explicit discussion of language-laden ‘out there’ 
abstract objects (ibid). But this separation involves many different historically 
developed forms of visual representation, and therefore the (often unexamined) 
ways-of-knowing that visual representation entails58.  
Lastly, Design Intent in design pedagogy is riven by the ideas of creative cognition 
as self-expression and creative cognition as cultural expression (Feast, 2010; 
Polaine, 2011). It seems clear that historically developed polarities of Design Intent 
will continue to generate intentional ambiguity, and to complicate collaborative 
approaches to design pedagogy. 
8. 2 The Rigour of the Abductive Methodology  
There are no fixed criteria from which it is possible to assess in a definite 
way the validity of an abductive conclusion. 
(Dobson, 2012, p. 66)  
In the absence of a handy set of abductive validity criteria, Maxwell (1992) regards 
reliability to be a particular kind of threat to validity. The following account of my 
efforts toward research rigour aims to show how aspects of this study’s methodology 
have been matched, aligned and connected, as a contribution to, rather than a claim 
of, reliability.  
Rigour as a reliability tenet can only be determined within a philosophical research 
position (Caelli, Ray & Mill, 2003). That position, in this study, is the CR ontology 
where there is a ‘real’ world that cannot be fully known. I have earlier adopted  
Pratt’s (2007, p. 32) “transcendental dualist” description of CR researcher 
                                                                                                                                        
 
58
 Barnard’s (1998, p. 3) reference to knowing through allegorical and metaphorical ‘images’ in 
Chapter Three provides good examples here.  
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postionality where “the inquirer is both part of the reality and partakes of its qualities 
but attempts at the same time to transcend the limitations of human knowledge”. My 
researcher position is then one where I decline to take a unified or unitary position. A 
transcendental approach is an emergence approach and necessarily one of 
analytical dualism, since one considers on one hand immaterial processes, and on 
the other, what is experienced as reality. A reasoned oscillation between the abstract 
and the concrete is necessary if relations them are to be credibly explained. 
From the immaterial side of things, it follows from this that at every stage of 
abductive inference, one must think with and about theoretical concepts and moves 
(Sayer,1992). How these moves fit with the methodology of a study (as everything 
the study stands for, tries to achieve, and claims) is especially demanding in the 
case of CR research. As Quinn (2006, p. 64) explains 
For realists, theories and concepts are regarded as more than sensitizing 
constructs, they are regarded as abstract expressions of entities that exist 
in the real (intransitive) world (Archer 1998)...[But as] Carter and New 
point out that “The world to which our concepts and theories more or less 
adequately refer, the intransitive realm, is neither a product of, nor 
constituted by, our theories about it” (2004:5); to believe otherwise would 
be to be commit the “epistemic fallacy” (Bhaskar 1989:133).59 
One must then accept that while theories may have great and significant usefulness, 
they cannot fully penetrate the real. An abductive methodology is necessarily a 
‘theory-heavy’ methodology, and does require of the researcher a willingness to alter 
theoretical course if necessary (Timmermans and Tavory, 2012, p. 173). An 
adaptable theoretical approach somewhat counteracts the theory dependence of an 
abductive methodology. Theoretical adaptability is especially needed in order to 
respond to how the data pushes the abductive analysis forward (Timmermans and 
Tavory, 2012, p 175). Inferences from data may need to be supported by further 
theory. 
Here I must interject that I came across the PhD-Design online forum at a fairly early 
stage in this research. It was my lengthy struggle to understand why this forum 
seemed to thematise design ways of knowing in a systemic way that finally brought 
                                            
59 I have cited Carter and New (2004) in this same regard in Chapter Three, Section 3.3. 
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me to Luhmann’s (1995) social systems theory and then to his distinction theory of 
cognition in communication (Luhmann, 2000, 2002, 2006)60. Even so, it was the 
process of pulsing between, on one hand, the PhD-Design online forum with its 
recursive messages about design knowing themes, coming from globally distributed 
design academics, and Luhmannian theory that allowed me to laboriously reach an 
applied understanding of Luhmannian theory. This meant that data came before 
theory, and a to- and fro- movement between data and theory began early in the 
study. This practice is recommended as one of research rigour by Morse, Barret, 
Mayan, Olson, and Spiers (2002). 
The theoretical re-contextualisation of anomalous empirical circumstances was then 
a process of formulating and refining what was to become an abductive conjecture. 
Luhmann’s theory allowed emergence to become a substantive issue, opened to 
empirical investigation. This led to what Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p. 172) 
have called cultivated ways of seeing, that are cultivated as the researcher moves 
through a continuing process of abductive conjecture. Timmermans and Tavory 
argue that qualitative researchers’ immersion in the worlds they study (in this case, 
design pedagogy) can lead to statements about researcher positioning that 
oversimplify that positioning. More important than a biographical positioning is a 
qualitative researcher’s theoretical acculturation (Dobson, 2012). This latter is far 
less a given than biographical positioning, and emerges in grappling with theoretical 
abduction. As Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p 173-174) say, echoing my own 
experience:  
Discovering new theories depends on the inability to frame findings in 
existing theoretical frameworks as well as the ability to modify and 
extend existing theories in novel ways...In depth knowledge of multiple 
theorisations is thus necessary to find out what is missing or anomalous 
in an area of study and to stimulate insights about innovative or original 
theoretical contributions.. “Knowing the theory” means, in essence, 
knowing the theories.  
                                            
60 As I have mentioned before, my use of Luhmann’s theorizationwas only possible fter realizing that 
there are two major developments in Luhmann’s theorisation. The first development came to wide 
acclaim as a systems theory revision, (Luhmann, 1995) where Luhmann theorised relations of 
difference or distinction between communication systems and their environments. The later 
development built upon systems theory but added Luhmann’s cognitive theory of observation by 
distinction to the system/environment theorisation of communication. It was this later development, 
that I was at length able to see as substantive to the research context of design pedagogy.  
 
205 
 
Timmermans and Tavory (2012, 173) further say that abductive inferences attempt 
to provide generalizable links to empirical circumstances, and the inferential fit with 
these circumstances must be more plausible than alternative theoretical accounts. 
Here I observe that though there are many communication theories that take in 
cognition, they do not accommodate the relational duality between historical 
structures and empirical events that is afforded by Luhmann’s theorisation61. Another 
virtue of Luhmann’s theory was that it allowed the abductive inference of structures 
through evidence of relations, rather than the abductive inference of relations from 
evidence of structures. This was mentioned as a research decision in Chapter Three 
in section 3.3.1. 
8.2.1 Alignment between the Empirical Research Context, CR and 
Luhmannian theory  
Timmermans and Tavory (2012, p 179) mention the “double fitting” of theory and 
data as an oscillation between the two. In this section, I show how the empirical 
research context directed theory, how theoretical extensions were indicated by data, 
and these processes pushed abductive inferences forward.  
In Chapter Two I discussed my focus on factors of visual meaning and knowing that 
impact on design studio pedagogy. In Chapter three I then positioned this focus as 
one of the emergence of shared design meaning in communication between 
students and teachers relations. The emergence of shared design meaning was 
construed within the philosophical framework of CR as shown in Figure 8.1 overleaf. 
                                            
61
 To my knowledge there is no theory other than that of Luhmann that provides an historical account 
of mechanisms of cognition in verbal, visual, written or action forms communication. 
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DESIGN STUDIO PEDAGOGY RESEARCH 
CONTEXT  
 
      CR EMERGENCE  
 
Research questions about the emergence of shared 
visual design meaning in the design studio: 
 
Different Pedagogical Ways of Knowing? 
 
Verbal Communication about visual meaning? 
 
Teacher non-arbitrary attribution of visual design 
meaning? 
 
 
Critical Realism: what makes 
empirical emergence possible? 
Relational mechanisms of 
emergence 
 
Pedagogical ways of knowing are relational mechanisms 
that condition the emergence of shared visual design 
meaning 
 
 
Abduction in Critical realism 
 
Figure 8. 1 CR emergence and the empirical design studio pedagogy context 
In figure 8.2 below I show how the PhD-Design online forum then signalled the 
substantive emergence theory used in this study.  
 
PhD-DESIGN ONLINE FORUM  
 
RESEARCH 
 CONTEXT 
 
SUBSTANTIVE ABDUCTIVE 
THEORY 
 
 
 
Threads and posts within these threads 
where design academics communicate 
about knowing visual design meaning.  
 
Different design 
pedagogical  
ways-of-knowing. 
 
 
Luhmann’s theory of cognition 
in communication . 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 The PhD-Design online forum and substantive theory 
In Chapter Five I offered an explanation of the alignment of CR and Luhmannian 
theory. Here I give a brief summary of the alignment of CR philosophy and 
Luhmannian theory:  
The relational duality in CR and Luhmann involves separation and relation of 
abstract structures and concrete experiences in events. Luhmann’s duality between 
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indication of abstract systems and distinctions that occur in concrete events could 
then be aligned with CR relational duality.  
• Historical structures as relational mechanisms in CR have parity with 
historically recursive structures of communication and knowing in Luhmannian 
theory. This brought the opportunity to map Luhmann’s theory of the 
emergence of cognition in communication onto CR relational mechanisms. 
• Events in CR have parity with Luhmann’s cognition in communication events.  
• Experience in CR has parity with the Luhmannian theory of understanding 
with or without acceptance of understanding in communication. This is design 
teachers and students experience in the design studio of the shared or 
unshared visual design meaning of students’ designed objects.  
Alignment between CR, the research context of design studio pedagogy and 
Luhmannian theory is shown in Figure 8.3.  
 
Figure 8.3 Alignment between CR, the research context and Luhmannian 
theory. 
 
CRITICAL REALISM 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
  
 
LUHMANN 
 
Emergence Ontology 
(Chapter 3) 
 
Emergence Context 
(Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
Emergence Theory 
(Chapter 4) 
 
Relational Mechanisms in CR philosophy, in the research context and in Luhmannian theory 
 
Real Structures 
 
 
 
Actual Events 
 
 
Empirical Experience 
 
Different Pedagogical ways-of-knowing 
 
 
 
Verbal Communication about visual 
meaning 
 
Teacher non-arbitrary attribution of 
visual design meaning; 
 
 
Knowing and 
communication 
systems. 
 
Cognition in 
communication events 
 
Implicit distinctions that 
indicate systems. 
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As required for a substantive abductive conjecture (Danermark, Ekstrom, Jakobsen 
& Karlsson, 2002), the general research context as defined by research questions 
was re-contextualised in terms of Luhmannian theory. This is shown in Figure 8.4. 
 
 
Figure 8.4 Re-contextualisation leading to the abductive conjecture.  
Also in Chapter Five, I reasoned that the second-order nature of data sources might 
support the abductive data analysis. I regarded second-order data as especially 
valid, because second-order testimony is selective and intentional in preferring 
 
RE-CONTEXTUALISED 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
 
SUBSTANTIVE ABDUCTIVE 
CONJECTURE 
(Chapter 4) 
 
 
Research questions about the 
emergence of shared visual design 
meaning in the design studio: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Verbal communication about visual 
design meaning? 
 
Verbal communication about visual 
design meaning carries implicit cognitive 
distinctions. 
 
Different pedagogical ways of-
knowing? 
 
Teachers’ own knowing processes are 
held in common with cognitive way-of-
knowing distinction from different 
communication and knowing structures.  
 
Teacher non-arbitrary attribution of 
visual design meaning?  
 
Teachers’ expectations about design 
meaning affect communication about 
visual design meaning.  
 
 
Luhmann’s (2000, 2002,2006) theory offers 
substantive explanation of CR emergence 
through relational mechanisms in the design 
studio.  
 
Theoretical re-contextualisation of the empirical 
emergence of visual design meaning in design 
studio communication events. 
 
 
 
 
Luhmann’s (2002) theory of cognition in 
communication.  
 
 
 
 
 
Structural coupling of individuals to knowing and 
communication structures (Luhmann, 2000, 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
Structural coupling brings expectations about 
social sense-making (Luhmann, 1995, 2002). 
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particular distinctions over other possible distinctions.  The first of two data sources, 
the PhD- Design online forum constituted a publically constructed and distributed 
communication of understanding (Lee & Brosziewski, 2007, p. 260) of knowing in 
design.  
Selection of threads in the online forum looked for a relational duality between 
design knowing themes and variational way-of-knowing distinctions of these knowing 
themes. This relational duality could, as I argued in Chapter Five, only be discerned 
as a second-order recapitulation of first-order ways of knowing, as embodied by 
these ways of knowing. Way-of-knowing distinctions were communicatively 
constituted by understanding (though not necessarily acceptance) between forum 
contributors, and there was a recursive progression from one distinctive way of 
knowing in respect of a knowing theme to the next. 
Online Forum contributors reproduced ways of knowing within knowing structures. 
These online forum contributors are structurally coupled to ways of knowing they 
distinguish in respect of knowing themes, from a second-order perspective. This 
means that their own personal ways of knowing coincide with ways-of-knowing within 
knowing themes. This is also evidenced by online forum contributors’ commitment to 
making way of knowing distinctions, and their asymmetrical relation of these ways of 
knowing to knowing themes.  
Figure 8.5 overleaf shows how the abductive analysis moved through the online form 
data. The extension of abductive theory to compatible realist historical theory (Little, 
2000) allowed the inference of the knowing structures Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent from knowing themes. These knowing structures 
could be seen to structure asymmetrical relations between knowing structures and 
ways-of-knowing, so operate as relational mechanisms.  
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Figure 8.5 Abductive analysis of online forum data using extended abductive 
theory 
 
ONLINE FORUM DATA 
 
 
ABDUCTIVE  
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Knowing themes are comprised of forum 
threads in which participant posts indicate 
themes through variational distinctions of these 
themes.  
 
 
 
Observation is cognitive indication by 
selected variational distinction (Luhmann, 
2002). (Chapter Four). 
 
Indication by distinction is a relational 
mechanism, in CR terms. (Chapters Four 
and Five). 
 
 
Online forum participants are second-order 
observers who are structurally coupled to 
design knowing themes and embodied design 
knowers. 
 
 
Second-order observers are structurally 
coupled to systems of knowing and 
communication and to the embodied first-
order observers of these systems. 
(Luhmann, 2000, 2002). 
 
Second-order observers observe the 
ontological duality between empirical 
events and abstract systems. (Chapter 
5). 
 
 
Knowing themes show commonalities of design inquiry, design representation and design 
intent. 
 
 
Temporal references are evident in data. 
 
EXTENSION OF ABDUCTIVE THEORY 
 
Realist historical ‘kinds’ are macro 
enduring structures with deep 
explanatory properties. Historical types 
are subsumed by historical kinds (Little, 
2000). (Chapter 6). 
 
 
 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent are macro historical kinds of 
knowing and communication that subsume micro design types or ways-of- knowing. 
 
 
Micro ways of knowing asymmetrically indicate 
or relate to Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent knowing 
structures.  
 
Relational mechanisms bring macro 
abstract structures into relation with 
micro concrete events and experiences  
(Bhaskar, 2008).(Chapter 6). 
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Taking forward the inference of historically structured relational mechanisms, the 
second of the two data sources, the design teacher group discussions showed the 
reproduction of historically recursive design ways-of-knowing. Data evidence drew 
upon the second-order observations of discussion participants, and their structural 
coupling to design studio pedagogical ways of knowing. A second-order observation 
presupposes a first-order observer - there must be a first-order observer for a way-
of-knowing to be described. Therefore the group discussion participants either 
showed reflective second-order self observation of their own design studio teaching, 
or showed second-order structural coupling to the design studio teachers embodied 
in their second-order observations. 
In Figure 8.6 overleaf the abductive analysis moves through group discussion data, 
again extending abductive theory to compatible historical theory. 
. 
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Figure 8.6 Continuation of abductive analysis in group discussion data using 
extended abductive theory.  
 
Figure 8.7 overleaf shows the final abductive inference across online forum and 
group discussion data. 
.
 
GROUP DISCUSSION DATA 
 
 
ABDUCTIVE 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
Group discussion participants are second-order 
observers who are structurally coupled to 
embodied first-order pedagogical way of 
knowing distinctions in the design studio. 
 
 
Second-order-observers are structurally 
coupled to systems of knowing and 
communication and embodied first-order 
observers of these systems (Luhmann, 
2000, 2002). 
 
 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design intent knowing and communication 
system structures are indicated by pedagogical 
way of knowing distinctions. 
 
Knowing and communication structures are 
relational mechanisms. 
 
 
Knowing and communication system 
structures are indicated by selected 
distinctions (Luhmann, 2000, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
Group discussion participants are design teachers who are structurally coupled to Design 
Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent pedagogical ways-of -knowing in the 
design studio. 
 
  
Pedagogical way of knowing distinctions are 
historically located. 
 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent are historically recursive 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing. They function as 
relational mechanisms in the design studio. 
 
 
EXTENSION OF ABDUCTIVE THEORY 
Historical developments in design 
knowing (for instance, Brown, Collins and 
Duguid, 1989; Thomas and Southwell, 
2003; Romans, 2005; Hardman, 2009 
cited in Chapter Seven) show historical 
recursivity of micro pedagogical ways of 
knowing. 
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Figure 8.7 The final abductive inference across data sources. 
The PhD-Design Forum archives make for a kind of audit trail of the Forum threads 
chosen as data, but only if my reader applies the analytical relation between 
indication (of thread knowing themes) by way-of-knowing distinction. 
 Member checking of my analysis of group discussions did not seem advisable. 
Morse (2002) et al. point out that participant members are not in the researcher’s 
shoes and may make interpretations (particularly of their own contributions) that fall 
outside of the research focus. 
8.3 The Generalizability of Abductive Inferences  
Behind the scenes of this research so far, I have rejected many of my own 
understandings along the way, and have similarly rejected various theoretical 
approaches after immersing myself in them, at length. This was necessary because I 
could not achieve generalizable inferences using these approaches. I construe 
generalizable inference in the following way:  
The inference that inflation leads to a hike in the price of bread is generalizable but 
fallible. It may not always (or in every case) be inflation that causes the price of 
bread to rise. 
 Sayer (1992, p. 71) makes an acute observation on the generalizability issue:  
It is the structure of the world, rather than our theories about it, that make 
practices possible or impossible... [There is a] difference between theories 
we know to be convenient fictions (i.e. know to be wrong in certain 
respects but nevertheless serviceable for some purposes) and theories 
 
ABDUCTIVE INFERENCE FROM ONLINE FORUM AND GROUP DISCUSSION DATA 
 
 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent are historically recursive 
pedagogical ways of knowing that operate as relational mechanisms of visual 
design meaning emergence in the design studio. 
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which for the time being have not been bettered (i.e. whose limitations 
have not yet been discovered). 
In sum, it is possible to make claims about the generalizability of research inferences 
as long as the applicable but provisional nature of such inferences is carefully 
spelled out. Following Sayer, (1992) I offer the generalizability of my abductive 
inferences in terms of the following particulars:  
The abductive inferences from data differentiate between Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent pedagogical ways-of-knowing. In the first instance 
it would be most surprising if these ways-of-knowing did not arise in data over both 
research settings (the Online Forum, and the Group Discussions). This is because 
inquiry, representation and intent are very concrete aspects of design pedagogy that 
have been observed in the studies of design pedagogy I have reported in Chapter 
Two. For one example, Oak (2000) refers to the expectation that students will gather 
information as the design inquiry process required for designing. Then Teymur 
(2008) refers to the design representational understanding of architecture as an 
historical discourse. In another instance, Fleming (1998, p. 41) refers to the romantic 
notion of individualistic creative design intent. There are many more examples in 
design pedagogical research studies. That these ways-of-knowing arose in the 
literature is to be expected. However, that inquiry, representation and intent should 
operate as relational mechanisms in design pedagogy, and how this should happen, 
is an entirely different proposition. 
When implicit distinctions indicate knowing structures, the mechanism involved is 
one where an understanding may be achieved that can transcend language and 
cultural barriers. The understanding, as I have explained in Chapter Four, comes 
from the simultaneous application of a distinction to an indication or utterance. To 
illustrate this generalizability issue, in a verbal exchange, the utterance might be the 
word ‘rendezvous’. A distinction selected from other possible distinctions needs to 
indicate this word, such that understanding ensues. Such a distinction is not 
necessarily constituted in language or in culture, but is variably constituted as 
information distinctions – information about an arrangement to meet, information 
about a specified time and place for meeting, or information about an assignation. If 
communication turn-taking can accommodate these alternative ways of expressing 
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the term ‘rendezvous’, communication can continue. So it is the informational 
distinction and not the language or cultural distinction that matters most to shared 
understanding. Cultural and language differences bring the need to alter the course 
of a communicative interchange, and require that different knowing and 
communication structures or systems must be considered. It is then not the case that 
meanings are ordered by language and culture. Rather, it is the experience of 
communicative distinctions that needs to be translated into language or cultural 
terms. Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent pedagogical ways-
of-knowing may then accommodate the pedagogical expectation of cognitive 
experience.  
In a different way, the inference of relational mechanisms has a generalizability 
advantage over more determinate understandings. Historically formed 
communication systems of design knowing like Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent are irreducible ‘kinds’ of design knowing that have, 
as Little (2000) has put this, great explanatory depth. Explanatory depth is afforded 
by the organisation of disparate yet related distinctions. While these distinctions may 
differ, they all indicate and relate respectively to a particular knowing and 
communication structure or system. This allows for the explanation of different 
pedagogical way-of-knowing mechanisms, which may still, though, be closely 
specified. In this way Bygstad and Munkvold’s (2011, p 13) balance between “too 
generic and too contingent mechanisms” is struck.  
It is too in a macro structural sense that the inference of historical structures or 
systems of communication and knowing applies across design pedagogical contexts, 
as Layder (1990, p 32) describes 
Although any social structure depends upon the existence of situated 
activity in a generic sense (that is, without some human agents 
reproducing its features there would be no structure) they do not depend 
on this or that specific episode of situated activity 
The relational mechanisms of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design 
intent are generic and situated, in Layder’s terms. Both macro and micro explanatory 
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power is afforded, where there is parsimony on the macro level of knowing structures 
and flexibility on the micro level of way of knowing.  
The research inferences tendered here do not exhaust the possibilities of design 
pedagogical ways-of-knowing in the design studio. This research explanation may 
nonetheless still be considered practically adequate, as Sayer (1992, p. 70) 
describes: 
The reason that the convention [1] that we cannot walk on water is 
preferred to the convention [2] that we can, is because the expectations 
arising from 1, but not 2, are realised. They are realised because of the 
nature of the material interventions (trying to walk on water) and of their 
material contexts. In other words, although the nature of the objects and 
processes (including human behaviour) does not uniquely determine the 
content of human knowledge, it does determine their cognitive and 
practical possibilities for us. It is not thanks to our knowledge that walking 
on water doesn’t work, but rather the nature of water makes 1 more 
practically adequate than 2. The fact that 1 is nevertheless still, in 
principle, fallible, needn’t alter our preference for it over 2. 
217 
 
Chapter Nine 
 The Research Explanation 
Research into design pedagogy is crucial but only if such research can speak back 
to teaching and learning practice. As Drew (2007, p. 1) has said, “All too often, staff 
who are actively engaged in research perceive that there is only an indirect 
relationship between what they do as researchers and how it may impact on the 
design of their courses.” Therefore, in this final chapter I tender my research 
explanation, and then show how it might be implemented in the design studio. 
In the foregoing data examination of my abductive conjecture, I have shown three 
ways-of-knowing that operate as relational mechanisms in design pedagogy: Design 
Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent. These relational mechanisms 
constitute different pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent are communicative 
knowing structures or systems that are historically formed. Particular historical 
distinctions within them may be reproduced by design teachers in any one design 
studio event. The reason why a design teacher may implicitly reproduce a particular 
historical distinction (and not another) is because that design teacher is ‘structurally 
coupled’ by his or her own store of communicable knowledge to a communicative 
knowing structure or system. The coupling of a teacher’s knowing to a 
communication system of knowing orientates the teacher’s expectations, as I have 
described in Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2. These are teacher expectations of how 
students might know the visual meaning of their designed objects. As I have said in 
Chapters One, Two and Three, I define pedagogical ways-of- knowing as the ways 
in which teachers expect students to know.  
These ways-of-knowing, which I argue function as relational mechanisms in the 
critical realist sense, are asymmetrical. It is the simultaneous yet asymmetrical 
distinction of a way of knowing from a range of meaning potential that crucially 
favours a meaning attribution. But that is not all; such a simultaneous decision can 
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per Luhmann (1995, 2000, 2002, 2006) only occur if there is a communicative 
linkage that allows such a cognition to take place. This linkage is one that has been 
forged in concrete communication events, and one that has over time become a 
structured system of knowing and communication. 
Such a linkage occurs implicitly in communication events. The implicit linkage is a 
distinction which indicates a macro, abstract structured system of knowing. Only the 
asymmetrical indication of a distinction makes it possible to indicate this thing and 
not another thing (Rasmussen, 2005, p. 8). The implicit use of this and not that 
distinction is selectable in any concrete design studio communicative exchange. As a 
result, certain design object meanings follow, that may or may not be shared. This 
means that communication does or does not proceed. 
The abductive inference from the three identified pedagogical way-of-knowing 
mechanisms (Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent) is that 
distinctions of at least one of these knowing systems will impact on any single design 
studio event.62 By an ‘event’ I mean an episode of communication about the meaning 
of a particular student’s design object. Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent are relational mechanisms that allow knowing about design meaning to 
be communicated, but not necessarily shared. Most importantly, in this study, design 
meaning is considered to emerge in the design studio only if it is shared between 
students and teachers. Pedagogical ways-of-knowing are then relational 
mechanisms that enable and constrain the emergence of shared meaning. 
The relational mechanism of indication by distinction is one where something 
happens as an event of cognition, and something is done, which is indication of the 
meaning of a student’s design by means of a distinction. From a CR point of view, 
the event of an act of cognition is the relation of an empirical act to an abstract 
structure, as an event. Such a relation is effectual, and so, real. In Luhmann’s 
vocabulary the German term ‘vollzug’, means ‘effectual’ but with a nuance of effect 
                                            
62 It must be noted that I do not argue that these are the only relational mechanisms at play in the 
emergence of events and experiences in the design studio, as I explained in Chapter Three, Section 
3.3. 
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as event (Clam, 2000). Interestingly, Eberhard (2004, p. 64) refers to Gadamer’s 
term ‘vollzug’ as meaning: 
“what takes place in”, also translated from Gadamer as “act”, 
“occurrence”, “process”, “to bring about” and “to be practised”...[t]he 
meanings of “event” and “performance” are equally present … this one 
word means happening and doing at once. 
This conjoined understanding of event and effect is the sense in which pedagogical 
ways-of-knowing act as relational mechanisms that occur in the ‘doing’ of design 
studio communication. Something happens, and something is done in 
communication between teachers and students about the students’ design objects. 
From the teachers’ side of things, implicity employing particular distinctions of visual 
meaning makes two things simultaneously happen: A backward connection to 
previous distinctions happens, and at the same time a forward projection happens of 
distinctions that hypothetical future consumers of design might understand. What is 
done, and what happens are fully the sense in which Bhaskar (2008) describes 
events as ‘actual’; events occur whether they are witnessed or not, and real 
structures condition the way in which events occur. This is the CR sense of relational 
or generative mechanism. The relational mechanisms of design pedagogical 
knowing involve the making of implicit cognitive distinctions that draw on Design 
Inquiry, Design Representation and Design intent structures of communication and 
knowing. 
 It is difference or distinction as a mechanism of process, of an impelling relation 
between one point and another or one event and another that is profoundly important 
here. Most simply put, distinction or difference allows a communication event to 
proceed further. This is because the very nature of a distinction is that it can only 
lead to more distinctions or reproduce ready-made distinctions. A distinction can only 
stand in relation to other distinctions, and communicative utterances can only be 
understood in relation to distinctions that leave aside other distinctions (Gren & 
Zierhofer, 2002). The whole question of a meaning relation then requires that 
whatever is to be related must first be separated (Rasmussen, 2005). Otherwise, 
there is sameness and oneness, and no relation is possible. The Luhmannian 
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understanding of indication by distinction is one of cognitive and communicative 
relational mechanism par excellence. 
As an overall thesis, Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent are 
relational mechanisms of knowing that make past distinctions present and future 
distinctions possible in design studio pedagogy. 
9.1 The Research Explanation in Design Studio Communication 
In a design pedagogical event, teachers attribute meaning to students’ designed 
objects. This rather than that student’s visual design object meaning is favoured by 
design teachers, as the literature in Chapter Two shows. I have argued through my 
analysis that this may be explained by the relational mechanism activation of Design 
Inquiry, Design Representation or Design Intent as pedagogical ways-of-knowing. 
Three scenarios of the ways in which these pedagogical knowing mechanisms of 
knowing may occur are sketched out as follows: 
In the first scenario: the teacher looks at the student’s designed object. The object is 
an ‘utterance’ in Luhmann’s (1995) terms; it is a signal that communication of 
meaning is intended. As I described an ‘utterance’ in Chapter Four, it is merely a 
communicative gesture like ‘welcoming’ or ‘appealing’ or ‘inquiring’, although words 
are spoken. The student’s designed object constitutes such an utterance, as a visual 
form of communication. 
The teacher may see the students’ object as indicating Design Inquiry as a way-of-
knowing. This particular visual meaning derives for the teacher from a distinctive 
form of inquiry; that of finding references. So the implicit way-of-knowing distinction 
of Design Inquiry that the teacher calls upon is ‘by reference’ for instance, to Zulu 
culture, as in the case of earlier diagrams (in Chapter Four) showing the Zulu Mama 
chair. In Figure 9.1 I depict referential knowing as a form of design inquiry among 
other forms of design inquiry. Design Inquiry ways-of-knowing involve a cognitive act 
in which the design object meaning can be known to the design teacher by means of 
a form of inquiry, rather than as a representation, or to express a design intention. 
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Figure 9.1 Design meaning as indication of Design Inquiry by the inquiry 
distinction of ‘finding a reference’. 
In a second scenario, the same process occurs where the designed object is viewed 
by the teacher as an utterance which signals a way-of-knowing. However, this 
teacher may see the student’s object as indicating Design Representation as a way-
of-knowing. The student’s designed object is for the teacher a distinctive form of 
representation, one of representation as discursive. Representational ways-of-
knowing involve a cognitive act in which the design object meaning can be known to 
the design teacher as a discursive form of representation, rather than by means of a 
form of inquiry, or to express a design intention. This is illustrated in Figure 9.2. 
overleaf.  
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Figure 9.2 Design meaning as indication of Design Representation by the 
representation distinction of ‘discursive knowing’.  
 
In a third scenario, the teacher again views the student’s designed object as an 
utterance which signals a way-of-knowing, but this time the teacher may see the 
student’s object as indicating Design Intent to express social meaning. So the implicit 
way-of-knowing distinction of Design Intent the teacher uses is that of social 
knowing, as shown in Figure 9.3 overleaf. Design intent ways-of-knowing involve a 
cognitive act in which the design object meaning can be known to the design teacher 
as an indication of Design Intent, rather than by means of a form of inquiry, or as a 
representation. 
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Figure 9.3 Design meaning as indication of Design Intent by the intentional 
distinction of ‘social knowing’.  
I have inferred that in each of these three instances of Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent, the teacher makes an instantaneous distinction 
that indicates a structured attribution of meaning to the student’s designed object. 
This attribution simultaneously incorporates what the designed object does not 
mean, or what is not selected as a meaning distinction. Only in this way can a 
distinction indicate a specific design meaning in relation to Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation or Design Intent. This is the relational mechanism of indication by 
selective distinction.  
These pedagogical ways-of-knowing have some significance for the schism between 
apprentice-style studio pedagogy and the ideal of participation in a design studio 
‘community of practice’ (Lave & Wenger, 1991) ideal. The comparative virtues of 
these surviving but different forms of design pedagogy were discussed in Chapter 
Two. However, if teachers could use Design Inquiry, Design Representation and 
Design Intent ways-of-knowing to explain their own thinking about design meaning, 
student dependence on teacher judgement may be reduced. Similarly, if the 
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relational mechanisms of Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent 
can be used on a community of practice ( Lave & Wenger, 1991) basis, this style of 
studio pedagogy may become less reliant upon teacher repertoires of content 
knowledge.  
Teacher reflection on the construction of design briefs and the scaffolding role that 
design briefs may provide in terms of ways-of-knowing may be a significant 
consideration. The open-endedness of design briefs that I have referred to in 
Chapter Two might be somewhat ameliorated by referring to Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent options.  This is an aspect of communication 
between teachers and students in which the expectation of ways-of-knowing can be 
become clearer.  
9.2 Formative and Summative Assessment Implications 
As I found in my Master’s research into design assessment (Kethro, 2007), there is a 
gap between teachers’ design knowing repertoires, and their hopes for student 
learning. This translates into a dichotomy between teacher feedback and student 
learning autonomy.  
This gap might possibly be narrowed by using Design Inquiry, Design 
Representation and Design Intent way-of-knowing distinctions as assessment 
constructs (Hopkins & Antes, 1985)63 that are used in learning contracts between 
teachers and students. Learning contracts usually negotiate between students and 
teachers what learning objectives and values are at stake, the manner in which they 
are to be accomplished, when this should happen and on what basis assessment 
should proceed (Knowles, 1986). For this reason, learning contracts are especially 
valuable for assessment and feedback on the complex performance that designing 
an object usually entails for a design student. I offer that Design Inquiry, Design 
                                            
63
 I note here that according to Hopkins and Ante (1985) an assessment contruct expresses that 
which cannot be observed or measured, so must be abstracted. For instance, one cannot measure a 
room, unless one applies abstract constructs such as length, breadth and height. The constructs 
length, breadth and height cannot, however be verified unless they are placed within a context that 
supplies terms of verification, for example ‘a room’. 
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Representation, and Design Intent way-of-knowing distinctions may afford useful 
constructs for the negotiation of student design learning contracts. 
I envisage learning contracts in design as follows: In the formative stages of design 
studio learning students may make revisable self-evaluations of the cognitive and 
communicative significance of their designed object, using their own selection of 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation and Design Intent way-of-knowing 
distinctions.  
Inevitably, learning contracts are disposed toward assessment. Messick’s analysis of 
construct validity is a helpful guide to how such formative self- or teacher 
assessments might refer to ways-of-knowing as constructs. Messick shows under-
representation of a construct as one assessment issue (Messick, 1989, p. 7). In 
communication about a contractual assessment of visual design meaning this could 
mean a lack of explanation of Design Inquiry, Design Representation or Design 
Intent distinctions of visual design meaning. Messick also mentions variance from 
construct relevance. In this case, there may be shifting choices of distinctions within 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation or Design Intent. There might too be 
superfluous way-of-knowing constructs (Messick, 1989, p. 7). Finally, Messick’s view 
is that related indicators of a construct (in this case, where the construct is either a 
Design Inquiry, a Design Representation or a Design Intent way-of-knowing) should 
serve to exclude construct variations or distinctions outside of a selected knowing 
and communication structure.  
Using these distinctions in formative feedback on learning contract goals may 
support autonomous student learning, provided that way-of-knowing constructs are 
not deterministically applied, and are rather used to foster a closer focus on a 
rationale for visual design meaning. Where learning contracts are negotiated, such a 
ration is communicated. Outside of a learning contract, however, implicit distinctions 
may not come to light.  
In summative modes of evaluation, way-of-knowing distinctions as constructs may 
be more useful simply for discriminating between what is fore-grounded and what is 
back-grounded in communication about visual design meaning.  
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9.3 The Research Explanation and Design Pedagogy 
It is clear that there are many design studio teachers who foster their students’ 
personal growth and promote their students’ ability to draw on independent 
experience in designing. Teachers want to understand in the student perspective, 
and teachers notice shifts in student meaning making in the design studio, from 
formative to summative stages of assessment. These teacher attitudes have been 
reported in Chapter Two, and are made most clear in Marton and Booth’s (1997, 
p.179) inspiring understanding:  
[Pedagogy depends on] meetings of awarenesses, which we see as 
achieved through the experiences that teachers and learners undertake 
jointly. Teachers mould experiences for their students with the aim of 
bringing about learning, and the essential feature is that the teacher takes 
the part of the learner. The teacher focuses on the learner’s experience of 
the object of learning. Here we have (what we call) ‘thought contact’, 
(with) the teacher moulding an object of study (for the students). 
Concern about student learning is the motivation for this study. ‘Thought contact’ is a 
critical learning issue in design education, because the object of learning in design 
disciplines always concerns interpretation. Design is a dialogue between objects and 
people in which certain interpretive references will inescapably operate, and in which 
other interpretive references may be brought to bear. The idea of relational 
mechanisms that co-ordinate such visual interpretations has several more general 
implications for teachers who seek to support student learning: 
As an heuristic strategy for communicating with design students about their designed 
objects, the teacher may make propositions of design meaning that are couched in 
Design Inquiry, Design Representation or Design Intention terms. In response, the 
student may clarify their route to design meaning. 
Then, If students and teachers think about the backwards linkage of a selected 
distinction to pre-conceived distinctions, as Luhmann’s theory of communication 
suggests, the possibilities for learning integration (Biggs, 1996) may be enhanced. 
Teachers and students may also together project the forward recursion of the design 
object meaning distinctions ‘out there’ in the social world. Visual design meaning 
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may be considered to be a continuum of linked communicative distinctions, rather 
than the imposition of a static interpretation. The chain of meaning connection starts 
in the design studio when students are developing their designs, when as Gedenryd 
(1998) says, students are starting to situate their designs in the future. The question 
of distinctions of design meaning that are selected from other possibilities for further, 
future and recursive distinctions can be seen in the light of learning transformation 
(Mezirow, 1991, p. 12). In a sense this relates to Mezirow’s perspective 
transformation, where a prior interpretation is used to construe a new one (1991, p. 
2). This may bring a change in the awareness of design meaning distinctions, and 
even a change of focus (Yan, 1999) as a learning transformation. 
Beside these considerations, it seems possible that the pedagogical knowing 
structures of Design Inquiry Design Representation and Design Intent might be 
construed as design ways-of-knowing. Design ways of knowing were first theorised 
by Cross (1982). There may be room for extending Cross’s seminal work to the 
relationally structured design pedagogical ways-of-knowing explained in this 
research.  
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